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This PhD thesis examines the development of Japan’s security policy between 2004 and 
2018 using two cases relating to (1) the constitution and collective self-defence (CSD) 
and (2) Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). This research aims to identify under what 
conditions Japan accelerates/decelerates its balancing behaviour and attempts to test a 
theory of neoclassical realism (NCR). The discrepancy between theoretical predictions 
and Japan’s actual behaviour is largely attributable to the dynamics of unit-level 
variables that are not yet captured theoretically in the constantly changing strategic 
environment. These unit-level variables include leaders, the constitution, bureaucrats, 
the public and socio-economic groups. This research also aims to pit these variables 
against each other to identify the relative weight of each with regard to respective 
explanatory powers. The current literature on realism and constructivism often fails to 
examine the issues regarding ‘to what extent Japan will remilitarise’, ‘what has 
accelerated/decelerated this process’ and ‘the relationship between external and internal 
political influence’. The two cases presented in this thesis help highlight two 
policy-making processes: legal security capacity and military capability. The often 
unparalleled development of these two security policy areas enables us to examine 
Japan’s shift in grand strategic adjustment. This thesis concludes that although Japan 
has not behaved as realists predicted, since the 2000s its behaviour has increasingly 
shifted from a defensive realist grand strategy to an offensive realist one. Japan has not 
just ‘remilitarised’ in an incremental, linear manner; its ‘velocity’ of upward trend has 
fluctuated constantly depending on the unit-level variables within the framework of 
NCR. In the early 2000s, Japan adopted a defensive realist type of behaviour that 
focused primarily on enhancing its defence capabilities. Due to an aggravating strategic 
environment with ambitious leaders and domestic political stability since the 2010s, 
Japan has sought to project its larger influence through an attempted constitutional 
revision for full degree CSD and the potential possession of offensive capabilities in 
BMD. This thesis employs NCR and pre-defined intervening variables to examine under 
what conditions, why and when Japan shifts its grand strategy, and what factors trigger 
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1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Research Puzzle and the Purpose of the Thesis  
 
‘What drives Japan to behave as it did and does?’ is the question primarily rooted in this 
research. To the best of the author’s knowledge, few IR scholars and policy-makers 
predicted that post-WWII Japan would develop in a unique way focused on economic 
recovery and growth, with little attention to security. This led to the emergence of Japan 
as a ‘structural anomaly’ (Waltz, 1979). Furthermore, no one envisaged that in the 
post-Cold War era, it would take Japan 25 years to break the long-standing taboo of the 
right of collective self-defence (CSD). Many expected it to happen much sooner. In the 
2000s, many scholars thought Japan would revise its constitution due to a changing 
strategic environment reflecting the rise of China and the emergence of North Korea as 
a threat (Boyd & Samuels, 2005; Hughes, 2006; Itoh, 2001)—but it has yet to do so. 
Similarly, no one thought that the discussion of CSD would lead to a limited degree 
through reinterpreting the constitution, not the revision.  
 
Equally, it was hard to predict in the 2000s that the introduction of ballistic missile 
defence (BMD) would easily remove the constitutional constraints, such as the ban on 
the use of space for military purposes, the ban on the export of arms and CSD, given the 
decades-long attempts to remove them. This removal slowed considerably in the late 
2000s. However, since the 2010s, the Japanese government once again has accelerated 
its upgrade of security policy by considering the acquisition of aircraft carriers and 
counter-strike capability. 
 
Overall, Japan’s security policy seems to be on the incremental trajectory of 
‘re-militarisation’ (Bee Yun, 2016; Hughes, 2009; Takao, 2008). However, its ‘velocity’ 
of upward security policy development is hardly captured or accounted for. From a 
realist perspective, its temperamental and inconsistent speed of security policy 
development is a puzzle despite a constant aggravation of the strategic environment. 
The main question for this thesis is ‘what leads Japan to accelerate and decelerate its 
incremental security policy development?’. Theoretically, there is an intense argument 
between constructivism and realism. On the one hand, constructivists maintain that the 
so-called ‘anti-militarism’—be it institutionally embedded or socially accepted—plays a 
crucial role in suppressing Japan’s ‘urge’ to upgrade its security against emerging 
threats (Berger, 1996; Katzenstein, 1996; Oros, 2015). On the other hand, realists 
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contend that Japan has become more receptive to the strategic environment despite a 
significant hindrance in domestic factors (Auslin, 2017; Hughes, 2016; Kliman, 2006). 
Constructivism and realism share commonalities in that Japan developed its security 
policy concerning structural factors such as China and North Korea. Furthermore, its 
domestic factors have somewhat constrained the degree of the incremental shift. 
However, the velocity and fluctuating speed of development are hardly captured by the 
existing literature. This thesis thus examines under what conditions Japan has started 
and strengthens/neglects its balancing behaviour. It ultimately aims to extrapolate 
Japan’s trajectory and the contents of its ‘grand strategy’ framework.  
 
Many scholars attribute Japan’s unpredictable speed of policy development to domestic 
factors, including the prime minister (Envall, 2015; Hughes, 2015a; Shinoda, 2011), 
bureaucrats (Johnson, 1995; Stockwin, 2008), the public (Berger, 1996; Midford, 2006), 
the constitution and its interpretations (Easley, 2017; Katzenstein, 2008), and even the 
role of the elections (Catalinac, 2016). Numerous research puzzles arise in this debate. 
Is the prime minister so critical in shaping Japan’s security policy, particularly since 
Shinzo Abe came to power for the second time in 2012? How do bureaucrats who were 
once considered to control all the policy-making dimensions play a role in security 
policy now? Has Japan merely been a follower of American strategic behaviours? How 
has the strategic environment, with threats such as North Korea and China, influenced 
Japan? To what extent do the pacifist constitution and its interpretation, particularly 
Article 9, come into play now as a guardian to prevent Japan from being ‘normal’? Does 
the socially accepted norm of anti-militarism amongst the public have a specific role in 
formulating security policy? The issues surrounding Japanese security policy are well 
summarised by Envall (2003, p. 8): it is ‘whether these obstacles [domestic factors] are 
greater than Japan’s foreign policy potential [in response to the security environment]’. 
On this matter, the thesis embarks on a rather ambitious task: it attempts to examine 
how the relative weight of such domestic factors can be compared as an explanatory 
variable without ignoring external factors. In doing so, the thesis attempts to pit these 
factors against each other in a consistent NCR theoretical framework  
 
As a backdrop, scholars increasingly appreciate the value of empirically specific 
concepts, such as historical contingency and long-accumulated social norms, as well as 
ideational aspects regarding Japan’s security policy (Pekkanen, Ravenhill & Foot, 2014). 
This inevitably imposes a dilemma between theoretical parsimony and context-rich 
explanatory power on researchers, resulting in scholars’ inclination towards eclectic 
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theorisation (Katzenstein & Sil, 2008). However, this thesis is not necessarily in line 
with the trend as an analytical framework and attempts to provide a theoretical account 
for Japan’s security policy development while striking a balance between parsimony 
and explanatory power. Confirming a theory’s logical consistency and 
accuracy—particularly a newly developed theory—by testing the case of Japan as 
‘structural anomaly’ not only adds cumulative knowledge but also makes sense of 
deviation. 
 
As a conclusion, the thesis finds that amongst the many factors, influencing Japan’s 
security policy, leaders matter the most besides the impact of the structure. This is in 
comparison to the influence of the constitution, the public and socio-economic groups. 
Leaders are often accountable in terms of both acceleration and deceleration of Japan’s 
balancing behaviour. In the end, Japan’s grand strategy has begun shifting from the one 
inspired by defensive realism to the one similar to an offensive realist state.  
 
1.2 Theoretical Framework and Methodology  
 
This thesis employs NCR as a main theoretical framework to define the above domestic 
factors into three categories: leaders’ image, domestic institutions and state-society 
relations. It aims to examine the relationship between the structure as an independent 
variable and foreign policy outcome as a dependent variable through the effective 
utilisation of the three as intervening variables. To put it simply, NCR dictates that the 
structure delineates strategic options that a state should take and the selection amongst 
them depends on the interaction of intervening variables. As a theory testing, process 
tracing is applied as a methodology to examine whether ‘causal mechanisms’ in a theory 
function in the actual world. In the case of NCR, the causal mechanism(s) of the 
intervening variables is a transmission belt between the structure (independent variable) 
and a state’s behaviour (dependent variable) (Checkel, 2008; Derek, 2017; Mahoney, 
2015). As indicated above, there are empirically important factors in domestic politics 
in Japan that shape its behaviour. The examination of the causal mechanisms helps us to 
determine whether they play as much of a role as is argued and clarify the academic 
debate surrounding Japan. 
 
Leaders refer to two categories of actors in Japan’s security policy: elected leaders (i.e. 
politicians) and other leaders who are not elected through the elections (i.e. bureaucrats). 
Elected leaders are often put into a place where they have to strike a balance between 
4 
 
the strategic needs of security policy and ‘political legitimacy’ for maintaining or 
consolidating their current political position (leaders’ dilemma). Despite being less 
influential, non-elected leaders constantly strive to realise their strategic visions. 
Leaders’ image thus implies two things: the leaders’ dilemma of elected leaders and the 
strategic visions pursued by non-elected leaders. The domestic institutions take two 
forms: regulations and laws to determine ‘who the leaders are to shape security policies’ 
and the institutionalised form of anti-militarism (i.e. the constitution and its 
interpretations binding Japan’s security policy). The last variable is state-society 
relations, which refers to the coherence between the government and societal (the 
public) and economic groups with influence over policy-making.  
 
For the sake of clarity, there is a quasi-hierarchy amongst the intervening variables. 
Leaders’ image functions to challenge against the domestic institutions. Domestic 
institutions are a rather static barrier for the realisation of leaders’ image, wherein 
state-society relations are hypothesised to lean towards either of them as part of leaders’ 
necessary resources or the lack thereof (Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016). The 
relationship of the variables simulates the debate between constructivism and realism in 
a realist paradigm: static nature (a barrier to prevent leaders from acting to respond to 
the structure) versus leaders (who are the main receptor of the signal from the structure 
and respond accordingly).  
  
This research intends to employ process tracing as a methodology. This is used for 
tracing ‘causal mechanisms’ through an in-depth empirical examination of how 
intervening variables come into play (Gerring, 2007). It aims to identify the ‘causal 
mechanism’ that has yet to be confirmed to link causes and outcomes by examining the 
above intervening variables.  
 
1.3 Japan in Broader International Relations Debates and the Contributions of the 
Thesis  
 
A brief discussion examining Japan as a case in the broader context of international 
relations (IR) debate merits mention. First, as reiterated above, Japan is a valuable 
empirical case as a major power globally with its economy (third largest) and security 
spending (eighth highest) (SIPRI, 2018). As with conventional theories such as realism 
and liberalism, which aim to explain broad patterns of state behaviour, accounting for 
Japan’s theoretically temperamental behaviour does enrich our understanding of the 
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country as an empirical study of how a major power behaves. Second, the time 
period—between 2004 and 2018—during which Japan is observed in this thesis adds 
contributions because China overtook Japan in 2011 militarily and economically. This 
suggests a change in the regional balance, which is often the cause of 
confrontation/conflict. How a state reacts to a rising power—especially its neighbour— 
and the degree of the rise on the path for a ‘superpower’ is itself a valuable empirical 
case. Theoretically accounting for a state’s behaviour will contribute to realist research 
paradigms.  
 
Second, Japan can be an important empirical case in many IR-related concepts. First, 
Japan can add to our knowledge of defensive realism concepts, meaning the relationship 
between security policy, technological diffusion and geography (Snyder, 1996). Second, 
as well as China, Japan’s current proactive stance gives us clues to the conditions that 
cause a shift from status quo power or challenger. Third, because Japan is bound by its 
constitution on security policy, it can provide empirical evidence for the relationship 
between law/constitution and security policy. Fourth, as many IR scholars confirm the 
influence of domestic politics on security policy, which includes leaders, the public, 
bureaucrats, civilian control, techno-nationalism and domestic institutions. Japan is no 
exception, and these factors can be examined in the case of Japan. 
 
Third, the thesis aims to test NCR, which recently has been developed into a rigorous 
framework by several studies (Diesen, 2016; Juneau, 2015; Ripsman, Taliaferro & 
Lobell, 2016). As N. R. Smith (2018, p. 747) argues, ‘NCR has grown over the past 
decades, [and] the push to make NCR more than just a theoretically informed toolkit has 
similarly grown stronger . . . while their ambitious claims have yet to be empirically 
verified’. Thus, it is a meaningful endeavour to test NCR in the case of Japan to ‘verify’ 
its logical consistency and explanatory power. A sound application with satisfactory 
results not only serves as a simple theory testing but also partially contributes to the 
endeavours to strengthen such a theory. There is a growth of literature in the application 
of NCR in the field of contemporary Japanese security (Cha, 2000; Lai, 2014; Saltzman, 
2015; Sherrill & Hough, 2015; Yoo, 2012; Yuzawa, 2018; Zakowski, Bochorodycz & 
Socha, 2018). However, while some show promising results, the scope is often very 
particular, be it event, action or time, often due to the limited space in journal articles. 
The thesis thus intends to examine the longer and broader scope of Japan’s security 
policy development under the ‘grand strategy’ framework to contribute cumulative 
knowledge of NCR application literature in both Japan and Asia. 
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1.4 Two Case Studies: The Constitution and Ballistic Missile Defence 
 
The thesis primarily examines two cases: the constitutional revision/reinterpretation 
debate with a specific focus on the right of Article 9 and BMD. CSD had been long 
prohibited under the constitutional interpretation of Article 9 since its establishment in 
1951. The constitutional revision/reinterpretation debates proceeded around Article 9. It 
is arguably the most significant constraint on Japan’s security policy because it largely 
restricts Japan’s external balancing options, such as providence of security, with other 
countries, including the United States (US) (Samuels, 2006). BMD is perhaps the first 
military equipment primarily designed to address strategic weapons such as 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).  
 
These two case studies fit the purpose of the thesis. The first purpose of this thesis is to 
investigate under what conditions Japan accelerates/decelerates its balancing behaviour. 
Both cases are developed continuously during the period between 2004 and 2018. More 
importantly, these are the prime factors that allow us to examine the degree of balancing 
behaviour as the constitution and its change delineates what Japan can constitutionally 
do in terms of balancing, and the development of BMD indicates Japan’s actual ability 
to balance.  
 
On the one hand, CSD not only allows Japan to engage in external balancing but also 
potentially leads to the revision of the constitution. The revision could enable Japan to 
possess offensive capabilities to jump into an arms race as internal balancing (Samuels 
& Boyd, 2005). Either way, because these balancing behaviours have been restricted, a 
reinterpretation or revision would be a clear sign of how Japan would engage in the 
strategic environment and its threat.  
 
On the other hand, BMD is principally for internal balancing through strengthening 
defensive capabilities—often captured in the debate of the offence–defence balance 
(Jervis, 1976). The degree to which Japan develops its defence system indicates whether 
Japan theoretically shows a balancing behaviour vis-à-vis China and North Korea, both 
of which possess ICBM and medium-range ballistic missiles. Furthermore, examining 
BMD could enable us to examine whether Japan is engaged in counter-balancing 
through offensive capabilities; part of the BMD system potentially consists of 
‘pre-emptive strike’ and ‘counter-strike capability’, which requires offensive capabilities 
such as aircraft carriers and cruise missiles (Ota, 2009). Because Japan did not possess 
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these capabilities when it started deploying BMD, the investigation of BMD 
development regarding systems and military equipment helps us delineate its balancing 
behaviour. 
 
The second purpose of this thesis is to examine causal mechanisms between structure 
and policy outcome (BMD and the constitution) through the calculation of domestic 
politics (the intervening variables). The two cases are deeply connected with structure 
and domestic politics. For the first case, constitutional reinterpretation and revision must 
go through the ‘domestic policy-making’ process because the reinterpretation requires 
the enactment, which needs two-thirds of seats in the Lower House, while the revision 
requires a national referendum (Neary, 2002). More importantly, the ruling party has the 
authority to initiate the law-making process or the revision, which allows us to examine 
leaders’ image, including the prime minister. Furthermore, the constitution itself is a 
‘domestic institution’ that constrains Japan’s policy development and even overrides 
international law (i.e. United Nations [UN] Charter). It is, then, possible to examine the 
extent to which institutionalised forms of anti-militarism, such as the constitution, are 
relevant.  
 
Similarly, BMD widens our scope of domestic factors. Because it is the military side of 
security policy, the broad direction of the Cabinet is often executed by bureaucrats. This 
enables us to examine how they influence the acquisition of military equipment, which 
is indicative of Japan’s balancing strategy. The comparison of the two cases lets us 
further elaborate on the analysis of the influence of the public and how leaders act 
with(out) the need for public support. By tracing the two cases to determine the extent 
to which these variables mitigate the impact and signals given by the 
structure—specifically, ‘when’ and ‘how’—the thesis aims to account for the 
temperamental nature of Japan’s balancing behaviour.  
 
The two cases help to address the third purpose of this thesis: determining the relative 
weight of each intervening variable in explaining ‘when’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ each is 
present or absent in the two cases. The comparison of the two cases investigates the 
purported and prolonged influence of the domestically spread anti-militarism norm.  
 
The period between 2004 and 2018 is roughly divided into three stages: 2004–2009, 
2009–2012 and 2012–2018. The first stage concerns the ruling party of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) with four prime ministers and four Cabinet shuffles. This stage 
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serves as an excellent study of the influence of the various prime ministers while the 
details of the two intervening variables (domestic institutions and state-society 
relations) remain unchanged. The second stage, with three prime ministers and Cabinets 
under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), allows us to make a fair comparison as to 
the examination of leaders regardless of political parties with the same conditions with 
the two variables. The third stage is when the LDP rose back with Prime Minister Abe, 
which leads us to focus on the influence of a single leader.  
 
1.5 Summary and Contributions of the Thesis  
 
The thesis largely confirms the validity of NCR as an effective theoretical framework to 
analyse Japan because it provides a clear link between structure and policy outcome 
through the intervening variables. It observes the causal mechanisms of each 
intervening variable to mediate the impact of the structure. This does not mean the 
structure is largely diminished; the more aggravating the strategic environment, the 
greater its influence (Ripsman et al, 2016). In response, leaders prioritise strategic needs 
while they maintain a level of public support. The level of public opposition waned 
where domestic institutions’ hitherto role of constitutional guardian was downplayed by 
leaders. Ultimately, Japan, which only began the broad discussion of constitutional 
revision in 2004 and issued the Cabinet decision to deploy BMD, has seen substantial 
development in both cases. The balancing behaviour of Japan moved towards defensive 
realist strategy by 2009, and since 2012, it again shifted towards offensive realist 
strategy.  
 
On the one hand, CSD was allowed in 2015 when leaders were comparatively more 
passionate about their strategic visions. By 2017, initial agreement on the constitutional 
revision of Article 9 was reached within the ruling party. On the other hand, the degree 
of BMD capability was substantially upgraded qualitatively and quantitatively, and 
Japan has begun considering the acquisition of offensive capabilities such as aircraft 
carriers and ‘counter-strike capability’ (cruise missiles) (Mainichi Shimbun, 2018b). 
Thus, the thesis explains Japan’s responsiveness to the structure in a more nuanced way 
with the intervening variables. In other words, the acute strategic environment creates a 
favourable situation where leaders would find it easy to pursue their strategic visions. 
Nonetheless, there is also the stage (2009–2012) when leaders, in spite of their 
awareness of the strategic needs, could not materialise sufficient resources to realise 
their will. Accordingly, the influence of domestic institutions goes beyond leaders. In 
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this stage, domestic institutions, along with the distance between leaders and 
state-society relations, accounts for the deceleration of Japan’s balancing behaviour 
despite the more aggravating strategic environment.  
 
Amongst the intervening variables, leaders’ image is the most important variable in the 
NCR model in the case of Japan. Contrary to the suggestions in some constructivist 
literature such as Berger (1996), the so-called anti-militarism was not as substantial as 
claimed. While the state-society relation plays a crucial role, its influence declined as 
the strategic environment became aggravated. Thus, the thesis confirms the importance 
of leaders in Japan—particularly the degree of their enthusiasm to respond to the 
environment, even though it might put them in a position to lose public support.  
 
In summary, Japan started to shift its security policy in 2012 from an increase in 
defensive capabilities, which is more or less in line with Japan’s stance of exclusively 
defensive-oriented defence, to a nascent revisionist stance with the offensive 
capabilities to balance against it. Given the ongoing aggravation of the strategic 
environment, NCR predicts that Japan will increase its military budget to develop 
further its offensive capabilities, which ultimately destabilises the region to a substantial 
degree as offensive realism predicts. In this sense, NCR, rather than simply 
dichotomised between defensive realism and offensive realism, utilises the intervening 
variables to capture Japan’s security policy development, its shift to an offensive realist 
state, and how, why and when it occurred.  
  
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature review to examine the 
conditions or factors contributing to Japan’s development of its security policy. It 
highlights a contentious debate between realists and constructivists regarding the 
structure versus agency debate. The analysis argues that the application of NCR is a 
meaningful way to provide a more nuanced realist view of Japan with a level of 
incorporation of constructivism-inspired factors.  
 
Chapter 3 outlines the theory and methodology used in this thesis. It explains the 
strengths of NCR and process training in comparison with other theories and defines the 
very core of realism’s concepts, such as structure and structural modifiers, on which 
NCR is based. This explanation is followed by a discussion of how the methodology of 
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process tracing is applied. The chapter then moves onto the operationalisation of NCR 
in the case of Japan’s security policy, particularly with regard to the constitutional 
reinterpretation/revision with regard to CSD and the development of BMD.  
 
Chapter 4 outlines the foundational analysis of NCR, which is used in the following 
chapters to examine the case studies. This assessment of the strategic environment as an 
independent variable in NCR helps to delineate what kind of signals the structure has 
sent to Japan. In doing so, the chapter is based on the analytical framework of ‘threat 
perception’, meaning there are three conditions to proceed the analysis: (1) the intention 
to inflict harm, (2) the economic and military capability to do so and (3) the degree of 
imminence with specific focus on China and North Korea. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on case studies. Chapter 5 introduces the first case study—the 
constitutional reinterpretation/revision with emphasis on CSD—which constitutes the 
core debate of the revision with many implications for Japan’s security policy. It 
examines the period between 2004 and 2018. Chapter 6 introduces the second case 
study—the development of BMD—which primarily considers how the capability of 
BMD has developed by tracing both institutional and material changes between 2004 
and 2018. It shows how Japan’s engagement in balancing through BMD has changed.  
 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by considering the independent variable (structure), the 
dependent variable (outcomes of BMD and constitutional revision debate) and the 
intervening variables (leaders’ image, domestic institutions and state-society relations). 
It also considers the analysis in terms of limitations and further research areas and 





2 Literature Review: What Drives Japan, How It Behaves and Where 
It Is Headed  
 
As Hughes (2015b) pointed out, the number of studies and the degree of scholarly 
attention to Japan’s security policy have increased since the end of the Cold War. 
Japan’s security posture was once considered ‘low profile’ and rather static; it now has 
transformed into a more proactive one with further involvement in the international 
system. According to Hughes (2015b), the existing literature can be categorised into 
three inter-related but distinguished scopes of a research puzzle: (1) why Japan behaves 
as it does, (2) how it tries to achieve its security domestically, regionally and 
internationally, and (3) where and in which direction it will advance. This section first 
indicates the post-Cold War development of Japan’s security policy, then moves onto 
the three categories of the literature review and concludes with the identification of a 
research puzzle.  
 
2.1 Japan’s Re-emergence in the International System Post-Cold War 
 
In IR debate, Japan is often characterised as ‘abnormal’ because of its fluctuation in 
security policy and theoretically inconsistent behaviours post-WWII to the present 
(Soeya, Tadokoro & Welch, 2014). Immediately post-WWII, the Japanese constitution 
was re-established almost from scratch, replacing the one from the Meiji period. In 
particular, Article 9 is famously known as a ‘pacifist constitution’, a permanent 
renunciation of the right to wage war and possess ‘war potential’ (Dower, 1999). In 
return for allowing the US to locate its military bases in Japan and providing security, 
Japan devoted its resources to economic recovery and development (Buckley, 1992; 
Hamada, 2011; Hayashi, 1979; Moore, 1987).  
 
While Article 9 essentially precludes Japan’s right to possess even defence capabilities 
according to the initial interpretation of it in the immediate post-WWII era, Japan was 
under constant US pressure during the Cold War to upgrade its military capability, 
leading Japan to establish the Self-Defence Force (SDF) in the 1950s (Kusunoki, 2017; 
Sasaki & Nakanishi, 2017). Given the considerable opposition from the public, known 
as ‘anti-militarism’, policymakers in Japan set self-imposed constraints to accommodate 
US pressures and public opposition (Hook, 1996; Schoppa, 1993). This includes 
non-nuclear proliferation, a 1% ceiling on the defence budget, a ban on the export of 
arms and a ban of CSD (Berger, 1996; Oros, 2008; Soeya, Tadokoro & Welch, 2011).  
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Luttwak (2009, p. 70) defined grand strategy as ‘all that is military happens within the 
much broader context of domestic governance, international politics [and] economic 
activity’. Japan’s grand strategy was a low-security profile in the international system 
with a focus on economic development, which is famously known as the ‘Yoshida 
Doctrine’ (Kusunoki, 2009; A. Watanabe, 2009). The nature of such a stance lies in the 
interpretation of the constitution because the clause is short and ambiguous which 
requires interpretation to delineate the implications. For instance, what the phrase in the 
clause, ‘war potential’ constitutes and what does not was discussed extensively and 
in-depth in the National Diet in the 1950s (Dower, 1999). This discussion was settled by 
the agreement that military capabilities specifically designed for self-defence are not 
‘war potential’ although this phrase is still ambiguous. The definition of self-defence 
therefore is a much debated area that has evolved from the 1950s to the present. Until 
the 1990s, (individual) self-defence was strictly confined to the sovereign territory of 
Japan and hence it was impossible for Japan to participate in any conflict or 
peacekeeping operation (PKOs) outside Japan—which by necessity has meant CSD is 
impossible.  
 
Despite the rather long-lasting low-profile stance, the 1990s saw the nascent 
transformation of Japan’s security policy. The inability to dispatch the SDF to the Gulf 
War with massive financial contributions and subsequent international criticism for its 
lack of ‘boots on the ground’ attitudes are argued to have encouraged/forced Japan to 
take a more international and active role in the international system by reinterpreting the 
constitution and enacting the relevant laws (Courtney, 1992; Dhirathiti, 2007; Inoguchi, 
1991). Coinciding with the end of the Cold War, the 1990s were domestically chaotic 
for Japan. The economic bubble burst along with an ensuing sense of ending 37 years 
privileging LDP one-party dominance. While the security environment rapidly changed 
due to the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the rise of China and North Korea 
with developing nuclear weapons, Japan experienced a substantial domestic turmoil 
with the following considerable political reforms. With a waned alliance with the US 
due to the latter’s lack of strategic and geographical interests in the Asia-Pacific, 
Japanese policymakers were forced to reconsider their security policy. The chain of 
causes for the chaotic 1990s is defined as a ‘rude awakening’ (Funabashi, 1997; Gupta, 
2016; Hughes, 1999; Lennon, 2002). 
 
There has been a nascent transformation of Japan’s re-emergence through constitutional 
reinterpretation. Japan enacted an International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992 that 
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enables the dispatch of the SDF overseas on UN PKOs as long as the areas are 
non-combat zones. The guidelines for the US-Japan alliance were renewed for enhanced 
co-operation. Japan assumed a role in regional leadership through multilateralism 
(Hughes, 2015b). The renewal of the US-Japan alliance materialised in the wake of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks. Japan rapidly ratified the relevant temporary measures through its 
constitutional reinterpretation, which allowed the dispatch of the SDF overseas besides 
PKOs under the Junichiro Koizumi administration (Miyagi, 2009). His assertive stance 
is often viewed as one of the catalysts for enlarging Japan’s capability and role in the 
international system (Heazle, 2009; Kliman, 2006). This is exemplified by the Cabinet’s 
decision to develop BMD and its subsequent deployment in the face of North Korean 
missile threat. This is also the era when the notion that Japan has been on the path of 
‘re-militarisation’ or ‘normalisation’ resurfaced in light of its attempt to expand its role 
and strengthen its military capabilities (Hughes, 2004a; Oros, 2008; Pyle, 2007; 
Samuels, 2007).  
 
However, since 2004, the gradual, incremental development had seemed to halt because 
of domestic political chaos, which was thought to have settled due to Koizumi’s long 
term. Six prime ministers served in six years between 2006 and 2012, during which no 
conceivable development was seen. Subsequently, almost all significant political 
agendas, including security areas, were aborted (Mochizuki & Parkinson Porter, 2013).  
 
Then again, the sudden upsurge of security policy transformation restarted in 2012 in 
tandem with the re-elected Prime Minister Abe, whose revisionist and nationalist stance 
is often the target of media coverage (Nakanishi, 2015). He established the National 
Security Council (NSC), the role of which is equivalent to the US NSC. CSD was 
finally allowed through the reinterpretation of the constitution to stretch the definition 
of self-defence, despite tumultuous opposition from the public and other political parties 
(T. N. Watanabe, 2016). Japan seems more receptive to China and North Korea because 
they intensified their aggressive stance (Schulze, 2016).  
 
As one can see, while the incremental trend of Japan’s security development is observed, 
its velocity has never been stable. Many theoretical predictions are inconsistent and 
therefore constitute a central research puzzle in this thesis. The following section traces 
several key theoretical views on Japan’s behaviour based on three key questions: (1) 




2.2 Motivations for Japan to Behave as It Does 
 
It seems that researchers’ interests in investigating motivations for Japan to behave as it 
does have remained strongly. While almost all the literature no longer denies the 
upward trend of Japan’s active involvement in international security, motivations and 




The first school of IR theory that aims to capture the development of security policy in 
Japan is realism with its applied or developed approaches. Given that conventional 
structural realism sees Japan as a ‘structural anomaly’ with its discrepancy between 
economic and security might, realist scholars have tended to pursue explanatory power 
to account for its behaviour within the realist paradigm (Layne, 1993; Waltz, 1993). 
However, the post-Cold War era saw the development of Japan’s security policy with its 
active participation in international security along with developed military capabilities. 
This is often characterised as ‘re-militarisation’ (Hook, 1996; Hughes, 2009; Takao, 
2008). Such a discussion has occurred within the framework of ‘normalisation’ in that 
‘abnormal’ seems to evaporate gradually (Cooney, 2013; Oros, 2008; Soeya et al., 2011). 
Nonetheless, interpretations of such a trend have been substantially diverse amongst 
realist scholars.  
 
Offensive realism has asserted that the reason for the security–economy disparity stems 
from the continuously presented opportunity for Japan to ‘free-ride’ or ‘buck-pass’ 
through the US security alliance (Lind, 2004). On the other hand, defensive realists 
have posited that in the pursuit of ‘minimum necessary’ defensive capabilities, the 
development of Japan’s security policy focuses on augmenting defensive capabilities 
with the necessary degree of commitment to maintain the US alliance. In a similar vein, 
Midford (2002) and Kawasaki (2001) argued that ‘reassurance’ through buck-passing is 
the key to understanding Japan’s security policy, which is not uncommon in a state that 
has a strong alliance. Thus, the strategy of ‘reassurance’ is to minimise defence 
capabilities to mediate the security dilemma while maintaining the US alliance to secure 
the channel of buck-passing to balance against the rise of China.  
 
Concerning the concept of strategic culture that navigates state behaviour, Japan is 
characterised in many ways. Snyder (1977, p. 8) defined strategic culture as ‘the sum 
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total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that 
members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or 
imitation’. For those who analyse Japan through the lens of defensive realism, Japan is 
‘mercantile realism’ (Heginbotham & Samuels, 1998). To offensive realists, Japan is 
seen as ‘a circumscribed balancer’ (Lind, 2004). Michael J. Green (2001) characterised 
the change in security posture from mercantile realism to a more active role, along with 
the change in the strategic environment as ‘reluctant realism’. Similarly, Kliman (2006) 
has seen Japan as ‘transitional realism’. Having looked at more accelerated development 
in recent years, Auslin (2017) went as far as to say that Japan detached itself from the 
above realist characterisations and initiated a ‘new realism’ towards a more 
conventional classical realist type of behaviour. Other studies have combined the 
element of history and the growing nationalism and term Japan as ‘resentful realism’ 
(Hughes, 2012, 2015a, 2016). In sum, while realists have emphasised structural forces 
and systemic stimuli, increasingly more scholars have paid attention to domestic politics 
to seek a better explanation.  
 
 Constructivism  
 
Constructivism, as another mainstream approach in the field of Japan’s IR, has 
contributed to enhancing our understanding of Japan’s behaviour. Its emphasis on the 
role, norms and identity of foreign policy-making has succeeded in highlighting the 
‘static elements’ of Japan’s security policy. Japan is characterised by the static nature of 
‘anti-militarism’ and ‘pacifism’ rooted in WWII and historical memories against the use 
of force (Berger, 1996; Hagström, 2014; Katzenstein, 2008; Katzenstein & Okawara, 
1993; Oros, 2008). Katzenstein (1996) has examined this issue and highlighted how 
norms constitute collective identity, leading to a particular choice of security policy in 
Japan: antimilitarism. Rather than structural impacts, he has identified that ‘social and 
legal’ norms have a mutually constitutive impact on constructing collective identities to 
shape security policy in Japan. By social and legal norms, he has meant the constitution 
(Article 9) and its interpretation of legal norms and anti-militarism for social norms. As 
Katzenstein (1996, p. 25) has argued, ‘the 1990s witnessed a strong turn toward 
sociological styles of analysis that highlights the importance of norms and identity’.  
 
While his thesis is largely in line with Katzenstein’s, Berger (1996) focused on 
‘politico-military’ relations and cultural norms in comparison with Germany. He traced 
how the public perception of the military (establishment) in both countries changed in 
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the pre- and post-Cold War period and argued there was a dramatic shift from praising 
the military to blaming it for all the ‘wrong-doing’ during the war. This negative 
perception has been firmly institutionalised through demilitarisation and entrenched in 
political elites. Therefore, Japan chose to separate the ‘military establishment’ from the 
public, leading to the tight bureaucratic and civilian control over it. Although he 
admitted the structural impact on the development of Japan’s security policy during the 
Cold War period, the outcome of the policy is widely constrained by anti-militaristic 
sentiment. Consequently, the defence strategy and security policy of Japan were far 
from what they were supposed to be according to liberalism and realism.  
 
Given the post-Cold War transformation of Japan’s security policy, posing a challenge 
against such a norm-based interpretation, increasing attention has been paid to ‘emotion’ 
to IR—and Japan is no exception. Hagström and Gustafsson (2015) introduced the 
concept of ‘relational identity’ with which Japan’s IR has been shaped by the particular 
influence of its neighbours. Moreover, the current strategic environment with the rise of 
China put Japan in an ‘identity crisis’, whereby its identity is challenged, negotiated and 
evolved through the supplement of ‘norm entrepreneurs’. Hagström (2015) argued that 
issues concerning the relative position among Japan, China and South/North Korea in 
the 2000s provided a window of opportunity for norm entrepreneurs to discredit the 
‘peace-loving nation’ or ‘pacifist’. Hagström and Gustafsson (2015) advocated the 
rationale that these identities are the prime cause of bullying by neighbouring countries. 
Relational identity provides a scope for investigation with constructivists to adapt to the 
changing environment and how it plays a role in reshaping Japan’s identity and hence 
security policy.  
  
 Liberalism  
 
In comparison, liberalism within IR theory has not been widely applied to Japan, which 
nevertheless has a similar approach of constructivism through a domestic-oriented 
examination. From the perspective of liberalism, Japan’s security development since the 
end of the Cold War, such as the dispatch of the SDF to UN PKOs, is not a sign of 
remilitarisation but a renewed stance of promoting democratic values and enhancing 
international security. In this view, Japan has shifted from a ‘domestically’ peace-loving 
nation with a low international profile to a global nation. Berger, Mochizuki and 
Tsuchiyama (2007) have claimed Japan is an ‘adaptive state’, and within liberal 
philosophy, Japan has adapted to the change in the international system in such a 
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marked way. Japan compromised the trade friction with the US in the 1980s, and in the 
1990s, Japan stepped out to be a more active player in the international security. Berger 
(2007) therefore has argued that the rationale of Japan’s development of security policy 
is not a way of maximising its national power in a realist sense but of bolstering 
international security. This is pretty much why Japan has seriously embarked on ‘human 
security’ together with official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) (Edström, 2003; Ho, 2008).  
 
 Other approaches and eclecticism 
 
Beyond the IR theories, many scholars extract some elements of theory-driven 
motivators to Japan’s behaviour that is examined through foreign policy analysis or 
analytical eclecticism. For instance, actor-focused analysis grew rapidly with Koizumi’s 
popularity; many studies argued his resources were amplified to influence security 
policy-making (M. J. Green, 2006; Kabashima & Steel, 2007; Miyagi, 2009; Mulgan, 
2002; Pempel, 2007; Shinoda, 2007; Uchiyama, 2013). A further upsurge to revise the 
constitution is seen in the second Abe administration (Hiroshi, 2009; Howe & Campbell, 
2013; Iwama, 2013; Kakizaki, 2015).  
 
With the assumption that leaders or policymakers critically influence security policy, 
many studies have confirmed that political reforms enhanced the concentration of power 
in the Cabinet and the prime minister (Envall, 2015; Reed, McElwain & Shimizu, 2009; 
Shinoda, 2000, 2011). In studies of Japanese domestic politics, this is rather a 
significant departure from the past because bureaucrats had long been considered to 
hold dominant power over policy-making (C. Hosoya, 1974; Johnson, 1995; Kaarbo, 
1997; Krauss & Pekkanen, 2011; Stockwin, 2008). This is also compounded by the fact 
that institutional reforms occurred whereby the Defence Agency (DA) has been 
upgraded to ministerial status (Schulze, 2016). Likewise, a unique but robust claim was 
made by Catalinac (2016, p. 2) that electoral reform, occurring in 1994, fundamentally 
altered the way of constructing security policy. The reform ‘compels 
candidates/politicians shift their strategies from pork for the district to policies for the 
nation’ (Catalinac, 2016, p. 2). Therefore, the current strategic environment, including 
North Korean threats and the rise of China, was effectively incorporated into the 
election campaign strategy, creating a rather persuasive discourse impacting security 




2.3 A Means to Achieve Security  
 
Although many of the studies overlap the previous ‘why’ question approach, the essence 
of this type of study addresses how Japan has achieved and will/should achieve security. 
There are many studies indicating that the US-Japan alliance is the best way to achieve 
security (Berger, 2004; Dian, 2014; Michael J. Green & Cooper, 2014; Osius, 2002; 
Penn, 2014; Rozman, 2015; Wirth, 2015). For instance, Mochizuki (2007, pp. 759-766) 
introduced four patterns in Japan’s strategic options for China through the US alliance: 
‘cooperative engagement with a soft hedge’, ‘balancing and containment’, ‘strategic 
accommodation’ and ‘competitive engagement with a hard hedge’. Most of the studies 
fall into one of the four categories. Fels (2017, p. 507) argued the continuity of ‘warm 
ties with Washington and cold politics with China’ is the prime means to balance. Japan 
increasingly has strengthened its security ties with Washington, and its strategy falls into 
that of Washington’s pivot towards Asia to balance against a rising China. Satake (2016, 
p. 28) noted the newly upgraded US-Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines include 
Australia for the first time with the specification of ‘actions and roles’. Thus, he argued 
that strengthening the ‘institutionalisation of the trade-off between reassurance and 
burden-sharing’ is key.  
 
Many scholars similarly have paid attention to specific military/defence means to 
balance (Bee Yun, 2016; Eldridge, 2017; Sado, 2015). Samuels (1994) investigated the 
so-called techno-nationalism and relevant defence production. Maritime security studies 
often are the scope of such studies (Black, 2014; Graham, 2006; Pajon, 2017; Patalano, 
2012, 2015). Some have argued Japan has embarked on an arms race through cyber and 
space security (Kallender & Hughes, 2017; Pekkanen, 2013; Pekkanen & 
Kallender-Umezu, 2010), while others have focused on more specific military 
capabilities such as BMD (Hughes, 2004b, 2013; Swaine, Swanger & Kawakami, 2001) 
 
Other scholars have suggested a level of detachment from the US. Tan (2015) claimed 
that Japan’s expanded engagement in international security has focused recently more 
on multilateralism in Asia than the US alliance. That Japan has attempted to exclude the 
US, such as the East Asia Summit in 2005, is a sign of normalisation with expanded 
multilateral diplomacy. Y. Hosoya (2015) saw the package of security bills as the mark 
of the advancement of ‘internationalising’ Japan’s security policy and therefore greater 
co-operation with the armies of other countries should be possible—even with the 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army as long as it sticks to PKOs (Singh, 2016). Nakanishi 
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(2015), in contrast, proposed a somewhat unique means to realise Japan’s interests: 
entrenching economic and political ties with India, the Middle East and Africa given a 
growing geopolitical shift from the Asian continent to the Eurasian littoral and maritime 
areas with arguably more economic and political opportunities. Recent studies 
emphasised different approaches, arguing that Japan’s soft power is the means for 
enhancing international profile (Drifte, 1996; Iwabuchi, 2016).  
 
2.4 Where Is Japan Headed?  
 
There are diverse interpretations regarding Japan’s future. Concerning the security 
policy after passing the CSD bill, Hughes (2017) predicted that the implication of lifting 
the ban on CSD increases the likelihood of US ‘entanglement’ due to the de facto 
prohibition of using Article 9 to refuse the US request to dispatch the SDF. This echoes 
the extensive research on the constitutional revision. Boyd and Samuels (2005, p. 62) 
argued that with the case of Germany and Japan, ‘saying “no” because one cannot and 
saying “no” because one won’t are not the same thing and can have different 
consequences for alliance relations’. 
 
There are two competing short-term predictions regarding the Abe administration. On 
the one hand, Hughes (2015a) provided a comprehensive picture of the Abe 
administration’s aim, ranging from security policy to historical issues to personal 
ideological issues, and found contradictory relations between these areas, suggesting the 
high probability of failing to accomplish his aims such as the constitutional revision. On 
the other hand, Sebata (2015) projected a strong possibility of constitutional revision 
due to the election result (obtaining a majority in both Houses) and the stability of the 
LDP (under Abe’s leadership). Hughes (2016) and Saltzman (2015) both saw a 
somewhat constrained, hedged balancing strategy against China despite Japan’s upward 
trend for ‘hard balancing’. The most recent studies have considered the potential impact 
of the result of the 2016 US presidential election, which emphasises a greater 
uncertainty of the future trajectory of Japan’s security policy (Lam, 2017b; S. A. Smith, 
2017). 
 
Some scholars have attempted to project a mid-term trajectory. Easley (2017) argued 
that Japan is moving towards ‘a normal country’ in an incremental sense with growing 
‘proactivity’. He predicted that Japan would continue to shape its security policy based 
on incremental adjustment under domestic and international constraints, and the 
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US-Japan is unlikely to pursue aggressive militarising. Dudden (2016) argued that two 
cultures historically have shaped and will shape the country’s security policy; 
‘inward-looking and tightly defined one or as open-ended and engaged with the world’ 
(p. 101), although Japan has leant towards the latter with the advent of ‘a new era of 
maritime imperialism’ (p. 100). The US-Japan likely will engage in balancing.  
 
More fundamentally, the once rejected premise based on Waltzian theory has recently 
surfaced again. That is, Japan would in the future possess nuclear weapons (Samuels & 
Schoff, 2014; Yoshino, 2016). Such a discussion has been in the media (Corr, 2017; 
Kingston, 2017; Prasad, 2016) and even in the national diet debate (Diet, 2016), 
suggestive that the option goes beyond a pure academic existence.  
 
2.5 Key Variables with Missing Links and a Research Puzzle  
 
Overall, Japan’s security policy certainly seems on the incremental trajectory with 
enlarged roles. However, its ‘velocity’ of upward security policy development is hardly 
captured or accounted for. To be precise, it has a temperamental and inconsistent speed 
of security policy development despite a constant aggravation of the strategic 
environment. The questions are ‘What leads Japan to accelerate and decelerate its 
incremental security policy development?’ and ‘How do several key factors interplay 
and shape such a development?’. 
 
Existing theoretical views on ‘what drives Japan’ are insufficient to highlight the 
relative weight of key variables such as structure, individuals and the constitution. For 
realism, while the influence of structure is clearly highlighted, it does not provide a 
nuanced account for Japan with its complex unit-level factors. On the other hand, 
constructivism can incorporate domestic ‘hurdles’, such as the constitution, into its 
analysis (Katzenstein, 1996). When it seems structural change occurs, it cannot 
reconcile the contentious interplay between structure and domestic factors (Hughes, 
2015). These difficulties indeed prevent us from advancing the analysis further to 
investigate how Japan aims to achieve its security and where it is heading. Eclectic 
approaches and other studies with a specific focus on a particular factor, such as the 
prime minister, can provide a spot-on analysis, whereas these are unable to settle the 





The above literature review shows there are many attributes regarding Japan’s 
unpredictable speed of policy development, which include the prime minister, 
bureaucrats, the public, and the constitution and its interpretations. Numerous research 
puzzles arise around them. Is the prime minister so critical in shaping Japan’s security 
policy, particularly since Abe came to power for the second time in 2012? How do 
bureaucrats who were once considered to control all the policy-making dimensions play 
a role in security policy now? Has Japan been just a follower of US strategic 
behaviours? How has the strategic environment, with threats such as North Korea and 
China, influenced Japan? To what extent do the pacifist constitution and its 
interpretation, particularly Article 9, come into play now as a guardian to prevent Japan 
from being ‘normal’? Does the socially accepted norm of anti-militarism amongst the 
public also have a specific role in formulating security policy? The research area in this 
debate is well summarised by Envall (2003, pp.8): it is ‘whether these obstacles 
[domestic factors] are greater than Japan’s foreign policy potential [in response to the 
security environment]’. On this matter, it is worthwhile to examine the relative weight 
of the contentious factors, shaping Japanese security policy in a rigorous theoretical 
framework.  
 
To examine these factors comprehensively, the thesis primarily scrutinises the two cases 
of policy-making process: (1) the constitutional revision/reinterpretation debate with a 
specific focus on CSD to trace a change in legal security capacity and (2) BMD to 
investigate the development of military capabilities. CSD had been long prohibited 
under the constitutional interpretation of Article 9 since its establishment in 1951. Many 
debates proceeded around the constitutional revision and reinterpretation. It is arguably 
the most significant constraint on Japan’s security policy because it largely restricts 
Japan’s external balancing options. BMD is the first strategic weapon Japan acquired in 
2004. It is the first time for Japan since WWII to acquire such a weapon to directly 
address a strategic missile. These two case studies fit the purpose of the thesis. The main 
research task is to investigate under what conditions Japan accelerates/decelerates its 
balancing behaviour. Both cases are developed continuously during the period between 
2004 and 2018. More importantly, these are the prime factors that allow us to examine 
the degree of balancing behaviour.  
 
On the one hand, CSD allows Japan not only to engage more in external balancing but 
also potentially radically revise the constitution, which could enable Japan to possess 
offensive capabilities to jump in an arms race as internal balancing. Because these 
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balancing behaviours are largely restricted, reinterpretation or revision is a clear sign of 
how Japan would engage in the strategic environment and its threats. On the other hand, 
BMD is principally for internal balancing by beefing up defensive capabilities—often 
captured in the debate of the offence–defence balance (Jervis, 1976). The degree to 
which Japan develops its defence system indicates whether the country theoretically 
shows a balancing behaviour vis-à-vis China and North Korea, both of which possess 
ICBM and medium-range ballistic missiles. Furthermore, looking at BMD could also 
enable us to examine as to whether Japan is engaged in counter-balancing through 
offensive capabilities. This is because part of the BMD system potentially consists of 
‘pre-emptive strike’ and ‘counter-strike capability’, which requires offensive capabilities 
such as aircraft carriers and cruise missiles. Because Japan did not possess these 
capabilities when it started deploying BMD, the investigation of BMD development 
regarding systems and military equipment helps us delineate its balancing behaviour. 
 
The second purpose of this thesis is to examine causal mechanisms between the 
structure and policy outcome (BMD and the constitution) through the calculation of 
domestic politics (the intervening variables). The two cases are deeply connected with 
both the structure and domestic politics. For the first case, constitutional reinterpretation 
and revision must go through the ‘domestic policy-making’ process because the 
reinterpretation requires the enactment of a law, which requires securing two-thirds of 
seats in the Lower House, while the revision requires a national referendum (Neary, 
2002). More importantly, the ruling party has an authority to initiate the process of 
law-making or the revision which allows us to look at leaders’ image, including the 
prime minister (Shinoda, 2013). Furthermore, the constitution itself is a ‘domestic 
institution’, which constrains Japan’s policy development. It is, then, possible to 
examine the extent to which institutionalised forms of anti-militarism, such as the 
constitution, are relevant.  
 
Similarly, BMD widens our scope of domestic factors. Because it is the military side of 
security policy, the broad direction of the Cabinet is executed by bureaucrats. This 
enables us to examine how they influence security policy-making because it is not 
necessarily about law-making that needs public support. The comparison of the two 
cases lets us further elaborate on the analysis regarding the influence of the public. By 
tracing the two cases to determine the extent to which these variables mitigate the 
impact and signals given by the structure—specifically, ‘when’ and ‘how’—the thesis 




The two cases ultimately help to address the third purpose of the thesis: determining the 
relative weight of each intervening variable in explaining ‘when’ and ‘how’ each 
intervening variable is present or absent in the two cases. The comparison of the two 
cases helps us to investigate the purported influence of the domestically spread 
anti-militarism norm. During the period between 2004 and 2018, there were six prime 
ministers between 2006 and 2012 and a seventh from 2012 onwards, which also 
provides insight into how the role of the prime minister shapes Japan’s balancing 
behaviour. The constitution obviously restricts BMD but not like CSD. It can examine 
how/if the role of the constitution differs when directly challenged for amending and 
when it directly restricts Japan’s security policy.  
 
The following chapter outlines a theoretical framework before empirically examining 
key factors (intervening variables) and how these are responsible for shaping Japan’s 
behaviour in tandem with the changing strategic environment. It uses NCR as a prime 
theoretical framework with process tracing as a methodology and explains how NCR 
can be a useful framework to achieve the three purposes in this thesis: (1) determining 
under what conditions Japan accelerates/decelerates its balancing behaviour, (2) 
investigating the causal mechanisms of the key factors, and (3) identifying the relative 





3 Theoretical Framework  
 
This PhD thesis employs NCR as a theoretical framework to test its theoretical 
consistency in the case of Japan. The fundamental importance of NCR lies in its 
ambitious attempt to incorporate domestic variables into a structural realist framework 
to account for why states behave not as predicted by realism by conceptualising and 
investigating the impacts of intervening variables of foreign policy. The purpose of this 
section is multifold. First, the section not only explains the overall theoretical paradigm 
of the thesis but also argues why NCR is chosen amongst other theories—in particular, 
it sheds light on the theoretical void between structural realism and constructivism. 
Second, given the notion there is no ‘single form of realism’, but many branches of 
realism, this chapter revisits the discussion as to how structure incentives with states to 
act in a certain way. Third, it attempts to address the NCR’s most critiqued 
weakness—an ad hoc application of variables—by providing a solid relationship 
between structure and foreign policy outcome with well-defined intervening variables 
on an ex-ante basis. Fourth, towards a full operationalisation of NCR and theory testing 
as a meaningful theoretical endeavour in the case of Japan, the section aims to 
conceptualise intervening variables with a clear hypothesis by investigating and 
employing the literature on Japan’s security policy.  
 
3.1 Neoclassical Realism: What Is It, What Is Its Purpose and Why Has It Been 
Chosen?  
 
This section explains the theoretical paradigm of NCR in comparison with the branches 
of realism and other conventional IR theories to clarify its seemingly fuzzy concepts 
due to the overlapping characteristics of other theories. It also aims to clarify the 
purpose of the theory, why it is selected and how it can be what Schweller (2003, p. 
315) calls ‘a progressive research programme’ with potential to enhance our 
understanding of how states act.  
  
 What Is Neoclassical Realism?  
 
The term ‘neoclassical realism’ was coined by Rose (1998) who collated the cumulative 
realist literature, focusing on domestic politics to theorise them into a consolidated 
research programme. Referencing the Waltzian school of thought, NCR attempts to 
incorporate first image and second image variables while appreciating international 
25 
 
structure and its implications to provide a better and well-informed account for states’ 
behaviour. NCR emerged from the growing frustration about neo-realism’s inability to 
predict and explain states’ response to international structure and the problems of its 
nature of determinism. NCR shares the fundamental assumption of neo-realism that 
structure and the relative distribution of power are by far the most influential in states’ 
foreign policy. However, NCR views structural incentives as not ‘absolute’ but rather 
mediated by domestic factors (Rose, 1998). NCR, therefore, is designed to address the 
shortcomings of neo-realism.  
 
Successive failures of neo-realist literature, such as causes of the end of the Cold War, 
stem from four fundamental factors omitted in neo-realism that are considered within 
the NCR research paradigm (Ripsman et al., 2016, p. 19). The first factor concerns the 
perception-and-misperception debate. Many have criticised how neo-realism fails to 
incorporate the fact that leaders are not always receptive to structure. In other words, 
leaders misperceive signals given by structure (Robert Jervis, 1976, pp. 28-31). Such 
misperceptions mainly result from leaders’ ‘cognitive filter’ (Blainey, 1988, pp. 35-36), 
information asymmetry (Robert Jervis, 1988), or personality or belief (Renshon & 
Renshon, 2008). The second factor is associated with ‘signals’ provided by the structure, 
meaning the absence of clarity regarding opportunities to maximise security and threats 
(Lobell, Taliaferro & Ripsman, 2012). For instance, Friedberg (2005) argues it was 
unclear whether the rise of China in the post-Cold War era was a substantial threat to the 
US, in which case, strategic options might vary and suggest that outcomes of foreign 
policy choices are simply outside the realm of international structure.  
 
The third factor concerns rationality. Although rationality is not necessarily predicated 
on the assumption of neo-realism, the fact that states should respond to structure in 
conjunction with neorealist theoretical predictions subsumes the rationality of leaders 
(Friedberg, 2005). Thus, NCR contemplates that it can be a reasonable scenario where 
leaders make irrational decisions, despite perfectly recognising the rational strategic 
options. The final factor concerns the functionality of states, which is assumed not to 
take any precedence on states’ behaviour by neorealism (Ripsman et al, 2016). 
Functionality refers to a government’s ability and capability to produce the same policy 
outcome as neorealist’s prediction by optimally responding to the structure. For instance, 
given the supreme impact of structure on states, domestic constraints—be they the 





When it comes to the question of what NCR is, the aim is to address the four 
fundamental factors omitted in neo-realism without jeopardising its core assumption. 
NCR, therefore, is a theory of realist-oriented foreign policy.  
 
 What Is the Purpose of Neoclassical Realism? 
 
Although the fundamental purposes of NCR are mentioned in the previous section, the 
way in which NCR is applied varies to a significant degree depending on how we set 
the independent variable. In other words, approaches of NCR may differ as to what is 
explained. This section attempts to sort out the existing NCR-oriented studies to clarify 
not only their purpose of application of NCR but also the NCR approach to this thesis.  
 
The first purpose of NCR application is complementary to neo-realism because its 
approach is to explain anomalies, such as a particular country’s behaviour in a particular 
time and space. A quintessential example is Randal Schweller’s (2004) work concerning 
‘underbalancing’, meaning the failure to balance against threats properly. The 
overexpansion of imperial states such as Germany and Japan falls in this 
category—such a behaviour makes it unlikely to maintain states’ security in the long run 
(J. L. Snyder, 1991). Thus, independent variables are a particular (abnormal) decision of 
states. Other works examine why weaker states wage war against stronger states 
(Blainey, 1988, pp. 115-124) and why states occasionally engage in intervention in 
‘peripheral areas’ in terms of inconsistency with states’ national interests (Taliaferro, 
2004). One key consistent assumption of this approach is that as Zakaria (1992, pp. 
190-191) points out, neo-realism is normally sufficient to explain states’ behaviour. 
Hence, it functions as a complementary study to neo-realist research paradigms. 
Furthermore, this type of works often focuses on leaders’ perception or actions due to its 
scope of particular time or decision; therefore, arguably the most ‘classical’ element of 
realism is subsumed under a neo-realism research programme. 
 
The scope and factors shaping states’ behaviours are multiplied when it comes to the 
second approach of NCR, which aims to explain a broader range of ‘strategic options’ 
or what one may call ‘grand strategy’ (Ripsman et al, 2016). This approach is predicated 
on the assumption—different from the first one—that unless states have little choice 
given the clear signals of threats, states may choose a range of options circumscribed by 
structure but not dictated. Another critical assumption is that signals from structure are 
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rarely clear, which produces a constantly uncertain situation in which states cannot have 
clear information a priori to make decisions. Independent variables, in this case, are in 
relation to ‘grand strategy formation’ or its ‘adjustment’. As will be discussed later, 
‘grand strategy’, defined by Kennedy (1991, pp. ix-iix), refers to states that ‘sought to 
integrate their overall political, economic, and military aims and thus to preserve their 
long-term interests’.  
 
Other key variables mediating the impact of structure are found within the NCR 
literature. Dueck (2006) argues that elites and leaders’ idea to perceive information is 
biased. Such information processing is often filtered through ‘strategic culture’, which 
refers to a culturally transmitted practice largely shared by the public or the elites 
(Kitchen, 2010). Zakaria’s (1998)  ‘state mobilisation model’ contends that states’ 
behaviour depends on their ability to harness national resources, such as consensus of 
the public and policy-making process and relevant political institutions. In a similar vein, 
Tsebelis (2002) argues that a state’s unique political institutions and policy-making 
structure create a ‘veto player’ that, despite its institutionally small power, plays a 
crucial role in policy-making. Furthermore, Allison and Zelikow (1999) examine the 
organisational and bureaucratic structure of foreign policy-making and its impact upon 
outcomes. The central focus is the so-called ‘transmission belt’ through which structural 
impediments are translated into states’ behaviour. Constituting a subset of domestic 
factors, this is often defined as ‘intervening variables’ (Rose, 1998). As Ripsman et al. 
(2016) note, most NCR studies employ this approach with the view to explaining a 
state’s strategy formation, which is also the central theoretical focus of this thesis (see 
Figure 3.1).  
 
Approaches of NCR differ depending on their respective purpose and dependent 
variable with different assumptions that are overlooked in relation to the application of 
NCR. In this thesis, the second approach is employed with the assumption that states 
often have to choose a grand strategy, incentivised by structure, from among several 
options; however, in the process of grand strategy formation, particularities of domestic 
politics may have a substantial influence and give us crucial guidance to analyse states’ 
behaviour. The following section attempts to clarify and conceptualise the key variables 


















Figure 3.1 Basic Interaction of NCR Variables 
 
 Why Choose Neoclassical Realism and Not Other Theories?  
 
The above basic understanding of the assumptions and approaches of NCR 
notwithstanding, one might ponder its overlapping characteristics with other theories 
and its theoretical inconsistency, such as constructivism (norms and identity) and 
liberalism (domestic-oriented focus), as well as other IR concepts (Coetzee & Hudson, 
2012). In this section, alleged theoretical flaws are addressed in comparison with other 
theories, and potential theoretical contributions made by NCR are discussed for its 
selection as a theoretical framework. In short, NCR provides a clear hierarchical 
relationship amongst key factors in shaping a state’s behaviour, which allows us to 
examine the relative weight of them. This fits into the purpose of this thesis: examining 
several domestic factors in Japan’s security policy in relation to the structure.  
 
First, one would immediately question the overlapping feature of NCR with innenpolitik 
in the sense that both emphasise the significance of domestic politics. Innenpolitik 
posits that the fundamental component in shaping states’ behaviour is domestic 
constraints, such as economic interests of leaders or their diversion from expected 
behaviours (Fordham, 1998). It is true that NCR holds a similar view of domestic 
politics. However, one of the critical flaws of innenpolitik, as Ripsman et al. (2016) 
argue, is that empirical studies suggest states’ behaviour can differ depending on 
structure, even for states with similar domestic political situations. In other words, 













governments act differently (Zakaria, 1998). By privileging international structure, NCR 
can produce a more nuanced picture of states’ behaviour and address the weakness of 
the innenpolitik approach. Moreover, NCR approaches domestic politics more 
systemically than innenpolitik. NCR gives a well-set analytical lens through the 
intervening variables, such as state mobilisation and state-society relations.  
 
On the other hand, some note the theoretical inconsistency of NCR with neo-realism as 
it departs at the point where NCR incorporates domestic components into its research 
paradigm (Rose, 1998). However, it is safe to say this view is wrong. The first 
theoretical concern, as Waltz (1979, p. 71) himself admits, is that structure ‘can tell us 
what pressures are exerted and what possibilities are posed by systems of different 
structure, but it cannot tell us just how, and how effectively, the units of a system will 
respond to those pressures and possibilities’. Given the increasing indeterminacy of 
structure provided by realism and uncertainty in the international system, NCR can be a 
power-mediating theory between innenpolitik and neo-realism. Betts (1982, p. 103) 
simplifies this matter by saying that ‘the greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of 
perceptions’.  
 
The second theoretical concern is a matter of ‘rationalism’. NCR rejects the notion of 
rationality, inconsistent with the neo-realism assumption. However, as it was argued, 
neo-realism first does not hold that states are all ‘rational’. Furthermore, Kitchen (2010, 
p. 121) argues that with a neo-realist way of treating historical anomalies, one must ask 
‘at what point do actors cease to be non-rational?’. Schweller (2004) similarly argues 
that NCR can provide an answer as to the line between states choosing to balance and 
states adapting band-wagoning, appeasement and buck-passing as the outcome depends 
on domestic politics while structure only gives incentives and options of how to respond. 
Finally, Layne (2006, p. 11) maintains that the elegance of neo-realism—parsimony—is 
lost when it comes to NCR. As with others, this thesis sees it as an ‘exchange’ of the 
value of theory (Foulon, 2015, p. 638) and ‘trade-off of rigour and parsimony in favour 
of richness and detail’ (Wohlforth, 1993, p. 15) as a necessary compromise and not a 
complete discard of these theoretical essences. Schweller (2003, p. 317) also gives a 
supportive view that in referencing Lakatos—who defined ‘research programme’—the 
values of a theory are to produce ‘cumulative knowledge’ and ‘address important 
questions about foreign policy and national behaviour’. 
  
Arguably, the most contentious debate occurs when NCR is compared with 
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constructivism in the usage of ideas, norms and cultures. Wendt’s (1992) well-quoted 
constructivist notion— ‘anarchy is what states make of it’—clearly contradicts the 
realist tradition of the supremacy of structure and the existence of ‘objective reality’. 
This is exactly why James (2009, p. 259) calls NCR ‘realist-inspired constructivism’. 
Thus, there is an epistemological conundrum when it comes to the matter of prior 
existence of structure.  
 
A close look reveals the fundamental difference between NCR and constructivism 
through the origin of NCR, borne from neo-realism. That is, in NCR, ideas matter to the 
extent to which states choose options delineated by structure and the international 
system. Therefore, unlike constructivism, with the implication that states’ behaviour 
could be anything as long as it is consistent with states’ identity or norms, NCR posits 
that structure first and foremost limits states’ behaviour and yet there are several choices 
in which ideas help states make decisions. NCR also views the nature of structure as 
conflictual (Schweller, 2003). According to Foulon (2015, p. 639), NCR questions how 
ideas—subsumed under the state-level variables—‘interfere between systemic 
incentives and future foreign policy’. He continues that critical difference and strength 
of NCR over constructivism is its ‘forward-looking approach’ with a level of 
predictability, which constructivism lacks due to its past-oriented stance. Nonetheless, 
epistemological inconsistency remains: idealism versus materialism. This thesis stands 
on Kitchen’s (2010) argument that IR theory should not be ‘overly concerned with 
epistemology and ontology’ (2010, p. 85). Instead, NCR focuses on the question of 
when ideational variables come into play against materialistic variables within the 
international system for the pursuit of greater explanatory power without violating 
realist assumptions and predictability.  
 
NCR can be said to share some conceptions of liberalism that appear to be the 
theoretical inconsistency of realism per se; however, this view is mistaken. NCR 
explicitly employs a multilayered theoretical framework to connect agents and structure, 
the latter of which is defined in realist terms. There are several branches of liberalism, 
including democratic peace theory and Putnum’s two-level game.  
 
Liberal democratic peace theory and NCR share a common feature: both consider 
ideology and domestic institutions as important intervening variables, although for 
liberal peace theory these should be confined to ‘democratic’ states (Owen, 1996). 
However, the attitudes towards structure are radically different. In liberal democratic 
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peace theory, units constitute an ‘international system’ of liberal democratic countries so 
that non-democratic states are largely excluded. As a result, the scope of LDP theory is 
heavily limited (Coetzee & Hudson, 2012). Moreover, states’ behaviour in liberal 
democratic peace theory is ‘bottom-up’. Instead, NCR provides a more encompassing 
view and theorisation of interaction between structure and agents in a top-down manner 
(Coetzee & Hudson, 2012).  
 
Second, two-level game theory has some similarities to NCR. As Alons (2010, p. 6-8) 
argues, it attempts to provide a theoretical framework within which both external and 
internal factors are incorporated. However, Foulon (2015) pinpoints several weaknesses 
of the theory that NCR can overcome. First, for two-level game theory, a channel 
between the domestic and external levels of analysis is not established. The only 
connection between these levels is individuals who assume the role of negotiation. 
Second, the two-level game theory fails to clarify the relative weight of the 
external/internal dichotomy. Most fundamentally, both liberalist theories assume that 
policy-making is ‘bottom-up’, which is a view not held by NCR or conventional 
branches of realism.  
 
Based on the discussion above, one can see that there is a clear distinction among NCR, 
theoretical eclecticism and foreign policy studies. On the one hand, unlike eclecticism, 
NCR carefully treats ideas and institutions in a way that preserves the core assumption 
of neo-realism. On the other hand, although NCR arguably derives from foreign policy 
studies, NCR departs from it by incorporating structural influence in its analytical 
framework. Furthermore, NCR sets more specific approaches than foreign policy 
studies by defining core intervening variables. By differentiating other theories and 
discussing their weaknesses that NCR can overcome, the application of NCR is a useful 
theoretical endeavour to address the empirical puzzles systemically.  
 
The link between structure and foreign policy outcome through intervening 
variables  
 
Having discussed the strengths and resolved some alleged theoretical inconsistencies of 
NCR compared with other theories, NCR itself is susceptible to criticism. To begin with, 
Walt (2002, p. 211) argues that NCR tends to incorporate intervening variables in an ad 
hoc manner and is incapable of providing hypotheses. He also criticises that NCR has 
yet to identify the relative weight of each intervening variable, which, by definition, 
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results in the absence of predictability and generalizability. Vasquez (1997) claims NCR 
has its degenerative nature to the realist research paradigm in that the theoretical 
parsimony of realism with predictive values is largely neglected. NCR is also criticised 
for the utilisation of too many (irrelevant) variables, suggestive of the possibility of 
‘theoretical overdetermination’. It is hard to deny that some NCR studies may deserve 
such critiques.  
 
This section attempts to overcome the above critiques. First, it discusses how neo-realist 
conceptions of system, structure and power are employed in NCR with consideration of 
‘structural modifiers’. Second, to resolve the critique of ‘lack of predictive values’, it 
introduces the concept of the ‘permissive/restrictive strategic environment’ through 
which a level of prediction can be made. Third, a clear-cut explanation is given as to 
how structural incentives are translated into intervening variables to produce a foreign 
policy outcome based on the prior definition to avoid the ‘ad hoc application’ of 
intervening variables. This enables us to formulate hypotheses to test against the 
existing theoretical explanations. Finally, a well-defined and differentiated functionality 
of each intervening variable is provided, and, in conjunction with the 
permissive/restrictive strategic environment, a general guideline specifies the relative 
weight of each intervening variable.  
 




NCR employs Waltz’s (1979, p. 71) concept of structure: (1) its ordering principle (the 
‘first-tier’ or ‘deep structure’), meaning how the units stand in relation to one another; 
(2) the degree of differentiation, or lack thereof, among the units (the ‘second-tier’); and 
(3) the distribution of capabilities among the units (the ‘third-tier’ or ‘surface structure’). 
It is important to note that NCR and neo-realism differ on the assumptions regarding the 
degree to which material capabilities influence states’ behaviour. NCR stipulates that 
such capabilities do not simply dictate states. Waltz (1979, p. 93) argues that ‘hierarchy 
entails relations of super- and subordination among a system’s parts’. While neo-realism 
posits that the combination of the three elements of structure creates a hierarchical 
relationship among states, it predicates the vertical aspects of such a hierarchy as 
material capabilities, and its differentiation among units determine the way in which 
they interact in the system. However, through the pursuit of developing neo-realism, 
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NCR tries to incorporate the horizontal element of units’ interaction—what G. H. 
Snyder (1996) calls the ‘structural modifiers’. These help us to engage in the complexity 
of the units’ socialisation process more critically.  
 
 System  
 
Although structure in neo-realism is widely debated and defined clearly by Waltz, 
‘system’ has been paid relatively less attention (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). A system is 
akin to the conceptualisation of the world because it depends on theoretical lenses 
through which ‘important actors’ interact to shape the world (Bull & Watson, 1984). In a 
neo-realist sense, states formulate such an international system. Although this does not 
necessarily mean that all the other actors, such as international organisations, are 
completely ignored, NCR holds that given the crucial roles played by states regarding 
such organisations, states are considered prime actors in the international system (Buzan, 
Jones & Little, 1993). For this very reason, Ripsman et al. (2016) argue that an 
international system in NCR refers to the interstate system, which places states as a 
central actor. The nature of the system is anarchic and results in a self-help system, 
meaning there are ordering principles.  
 
 Structural Modifiers  
 
Within this theoretical framework is an attempt to introduce two critical elements of the 
horizontal interaction of units (geography and military technology) and one concept 
(offence–defence balance) that help to illuminate how structural modifiers influence the 
basic interaction among states before intervening variables to come into play. As G. H. 
Snyder (1996, p. 170) conceptualises, military technology change ‘affects all great 
powers, at least potentially’.  
 
A quintessential example is nuclear weapons, which were alleged to reduce the risk of 
military confrontation during the Cold War (Van Evera, 1999) To put it into perspective, 
Van Ezra proposes the concept of an offence–defence balance. This concept maintains 
that the balance of defence and offence capability changes the intensity of security 
concerns, such as the security dilemma. The proliferation of nuclear weapons increases 
the damage in a war, and the incapability to protect against the usage of such weapons 
makes the first strike more advantageous (Van Evera, 1999). The second element of 
shaping horizontal interaction is geography. It provides a scope in which threats can be 
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more prominent due to the proximity and consideration of geographical particularities, 
such as sea-lanes or borders or the lack thereof (Boulding, 1962). Although elaborated 
later in this chapter, these play a crucial role in measuring the clarity of threat as an 
important transmission belt whereby structural incentives are translated into states’ 
behaviour.  
 
 Power  
 
The above discussion inevitably poses a question regarding what is power. NCR treats 
power differently from neo-realism. Even amongst the branches of realism, the debate 
over power is contentious (Schmidt, 2005). It is useful to introduce two approaches, 
advocated by Baldwin (2002), to define power. For neo-realism, power can be defined 
by ‘the relational power approach’, which considers material capabilities such as 
economic or military might or both as an actual aggregation of the power of states. It is 
true that NCR employs a varied set of measures to indicate states’ power, such as GDP, 
defence spending, population, demography and natural resources (Schweller, 1998). 
However, NCR emphasises an additional element of power by applying Baldwin’s other 
approach—national power—which views power as akin to ‘influence’ as a means to an 
end. That is, there should be a discrepancy between aggregated figures representing 
power and the actual limit of their utilisation. National power should differ from country 
to country so far as to what extent it can exert its resources. Conceptualising power in 
this way explains why Japan, despite its large economy, is not a ‘military power’: it has 
substantial limits on its capacity to utilise its resources (Boyd & Samuels, 2005). As will 
be developed later, this conception of power provides a logical channel through which 
intervening variables come into play in a realist analysis of the structure and behaviour 
of states.  
  
By considering technology and geography as structural modifiers, we set an additional 
layer of unit interaction conceptualised with offence–defence balance. Furthermore, 
defining power in terms of NCR terms justifies the need to look at state-level variables, 
the aim of which Rose (1998, p. 161) succinctly specifies as ‘bringing the states back in’ 
(see Figure 3.2). Structural incentives are translated into what Ripsman et al. (2016) call 

















 Figure 3.2 Conceptual Linkage Among Structure, System, Structural Modifiers and 
Power  
 
3.3 The Concept of Strategic Environment and Clarity 
 
NCR is criticised for its lack of predictive values that often stem from its purported 
inability to set hypotheses because of the ad hoc basis of applying intervening variables. 
This is particularly because Mearsheimer and Walt (2013, p. 432) argue, a 
well-developed theory is ‘falsifiable and offer[s] non-trivial explanations . . . [and] 
yields unambiguous predictions and specif[ies] their boundary conditions’. Thus, for 
NCR to have predictable values with falsifiable explanations, the concept of 
permissive/restrictive strategic environment and clarity—developed by Ripsman et al. 
(2016)— is determined by ‘clarity’. Depending on whether a given strategic 
environment at a given time is permissive or restrictive, along with the degree of clarity 
of threats, the direction of states behaviour can be predicted and hypothesised.  
 
 Assessment of a State’s Strategic Environment  
 
A state’s strategic environment is mainly formulated by structure (i.e. anarchical nature 
with uncertainty and the relative distribution of material capabilities) as well as 
structural modifiers (i.e. military technology and geography for the state to identify 
threats and respond accordingly) (Ripsman et al, 2016). Geography can provide us with 
an essential clue to assess the degree of threats (Snyder, 1996). On the other hand, 
military technology sometimes can transcend geographical proximity to conceive 















of long-range ballistic missiles enabled the Soviet Union to appear as a significant threat 
to the US despite the long geographical distance. There are three overall criteria to 
assess a state’s strategic environment as to whether it is restrictive or permissive with 
reference to ‘clarity’: ‘(1) revisionism or expressed hostility to harm the state’s 
territorial integrity or core interests; (2) the economic and military capability to inflict 
harm on the state, which in turn depends on geography and technology; and (3) a sense 
of imminence (i.e., expectations that it will use its capability to inflict harm in short 
order)’ (Ripsman et al., 2016, p. 46). In theory, the restrictive strategic environment 
gives a state a clear signal as to the proper response, whereas NCR’s hypothesis can be 
consistent or close to neo-realist prediction. On the other hand, in the permissive 
strategic environment, due to the lack of clear signals from the structure, options can 
vary depending on the state’s composition and thereby increase explanatory power with 
the intervening variable.  
 
In hypothesis building, it is important to note that as theory testing, NCR should 
determine the baseline to measure accuracy and logical consistency (Ripsman et al, 
2016). The thesis uses multiple realist branches—defensive and offensive realism—as a 
baseline. Leaving epistemological and ontological debates of each theory aside, it is 
useful to examine grand strategy adjustment to characterise a means for maximising a 
state’s security. This suggests that a state’s grand strategy can shift from behaviour 
based on defensive realism behaviour based on offensive realism. Relevant concepts 
such as grand strategy will be discussed in the following section.  
 
 Conceptualising ‘Grand Strategy’ and Its Adjustment as an Independent Variable  
 
The term ‘grand strategy’ is ambiguous, and a definition has never been crystal clear 
(Gaddis, 2009). The reason for examining grand strategy in NCR is not only because the 
research question of this PhD fits but also because it provides an analytical space that 
bridges the gap between states and structure. This thesis considers the adjustment of 
‘grand strategy’—or what one calls ‘grand strategic shift’—as an independent variable 
that is an outcome of states’ behaviour. Furthermore, the author believes the intervening 
variables—unit-level components—arguably have greater explanatory power for the 
gaps between structure and a state’s grand strategy as well as its adjustment.  
 
This section considers definitions of grand strategy and its functionalities to provide a 
clear picture to examine them as an independent variable. As Martel (2015, p. 24) 
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argues, the origin and purpose of grand strategy are ‘war-centric’. In this sense, grand 
strategy can relate to ‘operational’ and ‘tactical’ means, but this thesis considers ‘grand 
strategy’ at a broader level over a longer-term (Martel, 2015, p. 30). The broader 
characteristic of grand strategy in this thesis suggests it is global in scale, long term in 
temporal scope, highest political goals as a type of ends with all types of power 
(diplomatic, informational, military and economic).  
 
Turning to definitions, according to Morgenthau (1973, p. 141), grand strategy is ‘the 
art of bringing the different elements of national power to bear with maximum effect 
upon those points in the international situation which concern the national interest most 
directly’. This definition includes national power, which is defined in the previous 
section. Likewise, Gaddis (2009, p. 7) defines grand strategy as ‘the calculated 
relationship of means to large ends. It is about how one uses whatever one has to get to 
wherever it is one wants to go’. Martel (2015, p. 31) adds that grand strategy is highly 
‘impermanent’ because it changes according to the shifts in ‘events, ideologies and 
interpretations’.  
 
This is the critical difference from ‘strategic culture’, which is defined in more detail 
later. Strategic culture is predicated on the assumption that it is a pattern and rather 
static. J. L. Snyder (1977, p. 8) gives a broader definition of strategic culture as ‘the sum 
total ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns of habitual behaviour that 
members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or 
imitation’.  
 
The clear difference between grand strategy and strategic culture should be made. The 
former is a materialised strategy that has occurred, while the latter is essentially an idea 
that drives leaders to construct strategy. Thus, strategic culture can be materialised 
completely into the form of grand strategy, yet the functionality is guidance. With the 
malleable characteristic of grand strategy, whether the strategic environment is 
restrictive and permissive gives a broader predictive parameter within which a 
hypothesis of grand strategic adjustment can be made.  
 
Having outlined the definition and characteristic of grand strategy, the question remains 
as to what ‘grand strategic adjustment’ means and how to measure such an adjustment. 
The proposed approach is the employment of several balancing behaviours provided by 
the branches of realist derivatives, not as a theory per se but as an overall means of 
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grand strategy. Its adjustment refers to the shift from one balancing behaviour to another 
(e.g. from defensive to offensive realist behaviour or from soft balancing to hedging).  
 
Defensive realist behaviour refers to an attempt to maximise defensive capability to 
maintain the current position in the international community. Waltz (1979, p. 128) 
argues that ‘the first concern of states is not to maximise power but to maintain their 
position in the system’. Offensive realist behaviour suggests that states adopt aggressive 
and expansionist behaviour by maximising offensive military capabilities with the view 
to fixing the status quo (Mearsheimer, 2001). Goh (2005, p. 2) defines hedging as  
 
a set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) a 
situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives 
such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality. Instead, they cultivate a middle 
position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious 
expense of another.  
 
Last, according to Robert (2005, p. 36), ‘mechanisms of soft balancing include 
territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signalling of 
resolve to participate in a balancing coalition’.  
 
All of these steps can weaken the military power that the superior state can bring to bear 
in battle. In connection with the strategic environment, a broader direction of states can 
be made that the more restrictive the strategic environment is, the more likely states are 
to pursue direct balancing behaviour as the clarity and imminence of threats 
incentivising states to respond (Ripsman et al, 2016). On the other hand, in a permissive 
environment, states have options for soft balancing and hedging as well because of the 
unclarity of threats and the existence of several strategic options. Evidently, it should be 
empirically possible that states show contradicting behaviours against the above broader 
prediction. However, it should be determined on an ex post facto basis after testing 
NCR and the hypotheses.  
 
3.4 Intervening Variables  
 
A crucial aspect of NCR is its explanatory power by using intervening variables. 
However, few studies attempt to conceptualise each intervening variable responsible for 
the criticism of NCR as an ad hoc basis application. This section gives a concrete set of 
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definitions for intervening variables and a brief overview of their operationalisation. 
The selection of the intervening variables in this thesis is based on the work by Ripsman 
et al. (2016) to conceptualise intervening variables, which investigates most of NCR 
literature. The three intervening variables are applied to Japan through an empirical 
examination of Japan’s security policy, which identities leaders, institutions, the 
constitution, strategic culture and public/societal actors.  
 
 Leaders’ Image  
 
As a ‘classical’ element of NCR, leaders’ image plays a crucial role in shaping states’ 
behaviour with certain constraints given by structure. The value of this variable is based 
on the assumption that leaders are ultimately responsible for formulating a state’s policy. 
The scope of this variable refers to foreign policy executives (FPEs) (Ripsman et al., 
2016). Depending on a state’s political institutions, leaders include the president, prime 
minister, Cabinet members, bureaucrats, ministers and even political advisors close to 
influential leaders. The critical issue is how to define the leaders’ image. There are 
numerous approaches, with some focusing on perception and information processing (R. 
Jervis, 1976) and others emphasising ‘personal belief and character’ (Mintz & DeRouen, 
2010). In the thesis, leaders’ image is defined by the dilemma between external and 
internal political rationales for them to make decisions.  
 
First, it is assumed that leaders do not necessarily think in a neo-realist way, but they do 
have a clear image or ideal policy on how the state should behave (Rose, 1998). 
Concurrently, leaders are obligated to plan their move to not only maintain their 
political power but also mobilise the state ‘national power’. Through this dilemma, 
leaders tend to prioritise the maintenance of political power over the mobilisation of 
national power.  
 
To operationalise this dilemma and decisions made by leaders, the two concepts are 
introduced: strategic culture and political legitimacy. Strategic culture refers to ‘the sum 
total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that 
members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or 
imitation’ (J. L. Snyder, 1977, p. 8). This is a useful concept for several reasons. First, it 
incorporates an empirically found set of patterns of states’ behaviour that can be 
effectively employed to analyse leaders’ image regarding an ideal response to the 
strategic environment. Second, as with countries holding several strategic cultures, it 
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reveals the distinctive difference among FPEs’ ideas to capture a policy planning phase. 
Third, because the dynamics of the strategic culture of each FPE can be diverse, the 
criticism of a ‘lack of analytical scope’ for ‘change of strategic culture’ can be avoided.  
 
The second key concept is political legitimacy, which is deeply related to domestic 
stability. In other words, it is about whether leaders have sufficient support from the 
public with relative authority over policy-making (He & Feng, 2013). As with ‘prospect 
theory’, with domestic political stability and legitimacy, leaders with public support 
often choose a risk-taking policy that is in line with leaders’ strategic culture and yet not 
likely to be well-supported by the public. On the other hand, leaders without the support 
tend to take a risk-averse policy that is often in favour of the public—further 
contradictory to the realist prediction (He & Feng, 2013). It should also be entirely 
possible that in a restrictive strategic environment where a threat is imminent, leaders 
choose a risk-taking policy without much support from the public. This is why NCR 
holds that the conditions of the strategic environment are first and foremost an integral 
part of the analysis.  
 
One may also ponder that leaders are not necessarily elected politicians; they can be 
influential bureaucrats or advisors to the authority. Bureaucrats are partial leaders who 
are civil servants and not elected politicians. In this sense, they are inclined to push for 
realising their strategic vision without so much the influence of public support.  
 
 State-society Relations 
 
The second key intervening variable is state-society relations. Ripsman et al. (2016, p. 
70-71) define these relations as ‘the character of interactions between the central 
institutions of the state and various economic and or societal groups’. This often 
crystallises the element of the first variable—leaders’ image—and, in particular, 
political legitimacy. In democratic countries, voting is often a legitimated channel 
through which the public influences leaders and constitutes risk-aversion policy 
selection. A failure to do so may result in the loss of leaders’ position so that foreign 
policy may be likely to be changed by alternative leaders who comply with public 
demands (Cappella Zielinski, 2017). Albeit less likely, state-society relations also 
include a civil society group, the activism of which may influence decision-making. In 
contrast, influential activist groups, such as right-wing groups or techno-nationalist 
groups, exert influence in a way in which leaders lean towards risk-taking policy 
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selection (Solingen, 1994).  
 
Another critical element of this variable is economic/parochial interests. These include 
security policy, which often comes along with economic interests and parochial interests 
such as defence technology and industry. As with the mobilisation model advocated by 
Zakaria (1998), implementing a security policy inevitably devours financial resources as 
well. Furthermore, Cappella Zielinski (2017) argues that states sometimes face the need 
to collect revenue. Economic interests, therefore, are crucial in shaping foreign policy, 
the voice of which is translated from key economic groups or industry/finance-related 
bureaucrats. 
 
This leads to the next component, parochial interests. These are associated with vested 
interests and political corruptions. As NCR holds that leaders ultimately make decisions, 
personal relations between FPEs and actors that contain the exchange of vested interests 
may influence foreign policy. Therefore, the variable of state-society relations adds the 
details and coalition dynamics around which leaders reach a decision in a dilemma 
between their internal and external rationales.  
 
 Domestic Institutions  
 
The third intervening variable is domestic institutions that help to delineate the entire 
framework within which leaders’ action is confined and leaders and society interact. The 
policy-making process differs from state to state and is often defined by law or 
constitution. In this sense, this variable helps to delineate who the key actors are as 
FPEs. As assumed, the prime minister is chosen as a key FPE because the 
policy-making process designed by the law gives him/her authority to make decisions. 
Furthermore, the variable highlights the veto player who does not officially hold a 
power per se, and yet domestic institutions can create the situation in which a particular 
actor holds a critical role in making decisions (Tsebelis, 2002). In the case of political 
decision-making where the unanimity of Cabinet members is required, the person who 
is against the dominant view held by the others acts as a veto player (Levy, 1986). The 
variable considers constraints given not only by structure or institutions but also by the 
law or constitution—giving additional elements over which leaders construct policy. In 
essence, domestic institutions give us an overall rule or regulation in which leaders 
address the external/internal dilemma.  
Based on the above discussion, the criticism of theoretical overdetermination can be 
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overcome because of the delineation of clear functionality of each intervening variables 
and their mutual interaction. Although the quasi-central focus is on leaders’ image, its 
political legitimacy cannot be examined in detail without examining state-society 
relations, in particular, public support. Moreover, parochial interests can exert some 
influence as part of state-society relations based on the assumption that leaders are 
eventually responsible for policy-making. Furthermore, the struggle and competition 
over leaders’ image cannot simply be examined without a close look at the 
policy-making process and its relevant institutions as the variable of domestic 
institutions (Tsebelis, 2002). This is because such institutions highlight power relations 
amongst leaders and illuminate potential veto players whose role is often crucial in 
policy-making. Thus, by employing variables from Foreign Policy Studies, NCR not 
only maintains its structural supremacy but also enriches our understanding of foreign 
policy-making with a detailed account (see Figure 3.3 for a visualisation of the 
relationship among intervening, independent and dependent variables).  
 
These intervening variables indicate explanatory power when it comes to grand strategic 
adjustment. Functionalities of grand strategy particularly match the strength of the 
intervening variables. Martel (2015, p. 60) attempts to conceptualise the four 
functionalities. The first is ‘priority’ in both strategic culture and political legitimacy. 
This necessitates leaders to prioritise many external and internal demands, which has a 
close analytical linkage with leaders’ image. The second is co-ordination of several 
means to achieve a state’s goal (i.e. the way to organise and mobilise different 
resources), giving an avenue to examine state-society relations and domestic institutions. 
Related to the first functionality, the third is ‘the balance of means and ends’. This is the 
calculation of risks of security policy to look at leaders’ struggle to reach a consensus in 
the policy planning phase. The fourth is the integration of national power, giving us a 
comprehensive view of the interaction of each intervening variable. Given that grand 
strategy is impermanent, and such an adjustment is examined concerning several 
branches of realism, the intervening variables provide us with a clue as to what 






















*Orange arrows are the influence of intervening variables  
*Orange boxes are intervening variables  
*Green box is a dependent variable  
*Yellow box is an independent variable  
*Blue boxes are policy-making phases  
Figure 3.3 The Web of the Interaction of Each Variable  
 
In summary, NCR is operationalised as follows. The structure is by far the most 
influential factor shaping states’ behaviour. Uncertainty based on the lack of clarity 
often results in the state’s actions deviating from the realist prediction. To overcome the 
weakness, this theoretical framework introduces the permissive/restrictive environment, 
depending on which states’ action should be different and can be hypothesised.  
 
In the restrictive strategic environment, a state should be likely to show behaviour close 
to realist predictions, whereas, in the permissive strategic environment, a state’s 
behaviour largely depends on domestic-level variables. To test such a hypothesis, 
several means of strategic actions are employed based on the branches of realism: 
hedging, soft balancing, defensive realist behaviour and offensive realist behaviour. The 
grand strategic adjustment should be measured using the four strategically distinctive 
options.  
 
To examine how a state reaches a particular foreign policy outcome amongst the four 



















Based on the assumption that leaders make ultimate decisions, leaders’ image was 
examined regarding how leaders address the external/internal dilemma. Such a dilemma 
is characterised by strategic culture and political legitimacy (He & Feng, 2013). Given 
that war-centric strategy is not necessarily supported by the public, it is vital to 
maintaining political authority. This would cause leaders to make a compromise or 
railroad their strategic visions. This is the crucial element of the second variable of 
state-society relations. Furthermore, leaders may have to deal with economic groups 
with parochial interests so that leaders place particular weight on the voice of such 
groups, influencing security policy. The interaction of the two variables is crystallised 
by the third variable of domestic institutions, highlighting the power structure of leaders 
and institutional constraints making a particular strategy challenging to pursue.  
 
The three intervening variables, therefore, constitute a symbiotic relation. In the end, 
NCR should be able to provide the answer as to what conditions a state shifts its grand 
strategy with predictive values towards a meaningful theory testing and accumulation of 
theoretically organised empirical knowledge.  
 
3.5 Methodology – Process Tracing  
 
This research intends to employ process tracing as its methodology for tracing causal 
mechanisms through an in-depth empirical examination of the way in which a causal 
process comes into play on an actual case. While process tracing can be used for both 
theory testing and theory building, this research is inclined to theory testing through the 
application of NCR. Causal mechanisms link causes and outcomes, which therefore 
serves as ‘channels’ or ‘intervening variables’ (Gerring, 2007; G. King, Keohane & 
Verba, 1994; Weller & Barnes, 2014). Thus, the influence of intervening variables 
defined above can be adequately analysed through the method of process tracing.  
 
In process tracing, there are variants of its analytical usage—that is, ‘minimalist’ and 
‘systems’ understandings of process tracing. The former has the propensity to identify 
causal mechanisms that are yet to be confirmed to link causes and outcomes. For 
instance, norms and ideas that purportedly link causes and outcomes are theoretically 
contentious as a causal mechanism (Elster, 1998). Thus, the minimalist approach aims 
to address whether and how norms and ideas connect causes and outcomes (George & 
Bennett, 2005). The latter seeks to ‘unpack’ the linkage of the causal mechanism 
between them, which results in the interlocking parts of the causal mechanism to show 
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how causal powers or forces between a cause(s) to an outcome are transmitted (Russo & 
Williamson, 2007).  
 
In this research, process tracing is used through a minimalist strategy. In applying NCR 
to the case of Japan’s security policy, ‘intervening variables’ as a causal mechanism 
have yet to be rigorously examined. Therefore, the research attempts to examine and 
confirm whether these variables play out to lead an outcome in selected cases. Notably, 
through the two case studies, this study aims to explore causal mechanisms between 
causes (systemic forces) and outcomes (grand strategy).  
 
Thus, in theory testing, it is necessary to theorise a plausible causal mechanism by 
investigating existing literature with consideration of ‘contextual conditions’ (spatial, 
temporal and institutional conditions, particularly in Japan) (Falleti & Lynch, 2009). In 
NCR, leaders’ image, strategic culture, domestic institutions and state-society relations 
are in the scope of contextual conditions. This leads to establishing a hypothesised 
causal mechanism(s) to test theory through process tracing to find ‘mechanistic 
evidence’. To not produce just an analytical narrative, the minimalist strategy requires a 
thorough investigation of not only the existence of a causal mechanism(s) but also its 
probative values. Because this research aims to provide a comprehensive explanation of 
a particular outcome rather than generalisations or theory building, the discussion of 
selecting cases with comparative methods is not for consideration (Derek, 2017).  
 
Turning to data selection and evidence collection, many archives and materials in 
English and Japanese were collected. These include official documents of the Cabinet, 
Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), as well as news 
archives. The selection of interviewees based on leaders defined in this chapter, who 
might have information regarding the process that the thesis traces. For this purpose, the 
author also conducted elite interviews when possible, such as with people who work for 
the two ministries, those who work for the defence industry and relevant journalists who 
specialise Japan’s security policy with expertise on BMD or the Constitution. The elite 
interviews aimed to obtain data for a thorough process tracing when archives were 
insufficient. Interviews were conducted in Japanese on a semi-structure basis with fixed 
questions to obtain data to fill the gap in the process and confirm the already obtained 
data to link interviews and existing sources. A recording device was used to record each 
interview that was transcribed later. In total, 25 interviews were conducted mainly in 
Tokyo. All data of the interviews were digitised (e.g. scanned and stored) on a portable 
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device that had no communication capacity, such as a USB drive with complex 
encryption. 
 
3.6 The Operationalisation of Neoclassical Realism in Japan’s Security Policy  
 
This section outlines how NCR and its relevant concepts are operationalised in the 
proposed two cases of Japan’s security policy. In particular, how the two different areas 
of security policy—constitutional and military arena—are effectively examined with the 
same theoretical framework and variables discussed. It also provides a hypothesis so the 
NCR can be tested against other alternative explanations argued in the literature review.  
 
 Two Case Studies  
 
The first case is the constitutional reinterpretation regarding Article 9. Its development 
process between 2004 and 2018 is considered the beginning of the Cabinet initiation 
reinterpretation/revision of Article 9 to allow CSD. CSD imposes a constitutional limit 
on Japan’s capacity to balance (Samuels, 2007). The allowance of CSD by 
reinterpreting Article 9 may enable Japan to enhance its defensive realist strategy while 
the revision of Article 9 (i.e. pacifist clauses) would lead to an offensive realist strategy. 
Under the hypothesis of the paper, changing the degree of aggravating restrictive 
strategic environment provides a strong incentive to upgrade Japan’s security policy to 
balance through the defensive realist or even offensive realist-oriented strategy. 
However, the unique domestic political situation where firm aversion against a change 
in the constitution might hinder the degree of Japan’s grand strategic shift.  
 
The second case considers the development of the BMD, in particular between 2004 and 
2018 when the government issued a Cabinet decision to deploy BMD and the impacts 
of CSD (expanding the legal capacity of BMD) began to be seen (Hughes, 2013). An 
overall hypothesis of how structure resulted in Japan’s BMD development is that 
structure does not merely dictate the acquisition and development of BMD. Instead, 
structural impacts (North Korea) and external force (the US) create an opportunity and 
incentive for those with vested interests, which resulted in the convergence of the means 
(the development of BMD) with different purposes. Actors in the defence industry and 
some bureaucrats saw it as an opportunity to revitalise the domestic defence industry 
with potential profits, while some policymakers considered it a critical alternative to 
sustain/strengthen the US security alliance. Alternatively, leaders with strong visions in 
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Japan’s relative position in international security use the threat of North Korea to further 
the process of ‘normalisation’—and BMD is a means to achieve it. Combination and 
examination of the two cases effectively highlight their grand strategic adjustment, 
which is often overlooked in the overarching theme of ‘remilitarization’.  
 
 Independent variable: Strategic environment  
 
As discussed, the strategic environment is assessed through the three critical 
components of clarity: (1) revisionism or expressed hostility to harm the state’s 
territorial integrity or core interests; (2) the economic and military capability to inflict 
harm on the state, which in turn depends on geography and technology; and (3) a sense 
of imminence (i.e. expectations that it will use its capability to inflict harm in short 
order) (Ripsman et al., 2016). The strategic environment surrounding Japan is assessed 
through its relations with China and North Korea because both meet the first condition 
regarding revisionism and hostility. It is also important to note that the US plays a 
crucial part in Japan’s strategic environment. This is not only because Japan relies on 
the US for its security but also because the attitudes of the US towards countries 
inevitably influence the way Japan formulates its grand strategy.  
 
Dependent variable of grand strategic adjustment: Deconstructing Japan’s 
security options based on four realist behaviours  
 
Scrutinising two cases to examine grand strategic adjustment inevitably poses a 
question of how these cases formulate a grand strategy. This section discusses how their 
combination represents Japan’s grand strategy. It also aims to identify the degree of 
militarisation concerning four balancing behaviours.  
 
First, the implication of each case should be examined. In the case of Article 9, it starts 
with the fact that Japan could not exercise CSD. Therefore, Japan cannot take up a role 
in both regional and international security in resolving conflicts through any military 
means. The allowance of it expands Japan’s role and capacity as well as enhances 
interoperability of the US alliance to share more ‘burden’ through defensive means 
(Hughes, 2013). On the other hand, the revision of Article 9, although depending on the 
details of the revision, may eliminate the constraints of non-possession of offensive 




The case of BMD is somewhat more defensive in nature. Its fundamental purpose is to 
deal with the attacks that involve ballistic missiles. Although its attacking ability against 
incoming missiles can be offensive, such capability is incorporated in the existing 
defence system so that the deployment and development of BMD are considered as an 
enhancement of defence capability. As with offence–defence balance, moving towards 
BMD development is a means to achieve security by maximising defence capability (i.e. 
defensive realist behaviour). Despite its defensive nature, there is one exceptional factor. 
That is ‘counter-strike capability’ or the ability to destroy the threat’s offensive 
capability as a first strike, which could be allowed through the revision of Article 9 (Ota, 
2009). Attacking for the sake of defence leads to the acquisition of offensive capability, 
shifting the strategy from defensive to offensive realist behaviour. What follows are four 
different grand strategies for Japan and how these would shift as foundational outcomes 
for hypothesis building.  
 
Soft balancing suggests that diplomatic focus with non-military tools constitutes a grand 
strategy (Arase & Akaha, 2010). In the case of Japan, such strategy can be approached 
by diplomatic dialogue with North Korea and economic interdependence with China as 
well as its engagement in regional institutions such as ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) and six-party talks. This implies there should be no 
development in both cases.  
 
Hedging suggests a situation in which a state cannot determine which balancing 
behaviour should be adopted while the state should flexibly prepare itself, leaving 
several options (Goh, 2005). In the case of CSD, the discussion of potential 
development and preparation for future deployment is underway. The same goes for 
BMD. Although the change can be expected, the essence of grand strategy prefers a 
status quo. Defensive realism contends that a state attempts to maximise its security 
capacity that takes place in the form of BMD development/deployment. This is because, 
as its name dictates, BMD is by definition a defence system that should be capable of 
dealing with incoming missiles from threats. Dedication towards it means the 
enhancement of defence capability, though, as discussed, not to the extent to which 
Japan acquires a counter-strike capability. On the other hand, offensive realism dictates 
that a state is by definition, an expansionist (Mmearsheimer 2001), which results in a 
permanent nature of conflicts in structure. As discussed, CSD constitutes an element of 
offensive realist behaviour that comes along with the possession of a counter-strike 
capability in BMD.  
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In measuring Japan’s strategic adjustment, the absence and presence of several types of 
behaviour in each case are under consideration (see Table 3.1). If there is no ongoing 
development or consideration of development, then Japan’s grand strategy is soft 
balancing. If Japan chooses to consider one or both of the cases and yet has not made a 
concrete decision to deploy BMD and reinterpret the constitution, then its grand strategy 
shifts to hedging. In case Japan decides to deploy BMD and its development with the 
absence of progress in CSD issue, the grand strategy shifts to defensive realist-oriented 
strategy. As the ultimate case where Japan pursues the CSD and counter capability of 
BMD, the shift in its grand strategy can be seen from defensive to offensive realist 
strategy.  
 
Table 3.1 Japan’s Grand Strategic Adjustment and Its Means 
Article 9 The development of BMD Type of behaviour 
× × Soft balancing 
△ △ Hedging 
〇 (CSD) 〇 (Deployment) 
Defensive realism 
◎ (Revision） 
◎ (Offensive capabilities) Offensive realism 
*◎ = further development, 〇 = development, △ = consideration of development,  
× = absence of development  
 
An overall assessment of the strategic environment surrounding Japan since the end of 
the Cold War should conclude that it has become increasingly more restrictive with 
increased clarity. The Japanese grand strategy shifted accordingly. The period between 
approximately 1998 and 2006 saw North Korea launch missiles, during which the 
strategic environment shifted from permissive to restrictive. It has been worsened by the 
gradually apparent hostility of China towards Japan and its economic and military rise, 
overtaking Japan’s military spending.  
 
The overall hypothesis so far is that in the relatively permissive environment, Japan 
would pursue soft balancing, while the gradual shift in the environment leads Japan to 
hedge. In the restrictive environment, Japan would shift its strategy from hedging to 
defensive realist strategy. Last, the more aggravated the strategic environment, the more 
likely Japan is inclined to shift from defensive to offensive realist grand strategy, 
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characterising and hypothesising its progressive yet gradual grand strategic adjustment. 
 
 Intervening Variables  
 
Most of the literature on Japan’s security policy widely covers the influence of leaders 
and other actors, institutions and the public. This section serves to rearrange the existing 
literature to provide empirically detailed and predefined intervening variables.  
 
 Leaders’ image  
As discussed, leaders’ image composes of two elements—strategic culture and political 
legitimacy—although the latter does not necessarily apply to bureaucrats who are 
argued to have a strong influence on policy-making in Japan (Johnson, 1995). Therefore, 
political legitimacy has a particular characteristic that comes into play when examining 
leaders who are politicians. While political legitimacy is a concept that can be applied 
more or less evenly to any democratic countries that emphasise the election, strategic 
culture is distinctive to a particular state. Japan is no exception.  
 
There are four strategic cultures—normalisation, US ally, middle-power 
internationalism and pacifism—whose ideological competition helps shape Japan’s 
grand strategy (Samuels, 2007). Normalisation strategic culture refers to the idea of 
abolishing existing constraints that make Japan ‘abnormal’, such as the pacifist 
constitution and the upgrade of the SDF. Strategic culture is also associated with the 
fundamental aim to distance the country from the US to pursue a more autonomous 
security policy. On the other hand, the strategic culture of a US ally, despite its 
similarities of normalisation to view the current constitution as barriers, suggests the 
necessity to achieve security within the development of the US-Japan security alliance. 
Internationalist strategic culture emerged after the end of the Cold War, which Soeya 
(2005) characterises as middle-power internationalisation, and emphasised international 
co-operation based on UN centralism through disaster relief, peaceful conflict resolution, 
ODA and FDI. Pacifism has a clear connection with ‘anti-militarism’ and emphasises 
unarmed neutrality and hence the preservation of the current pacifist constitution.  
 
Although those strategic cultures do not necessarily translate into one of the grand 
strategies mentioned before, strategic culture is a set of beliefs that influences 
decision-making. As Oros (2014) argues, individual leaders hold strategic ideas that can 
fall under one of the strategic cultures that compete to actualise into policy outcome. 
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NCR holds that the interaction of such strategic cultures depending on political contexts 
at a given time produces outcomes that do not have a clear connection with a particular 
strategic culture. The grand strategic adjustment occurs through ‘adjustment’, not 
suggesting a fundamental departure from the previous time. Therefore, it is assumed 
that leaders, based on the ideological competition, can adjust with reference to a 
dominant strategic culture among them at a given time.  
 
Examining leaders’ image requires the identification of leaders in security 
policy-making. Although empirical studies help delineate important leaders, regulations 
and laws that specify the role of actors in security policy-making are examined under 
the key intervening variable of domestic institutions. First, the prime minister is 
arguably the most critical actor in Japan (Shinoda, 2000; Uchiyama, 2013). As the 
Cabinet Law (1952) stipulates, the prime minister is the head of the Cabinet and is 
responsible for decision-making. The law confirms that individual ministers are in 
charge of their respective areas.  
 
As many argue, bureaucrats are almost inseparable when it comes to security 
policy-making in Japan. The ministers of defence and foreign affairs are included in 
‘leaders’. The inclusion of the MOFA is based in history. Before the MOD was 
upgraded from the DA, security policy was often co-ordinated through the MOFA 
(Fukuyama, 2013). The Act for Establishment of Ministry of Foreign Affairs stipulates 
that the MOFA is responsible for tasks concerning foreign policy, including national 
security. For instance, the MOFA has the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty Division in which, 
as Fukuyama (2013) observes, the most capable bureaucrats of the MOFA are allocated. 
This division is responsible for close co-ordination with the US for economics and 
security.  
 
The Act for Establishment of Ministry of Defence (1954) specifies the role of the MOD 
is the same as the MOFA: to construct security policy. In particular, according to 
National Government Organization Act (1948), each ministry has one administrative 
vice minister, whose role is crucial in connecting the minister and the ministry for 
policy-making and co-ordination. The prime minister tends to have personal and special 
advisors (Makihara, 2015), the latter of which hold an official position in the Cabinet as 
a special advisor to the prime minister. Personal advisors are unofficial, although 
finding a link of personal connection with the prime minister would help further 
illuminate leaders’ image. In sum, leaders include the prime minister, relevant Cabinet 
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members, administrative vice ministers from MOFA and MOD, and personal and 
official advisors to the prime minister.  
 
 State-society relations: The public and economic/societal groups 
 
As discussed, state-society relations refer to the relationship among the government, key 
economic groups and the public. The latter two are necessary resources to mobilise. In 
particular, the Japanese public is known for a strong aversion to security policy 
development that is embedded in the form of anti-militarism (Berger, 1996; Katzenstein, 
2008; Midford, 2006; Oros, 2008). Therefore, it is critical to note that leaders make 
cautious decisions on how to respond to the structure by prioritising political legitimacy 
and external threats. Japan has always enhanced international security co-operation 
thorough constitutional reinterpretation by stretching the implications of the original 
pacifist constitution. Such a reinterpretation is essentially dealt with in the Diet as 
policy-making because bills to propose a change in security policy have to be made into 
law, which requires, in general, more than half of the seats in both the Upper and Lower 
Houses (Neary, 2002). Therefore, political stability is essential to pursue security policy 
change and more broadly grand strategic adjustment.  
 
Another important aspect of the public in Japanese politics is its fluctuating support for 
the prime minister that resulted in six short reigns between 2006 and 2012. According to 
Carlson (2017), one reason is policy failure scandals, such as the lost pension records 
that weakened the LDP and the DPJ’s alleged inability to handle the 3.11 earthquake 
and subsequent nuclear meltdown. Regime change and change in prime minister within 
the same party often come with a shift in policy change, creating the image of de facto 
regime change (Kitaoka, 2008). A quintessential example is when Fukuda Yasuo took 
over the premiership from Abe within the LDP in 2007. Fukuda did not pursue Abe's 
initiative for the constitutional revision. This signifies political legitimacy that Japanese 
leaders have to take into account.  
 
The second element of the variables concerns societal/economic groups with vested 
interests. Security policy implementation involves the development of the existing 
military capability that is handled by the defence industry, such as the Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industry and Kawasaki Heavy Industry. This has more to do with the case of BMD. 
Because political corruption, such as bribes, between the MOD bureaucrats and 
business elites is well-documented (Hughes, 2009), it is likely the defence industry may 
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reflect its interests in defence policy drafted by the MOD. The second societal/economic 
group is Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), which is arguably the biggest business 
organisation to promote social and firms’ interests in economic policy-making, 
including policies concerning the defence industry. As a lobbying body, Keidanren plays 
a crucial role in negotiating with the government and co-ordinating respective interests 
(Yoshimatsu, 2005). There are several think tanks or quasi-governmental institutions 
that may have relevance to security policy-making in Japan. They are included because 
influential former politicians—often former defence ministers—and the so-called 
kokubō-zoku (politicians with defence expertise) are involved with lobbying power.  
 
Nippon Kaigi, arguably the largest right-wing group, is portrayed as the ‘most powerful 
lobbying group’ (Economist, 2015) and a ‘nationalist think tank’ (Economist, 2013). 
Abe is a member of this group along with other politicians who advocate constitutional 
revision with the stipulation of the military (Shiomi, 2016). The group may have 
enhanced the stance to advocate the constitutional revision that Abe already held as 
prime minister.  
 
The Japan Foundation Centre for Global Partnership, a semi-governmental institution 
founded by the MOFA, provides a channel where the US and Japanese politicians 
interact through an event called ‘Japan-American Cultural Society, the Exchange of 
Japan-US Lawmakers on National Security Issues’. Hisao Kyuma (former chief of LDP 
security policy research council), Tsutomu Kawara (former minister of defence) and 
even elites from the defence industry have been invited. Such interaction may influence 
the defence policy co-ordination with the US (M. Noda & Tanaka, 2009).  
 
The same goes for the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, which consists of a number of 
security- and defence-related politicians and business elites. The involvement of active 
or retired influential politicians can serve as a channel to maximise its lobbying power 
on security policy-making. Although these groups’ relative importance over the other 
intervening variables could be less significant, it is useful to trace the leaders’ personal 
connection through which decisive information can be transmitted from these groups 
and reflect on policy outcome. Scrutinising these groups also gives us a clue to examine 
the influence of kokubō-zoku.  
 
State-society relations primarily concern the cohesion of the government, parties and 
societies. Opposition parties are considered part of variables, while often the opposition 
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parties are not substantial in the case of Japanese politics. However, one of the periods 
for examining the two case studies deals with the regime change that shows the greater 
influence of opposition parties. Regarding the variable of domestic institutions, the 
institutional strengths of opposition parties can be measured simply by the votes and 
seats in the diet. Opposition parties could play a role in enlarging public dissatisfaction 
by attacking the ruling party or strongly opposing a particular security policy initiative. 
Thus, opposition parties, as part of the intervening variable, primarily entail to what 
extent they exert influence on security policy-making beyond their institutional capacity 
given by the seats they have.  
 
 Domestic institutions  
 
Domestic institutions are arguably the most complex variable in the Japanese political 
setting. Besides the general institutional settings of policy-making, domestic institutions 
often serve as internal barriers when Japan shifts its grand strategy to take more active 
roles in the international system. These barriers are what Katzenstein (1996) calls an 
‘institutionalised form of anti-militarism’ and all stem from the pacifist constitution. For 
instance, when it comes to constitutional reinterpretation to allow the right of 
self-defence, the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB) exerts a significant influence over 
policy-making. The process for enacting laws must undergo the examination work of 
the CLB, which is famously known as hō no bannin (‘the guardian of law’) (Sakata & 
Kawaguchi, 2014). Its role maintains constitutional consistency, and hence its identity is 
institutionalised as ‘anti-militarism’ to maintain the pacifist constitution.  
 
Moreover, enacting laws requires a simple majority in the Upper and Lower Houses. 
For instance, in 2012, the LDP only held a majority in the Lower House, suggesting the 
potential abandonment of policy initiatives by the rejection of the Upper House 
(Shinoda, 2013). One exception is to have the superiority of the Lower House over the 
Upper House. When the policy plan that has been approved by the Lower House is 
rejected in the Upper House, but when a re-vote in the Lower House exceeds two-thirds 
of the politicians in attendance favour of the policy plan, the law is passed (Neary, 
2002). Furthermore, Diet Law dictates a period within which the Diet must reach a 
decision (150 days with the right to extend once for 150 days) . If no decision is reached, 
then the policy plan is discarded (House of Representatives, 2014).  
 
Another key element of the variable is elections. Elections often put the current leaders 
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at the juncture as to whether they will be able to keep their policy initiatives towards the 
implementation. General elections have larger implications on security policy for 
several reasons. First, the change in the leader of the ruling party would substantially 
impact the course of security policy development (Kitaoka, 2008) . Second, particular to 
Japan, the Cabinet often exercises the right to dissolve the diet—the snap election—to 
maintain political stability whereby leaders prioritise ‘political legitimacy’ as part of the 
leaders’ dilemma (Catalinac, 2016). Last, even though the ruling party wins the general 
election despite some loss of seats, the ruling party swaps the prime minister because it 
is often considered a sign of the prime minister’s declining popularity and leadership 
(twice in 2009 and 2012 for the Lower House election and once in 2007 for the Upper 
House election). When leaders prioritise political stability, they do not spare resources 
to implement security policy initiatives. As the election campaign starts several months 
before an election, it may cause a delay when security policy initiatives are 
controversial. Thus, elections can be both a great indicator of the speed of security 
policy development and an institutional barrier when a controversial security policy is 
on the table.  
 
Although the above policy-making process in the domestic institution does not 
necessarily apply to the case of BMD, the constitution does impose significant 
constraints on BMD development. The self-imposed constraints—another 
institutionalised form of anti-militarism—that stem from the pacifist constitution, such 
as the ban on arms export, non-military use of space and CSD, are hindrances to the 
BMD development (Hughes, 2013). Such highly technological military equipment with 
huge potential costs is not an easy option to pursue if technological transfer and 
international collaboration are not allowed. In particular, the domestic defence industry 
cannot pursue international markets because the ban on arms export limits the 
development of space exploration, which often takes place through international 
collaboration (Morimoto, 2002). The legal framework in the 1990s and early 2000s did 
not permit such space usage. In the case of Japan, BMD is initially a US initiative, so 
the US is not only of critical importance but also a prerequisite partner to deploy the 
system. This means CSD also limits the interoperability between the US and Japan and 
hence the overall defence capability of Japan.  
 
The general development of BMD occurs through the co-ordination of the SDF and the 
MOD. However, the decision-making to deploy BMD requires the Cabinet’s decision, 
which involves the policy-making explained above. Although less significant, the 
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development of BMD requires a budget that must go through the policy-making process 
of the Budget Committee in the Diet. In sum, domestic institutions highlight potential 
barriers for pursuing the strategy of BMD. A breakdown of each intervening variable is 
provided in Table 3.2  
 
Table 3.2 Breakdown of Each Intervening Variable  
Intervening 
variable 





Elected leaders – politicians 
(with leaders’ dilemma)  
- US ally (MOFA, DA/MOD, some 
prime ministers, some LDP and DPJ 
politicians) 
- Normalisation (some prime 
ministers, LDP/DPJ politicians)  
- UN centrism  
- Pacifism (the Komeito [LDP’s 
coalition partner])  
Non-elected leaders – 
bureaucrats  
(without leaders’ dilemma)  




Policy-making framework  Laws and regulations such as who 
possesses the power to implement 
policies and a two-thirds majority to 
enact security-related laws 
Institutionally embedded 
anti-militarism  
Article 9 and its derivative, such as 
the ban on arms export and CSD 
(represented by the CLB) 
Elections  Potential to reshuffle leaders, such as 
the prime minister and leaders 
focused on prioritising political 
stability over strategic views  
   
State-society 
relations  
The public  The Cabinet support rate (over a 
security policy), which is known as 
the socially accepted norm of 
anti-militarism 
 Economic/societal groups  Keidanren, the defence industry, 
Nippon Kaigi, etc. 
 Opposition parties  DPJ and LDP  
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3.7 Hypotheses of Japan’s Incremental Grand Strategic Adjustment 
 
The final section of this chapter provides hypotheses by linking all the variables. First, 
as outlined, the assessment of the strategic environment surrounding Japan underscores 
the basic line to determine whether Japan shifts to a more realist-oriented grand strategy 
(either defensive or offensive) from hedging or soft balancing. Moreover, depending on 
the degree of the permissive or restrictive strategic environment, the strategy can shift 
within from soft balancing to hedging and from defensive to offensive realist type of 
behaviour. An actual outcome is left to the interaction of the intervening variables. Table 
3.3 and Figure 3.4 recaptures the operationalisation of NCR with hypotheses and an 
analytical model to analyse Japan’s grand strategic adjustment. 
 
 








H1 Soft balancing  A non-military tool to conduct Japan’s security 
policy. Neither CSD nor BMD is pursued because of 
the permissive nature of the given strategic 
environment. 
H2 Hedging Both CSD and BMD are under consideration but not 




In the restrictive environment, defensive capabilities 
are enhanced through BMD, and the constitutional 
revision may or may not be pursued depending on 
the need for external balancing.  
H4 Offensive realist In the more restrictive strategic environment, Japan 
actively pursues the full-degree of CSD or the 




Figure 3.4 NCR Analytical Model of Japan’s Security Policy  
 
Under soft balancing, that Japan neither pursues the development of BMD nor attempts 
constitutional revision/reinterpretation. Instead, it pursues security through non-military 
means, such as diplomacy and economic interdependence. Hedging includes some 
initial attempts or considerations of both constitutional revision and BMD. Defensive 
realist strategy suggests that Japan could deploy BMD for defensive purposes with the 
allowance of CSD, not including any counter-strike capability or any sorts while not 
aggressively pursuing the constitutional revision for a more active role in the 
international security. Last, with offensive realist strategy, Japan more actively seeks a 
way to achieve constitutional revision to attain a full degree of CSD with the pursuit of 
offensive military capability, such as counter-strike capability.  
 
The shift within the permissive and restrictive strategic environments depends on the 
interplay of the three intervening variables. The two concepts help hypothesize the 
intervening variables. In the case of CSD, political legitimacy plays a crucial role. As 








Is the strategic 
environment permissive 
or restrictive?  
restrictive 
Permissive  
Is the current 
government 
politically stable?  







1 Leader’s image  
2 State society relations/domestic 
institutions 
2 State society relations/domestic 
institutions 
1 Leader’s image  
2 Exerts more 
influence over 1 
1 Leader’s image  
2 State society 
relations/domestic institutions 
1 Leader’s image  
2 State society relations/domestic 
institutions 
1 Exerts more influence over 
2, but often echoes with each 
other 
2 Exerts more 
influence over 1 
H4 Offensive realism 





H3 Defensive realism 
Enhancing defence 




H2 Hedging  
BMD development 
ambiguously/ slight 
attempt to change 
constitution (2004-2006) 
H1 Soft balancing  
No significant change but 
under consideration of both 
BMD and constitution  
2001-2003? 
1 Exerts more 
influence over 2 
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aversion to CSD. Therefore, the restrictive environment and political stability are a 
quintessential condition to pursue CSD or revision of Article 9.  
 
On the other hand, with the bureaucratic politics model, information asymmetry can 
occur in the case of BMD because of its nature of high technicality that results in the 
bargaining of leaders in favour of bureaucrats (Sebata, 2010). Thus, in the case of BMD, 
the development is hypothesised to be ongoing regardless of political stability because 
the public is less influential without a specific channel to influence, such as elections. 
However, this should be unlikely in the restrictive environment, where there are not 
many options for a defensive realist strategy. In this sense, the thesis views the 
implications of the anti-militarism differently from most constructivists who argue for a 
more or less equal impact on overarching Japan’s security policy. While anti-militarism 
is institutionally embedded continues to exercise its power (Katzenstein, 1996), the 
thesis considers that in the case of BMD the socially accepted norm of anti-militarism is 
relatively absent. Therefore, the hypotheses of this thesis include the view there is a 
different degree of impact of anti-militarism in each case.  
 
From the following chapter, Japan’s security policy development is examined through 
the application of NCR, which starts with the assessment of the strategic environment 
since the post-cold war era. This is to examine the changing degree of 
restrictiveness/permissiveness of the strategic environment which determines the overall 
course of Japan’s security policy. After the assessment, the actual outcome is scrutinised 




4 Assessment of the Strategic Environment: Japan’s Behaviour 
Post-Cold War and In Future 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter presented the theoretical framework and its operationalisation in 
the case of Japan. Nevertheless, as long as the structure in a realist sense matters as a 
critical variable to test NCR, it is crucial to suggest how the structure theoretically could 
have impacted Japan’s security policy in the post-Cold War era. This chapter, therefore, 
serves as the theoretical assessment of Japan’s strategic environment with the theoretical 
predictions by a branch of realism(s).  
 
Both offensive and defensive realism are applied to put forward possible paths Japan 
could take. China and North Korea are chosen to constitute Japan’s main strategic 
concerns towards which Japan theoretically could show balancing behaviour. Many 
argue that since the 1990s Japan has begun to face two critical yet different types of 
threats from North Korea, with its hostile, albeit small, economic and military size, and 
from China, with ambiguity despite its substantial material rise in the region. As 
explained in the previous chapter, the assessment primarily pertains to the three 
conditions according to NCR:  
 
(1) revisionism or expressed hostility to harm the state’s territorial integrity or 
core interests; (2) the economic and military capability to inflict harm on the 
state, which in turn depends on geography and technology; and (3) a sense of 
imminence (i.e., expectations that it will use its capability to inflict harm in 
short order). (Ripsman et al., 2016, p. 46) 
 
‘Revisionism’ in this research refers to a state that influences a change in the status quo 
(i.e. regional balance of power through the change in military and economic capabilities 
and stance to challenge the status quo) (Mearsheimer, 2001).  
 
Furthermore, this chapter presupposes the strategic environment with the US-Japan 
alliance because of its significance in the region. It has been more than 65 years since 
Japan formed an alliance with the US. During this time, the US has shown 
predominance in IR as a superpower. In particular, the US-Japan alliance has taken a 
form of ‘the division of labour’: while Japan provides the ‘shield’ for defence, the US 
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supplies the ‘spear’ for an offence under its nuclear umbrella (Samuels & 
Heginbontham, 2018), which Pyle (2018) describes as an ‘unnatural intimacy’. Thus, in 
the context of East Asian security with US commitment to the region, a threat made 
towards the US is predicated on the assumption that it also is indirectly made towards 
Japan.  
 
4.2 The Rise of China  
 
 Breakdown of China’s Rise: Economy and Military Capabilities  
 
Although it is hard to pinpoint when China began its rise, by the early 2000s, China had 
shown signs of surpassing Japan’s economic might and military capabilities from a 
simple observation of GDP growth and size (World  Bank, 2018a) (see Figures 4.1 and 
4.2). As outlined above, the size of the economy does matter as one of the most 
fundamental elements to constitute a threat in a structural realist sense. While the size of 
the Japanese economy in 2004, for instance, was twice that of China, the annual growth 
of the Chinese economy—which experienced a 10-digit growth rate—was five times 
higher than Japan’s annual GDP growth (World Bank, 2018a). In fact, due to the 
10–15% annual rise in China’s defence expenditure, together with Japan’s almost 
unchanged level of the defence budget, China has spent more on defence than Japan 
since 2005. With these figures, Japan started to recognise China as a potential threat in 
2000 in its annually published defence white paper (Asahi Shimbun, 2000b).  
 
 






















Figure 4.2 Annual GDP Growth of US, China and Japan (retrieved from World Bank 
(2018a))  
 
China overtook Japan’s economy in 2011. By then, as Figure 4.3 shows, Chinese 
military expenditure was more than twice that of Japan. As of 2018, China has a defence 
budget that is five times larger than Japan’s and an economy twice the size (World Bank, 
2018a). Figure 4.4 shows us a striking feature of the formidable size of the Chinese 
economy. Calculating a state’s economic power using purchasing power parity (PPP), 
China’s PPP has already surpassed even the US since 2014. As of 2017, China’s PPP is 
20% more than the US.  
 
Figure 4.3 Annual Military Expenditure of US, China and Japan (Stockholm 


























Figure 4.4 Purchasing Power Parity of US, China and Japan (retrieved from World Bank 
(2018a)) 
 
Regarding China’s actual military capability, in the 1990s Japan and the US were 
concerned by China’s potential to launch a nuclear missile, making it the fifth country to 
officially possess nuclear weapons. The US NSC (2000) report indicates that China 
already possesses 40–50 intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles with one 
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. However, according to the report from the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), in the 1990s and early 2000s, most of 
the increasing defence expenditure in China was spent on modernising the military with 
a reorganisation of ground, navy and air forces. Hence military capabilities were 
considered limited in comparison to other nuclear powers as it was scheduled for 
completion by 2001 (IISS, 2000). That said, as of 1996, China already developed 
offensive capabilities of ICBM, and medium and short-range ballistic missiles – Japan 
is in its range. This suggests China had already a capacity to inflict harm to Japan. By 
2006, China reported that a domestically produced nuclear attack submarine was 
underway for imminent operation (IISS, 2006).  
 
However, the landscape has gradually changed as the Chinese military proceeded its 
modernisation and development in the 2000s (Fisher, 2008). China succeeded in its 
space mission in 2003 through the launch of Shenzhou-V as a military satellite with 
more efforts to be made for ‘self-sufficiency’ by harnessing the military-industrial 
complex, together with increased R&D (IISS, 2004). This echoes with increasing 
uncertainty and a lack of transparency on the breakdown of the Chinese military budget. 




























































































































notably absent are details on military-related expenditures such as the procurement of 
weapons from abroad, state subsidies to the defence industry and R&D programmes 
(IISS, 2006).  
 
In 2010, the U.S. Department of Defense put forward estimates of the degree of 
modernisation of Chinese military (modern warfare capability), such as firing anti-ship 
cruise missiles and developed combat aircraft (IISS, 2010). This went in tandem with 
the acquisition and deployment of aircraft carriers and newly developed combat aircraft. 
What is notable is the resources shifting into the navy and air forces in China with more 
aggressive and obvious behaviour to expand regional influence over the East and South 
China Sea, which includes a territorial dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with Japan 
(IISS, 2012). This results in the increased number of vessels, submarines and aircraft 
carriers with combat aircraft. Subsequently, China reorganised its military structure for 
more direct preparation for ‘conflicts’ or ‘confrontation’ due to the structural transition 
from seven ‘military regions’ to five ‘theatre commands’ (IISS, 2017). While the 
Northern Theatre Command is primarily for the Korean Peninsula with the potential 
inclusion of Japan, the Eastern Theatre Command is for Taiwan and possibly Japan. 
China’s expansion and enhancement of its military capability reached the point where 
China officially built its first foreign military facility in Djibouti in 2017, increasing its 
destabilising impact in the region and more obvious revisionist stance, which seems to 
be a critical threat to Japan (New York Times, 2017).  
 
From the above argument, concerning the criterion of ‘threats’—the economic and 
military capability to inflict harm on the state, which depends on geography and 
technology—it seems China already possessed military capability per se to inflict harm 
to Japan since the 1990s (Fisher, 2008). However, its military budget rose to take over 
Japan in 2005 and the economy surpassed that of Japan since 2011. Together with 
modernised Chinese military forces, it is safe to say that at least since the mid-2000s, 
China began to meet the condition that contributes to the ‘restrictive strategic 
environment’.  
 
 China’s Revisionism from the Perspective of Japan and Sino–Japanese Relations  
 
There are two perspectives to examine Sino–Japanese relations with reference to realist 
paradigm: (1) cross-strait relations in which Japan might become entangled in the name 
of its US alliance and (2) its expansion of the regional influence over territorial issues to 
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see its revisionism (Fravel, 2007). Examination of the literature on these three issues 
enables us to see the remaining conditions to assess the strategic environment. In short, 
China’s revisionism stance has strengthened with the increased likelihood of inflicting 
harm on Japan within an increasingly restrictive strategic environment.  
 
Cross-strait relations and Japan’s potential involvement  
 
‘Cross-strait relations’ generally refers to the relationship between China and Taiwan 
and the political status of Taiwan, which is separated by the Taiwan Strait in the West 
Pacific Ocean, close to the Ryukyu Islands in Japan and partly consists of the East 
China Sea (Zuo, 2016). The term primarily stems from the Korean War and the 
ideological chasm between the US and China during the Cold War. For the US, despite 
the absence of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, there has been tension between the 
US/Taiwan and China.  
 
Although Japan did not meddle with the US regarding the Cross-Strait issues during the 
Cold War, since the mid-1990s, both the MOFA minister and the chief Cabinet secretary 
publicly stated that a renewed US-Japan Guidelines for Security Cooperation includes 
Japan’s co-operation in the conflict (Asahi Shimbun, 1997a). This is all the more 
significant because Japan showed its willingness to join a potential conflict right after 
the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. It caused a series of missile tests and military drills 
surrounding the Taiwan Strait due to the statement of Taiwan’s president in the US to 
move away from the one-China policy (Zuo, 2016). The US responded by sending the 
largest display of US military power in Asia since the Vietnam War (Bush, 2005). This 
shows that whenever China uses the military to challenge the status quo, the US 
inevitably gets involved.  
 
In the early 2000s, the tension did not seem to ease through the agreement of the 1992 
consensus, namely, that there is one China with disagreement over what it means to both 
sides, with the increasing aggressive stance of China (Mearsheimer, 2014). However, 
the Anti-Secession Law was passed at China’s 10th National People’s Congress in 2005. 
This stipulates that a military means to resolve the Cross-Strait tensions are no longer 
excluded as an option, showing a more aggressive stance with the willingness to use 
coercive force (Lee, 2011). It is also noteworthy that the US has engaged in military 
sales to Taiwan to strengthen its military capabilities since 1979, making itself the 
ninth-largest recipient of arms from the US (Albert, 2018). Amongst such sales, the one 
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in 2010 was outstanding in that the Obama administration announced it would sell 6.4 
billion USD worth of antimissile systems, against which China terminated all the 
military ties with the US, such as military exchange (Browne & Solomon, 2010).  
 
As Dittmer (2017) argues, despite Xi Jinping’s inauguration, which seemed to 
accelerate China’s revisionist stance, cross-strait relations remained relatively stable. 
Not many events occurred under the pro-China party, such as the Third Taiwan missile 
crisis. However, this does not mean the tension was mitigated. As a plan, China made it 
very clear that the reunification of Taiwan is one of the critical national goals under 
what it is called ‘the Chinese Dream’.  
 
Such seemingly relative stability did not last. The election and administration of U.S. 
President Donald Trump agitated relations with China and the tension in the Taiwan 
Strait. The election of Tsai Ing-wen, along with her refusal to accept the 1992 consensus 
and seek independence for Taiwan, had a similar effect (Hu, 2018). In particular, Trump 
broke a taboo by having official contact with President Tsai by phone, to which China 
responded by sending an aircraft carrier to the Taiwan Strait (BBC, 2016). Accordingly, 
at the five-year National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping 
suggested dealing with any form of Taiwan independence attempts with its military 
capabilities (Ping, 2017). Since then, China increased its pressure on Taiwan for 
reunification by cutting off diplomatic communications, imposing economic sanctions 
and excluding Taiwan from participating in international forums with more military 
exercises (Mazza, 2018). With the worsening US-China relations, tensions have 
increased, and there is the potential for conflict, which may get Japan involved.  
 
Chinese expansion of regional influence: East Asia and the South China Sea  
 
As China grew economically and militarily, its stance towards territorial disputes 
became more assertive and aggressive (Montogomery, 2014). There was a clear attempt 
to change the balance of power in the Asia Pacific region. 
 
Regarding the territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which more directly 
concern Japan than the South China Sea, Japan’s behaviour is a trigger for the issue. 
Since the 2000s, Japan has ensured its alliance with the US, in particular, Article 5 in the 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, 
applies to a potential military confrontation between Japan and China . This is because 
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Article 5 allows the US the right to military bases in Japan in exchange for the US 
pledge to defend Japan (Zagoria, 2015).  
 
The Senkaku Islands are located near the Ryukyu Islands and Taiwan, and Japan 
claimed sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands in 1985. The Senkaku incident in 2010 
involved Chinese trawlers ‘invading’ Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku 
Islands and the Japanese Coast Guard capturing Chinese crew members. Both China 
and Japan claimed sovereignty over the islands; hence, this incident caused protests by 
China (Japan Times, 2010). China prohibited the export of rare earth metal to Japan, 
which to the eye of Japanese policy-makers, was seen as China’s direct response to the 
incident despite no conceivable linkage between the incident and the ban of export (A. 
King & Armstrong, 2013).  
 
Since this incident in 2010, China has been more aggressive by sending vessels within 
the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. Such acts were further aggravated in 2012 
when then-Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara purchased and nationalised the islands. As 
a result, the number of Chinese vessels in the territorial sea area, which had been 
virtually none until 2011, increased by more than 100 in 2013 and continues to increase 
(Japan Coast Guard, 2018). Although the number of increased vessels did not cause 
Japan to take any coercive actions, some military analyses proposed that a military 
confrontation could happen at any time because of ‘individuals’, as the case of collision 
incident demonstrated (Luce & Johnson, 2016).  
 
According to Lim, Ju, and Li (2017), China’s growing assertiveness in the South China 
Sea confirms its revisionist stance. This poses a security challenge to Japan, although 
Japan is not directly involved in the territorial disputes. The South China Sea extends 
from the Karimata and Malacca Straits to the Taiwan Straits; the sea consists of 
maritime boundaries and islands, reefs and banks over which China, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei claim sovereignty. While the 
countries, including China, signed an agreement in 2011 to set a framework for 
resolving territorial disputes, China built and developed an artificial island even though 
the tribunal was issued to reject China’s sovereignty over the islands (Perlez, 2016). To 
Japan, the South China Sea is an essential route for importing goods; 80% of oil import 
is conducted through this sea lane (Yamada, 2016). The South China Sea has been 
regarded as ‘free of navigation’ by Japan and the US. However, if China kept enlarging 
its voice in the region and claimed it an exclusive economic zone, Japan would be 
68 
 
unable to import as it does now (Koda, 2016).  
 
Yet China has not shown any sign of slowing down its activities; rather, since 2015, it 
has gone so far as to build military facilities on the artificial island (Watkins, 2015). 
These actions strengthen the Chinese view of ‘protecting the territory’ (Watts & Dou, 
2018). The US kept weighing the disputes but did not delay the process of China’s 
expansion in the area. The US revealed that China seems to plan to place ‘floating 
nuclear power plants’ on the islands (Tweed, 2018).  
 
In summary, China has possessed the economic and military capability to inflict harm 
on Japan since the 2000s as it has both nuclear and offensive ballistic missiles (the first 
condition to constitute a threat). Given the emergence of territorial disputes with the 
increasingly accentuated China’s revisionism (Lim, Ju and Li 2017), which does not 
rule out ‘non-peaceful’ means to achieve security, China has grown its hostility to 
challenge Japan to harm the core interests of Japan (the second condition) (Fravel, 
2007). However, the sense of imminence (the third condition) is hard to measure 
because there is a lot of uncertainty (Kim, 2015). China, with its growth, has made the 
strategic environment ‘restrictive’ already in the 2000s and make it increasingly 
restrictive as time elapsed.  
 
4.3 North Korea  
 
Arguably, North Korea adds an extra sense of threat in comparison to China as it meets 
the three conditions to constitute a threat. North Korea emerged as a threat much earlier 
than China in the 1990s with a series of dangerous and sceptical behaviours. It is also 
important to note that the North Korean economy is absent in the analysis due to its 
small size—its value is less than 0.01% of the world economy.  
 
 North Korean Development of Military Capability  
 
While a military confrontation between North and South Korea was a concern to Japan 
during the Cold War era, it was not until the 1990s that North Korea emerged as a 
potential threat in East Asia with a missile test (known as the 1993–94 first North 
Korean nuclear crisis). There was already a strong sense of danger from North Korea, 
who pursued nuclear weapons by secretly building a plutonium plant at Yongbyon 
despite the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1985 (Niksch, 
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2010). Eight years later, in response to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
which inspected the process of shutting down nuclear-related facilities and concluded 
that North Korean efforts lacked transparency and were insufficient, North Korea 
withdrew from the IAEA. In 1994, however, North Korea agreed to denuclearisation in 
exchange for a security guarantee and economic aid from the US and its allies 
(Michishita, 2010). Japan did not and still does not have any diplomatic relations with 
North Korea, thus enhancing uncertainty and potential risks to regional stability.  
 
What turned out to be decisive proof for North Korean military capability was the 1998 
missile test of Taepodong-1, an intermediate-range ballistic missile, over Japan 
(Hagstrom, 2015). While North Korea already had developed Nodong-class missiles by 
then, which put Japan within its range, the 1998 missile test showed that North Korea 
could launch a missile to hit a target without any malfunctions mid-course (Niksch, 
2010). Furthermore, North Korea officially withdrew from the NPT in 2003 . The stated 
reason for its withdrawal was the US’s hostile policy towards North Korea and the 
threat of a pre-emptive nuclear strike (Kouo, 2006). This explicit hostility towards the 
US put Japan in a crisis because the US is Japan’s most significant ally, the US has 
military bases in Japan, and Japan has no diplomatic relations with North Korea.  
 
Since then, North Korea has continued to upgrade its military capability. Although 
North Korea made occasional attempts to justify its use of nuclear powers for civilian 
purposes, Forster (2014) argues that it can provide only local electricity, not the national 
level. In 2005, North Korea openly admitted that it has developed and now possesses 
nuclear weapons (New York Times, 2006). While the US increasingly termed North 
Korea as the ‘axis of evil’, along with Iran and Iraq, North Korea made constant threats 
towards the US, such as a statement that implied it would provide nuclear weapons to 
terrorists if the US continued its hostility towards North Korea (Davenport, 2018).  
 
Following the unsuccessful six-party talks amongst China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, 
South Korea, and the United States, North Korea tested the Taepodong-II in 2006. 
While North Korea claimed its 1998 launch involved a rocket, in 2006, it officially 
tested seven missiles, including short and medium-range missiles, and detonated a 
nuclear device (Niksch, 2010). Clear development of North Korean missile capability is 
seen in 2009 when North Korea conducted missile and nuclear tests. Two three-stage 
Taepodong-II missiles were launched: the first was a satellite and the second flew more 
than 3,000 km, increasing the probability of inflicting harm to even the US (Hess, 2009). 
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In the face of the threat from the US, North Korea used the missile test to prove its 
possession of a nuclear weapon to protect itself. North Korea also withdrew from the 
six-party talks, which was the solo channel of official dialogue through which multiple 
parties could negotiate and exert pressure (Michishita, 2010). 
 
Another change occurred when North Korean leader Kim Jong Il died in 2011 and his 
son Kim Jong Un succeeded him at the age of 28. Initially, it was uncertain whether the 
behaviour of North Korea would change and how long the young leader would remain 
in power (Buzo, 2018). However, North Korea again showed off the development of its 
missile capability through two missile tests in 2012. According to Kang (2013), the 
main development is the successful combination of uranium centrifuge facility and 
ICBM. This combination means North Korea has the capability to put an ICBM in the 
targeted satellite orbit with an enhanced range.  
 
Meanwhile, North Korea’s intention to inflict direct harm on Japan is evident. In 2013, a 
North Korean newspaper reported that should Japan participate in a potential military 
confrontation with the US and South Korea against North Korea, Japan would be hit by 
a nuclear weapon (Asahi Shimbun, 2013j). Then in 2017, North Korea conducted 
missile tests almost every month, particularly after Trump took office. The relationship 
between the US and North Korea has never been worse since the Cold War ended. In 
Trump’s ‘fire and fury’ speech, he warned North Korea that the US would use force 
against it (Zeleny, Merica & Liptak, 2017).  
 
In addition, on 15 September 2017, North Korea issued an official statement declaring 
that the ‘Japanese archipelago must be sunk with nuclear bombs’ (Griffiths, Cohen & 
Berlinger, 2017). While North Korea did not directly imply an attack on Japan—at the 
most, it implied an attack on the US military bases in Japan-North Korea and its media 
an intention to attack Japan’s soil 17 times in 2017 alone (Shiva, 2018). This is 
particularly because North Korean missile tests demonstrate that North Korea is capable 
of launching a missile with a miniaturised nuclear weapon, reachable to the US soil 
(Warrick,Nakashima & Fifield, 2017). Henry Kissinger remarked that ‘if they [North 
Korea] continue to have nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons must spread in the rest of 
Asia’, with the possibility of Japan to have nuclear weapons (D. E. Sanger,Sang-Hun & 
Rich, 2017).  
 
Although the heightened expectation of war has been mitigated somewhat by the 2018 
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North Korea–US summit to agree on a bilateral framework to move towards 
denuclearisation, the strategic environment, already restrictive, is more so than ever.  
 
4.4 Assessment of Japan’s Strategic Environment in the 21st Century 
 
Following the two countries’ development of military capability and a brief outline of 
relations with Japan, this section examines if and when North Korea and China (will) 
meet the criteria of evaluating the strategic environment, and whether and to what extent 
it is ‘restrictive’ or ‘permissive’. The criteria are ‘(1) revisionism or expressed hostility 
to harm the state’s territorial integrity or core interests; (2) the economic and military 
capability to inflict harm on the state, which in turn depends on geography and 
technology; and (3) a sense of imminence (i.e., expectations that it will use its capability 




Since the late 1990s, China began to meet the second condition of a threat: the 
economic and military capability to inflict harm (Fisher,  2008). First, as the gap in 
military expenditure started to close between Japan and China, its missile 
capabilities—short, medium and long-range—enhanced. The Chinese military can 
inflict harm on Japan with its number of personnel and nuclear warheads. Despite the 
rise of its economy and military, there seems to be no intention to inflict harm nor 
revisionism.  
 
The 2000s began to have a change in the regional balance of power that confirmed 
China’s nascent revisionist behavior (Mearsheimer, 2014). Until 2004, Japan had been 
the largest economy with the largest military budget in the region. This status changed 
when China increased its military expenditure and experienced a 10-digit growth in its 
economy. The balance of power theory dictates that Japan, as a status quo power, is 
encouraged by the structure to begin balancing against China; therefore, the strategic 
environment regarding China in the 2000s onwards can be characterised as restrictive.  
 
A larger and acute extent of change is observed in the 2010s as China not only overtook 
the Japanese economy but also displayed its revisionist stance and behavior (Lim, Ju 
and Li 2017). In particular, this is seen with China’s stance towards territorial disputes 
such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. As if the degree of revisionist stance is 
72 
 
commensurate with its larger economy, China has become more assertive towards Japan. 
In the first half of the 2010s, China seemed to include a coercive means to realise its 
interests (Mearsheimer, 2014). As discussed, China began meeting the first condition 
(revisionism) and second condition (hostility to inflict harm to Japan), while the third 
condition (a sense of imminence) is uncertain.  
 
In the second half of the 2010s, while meeting the first and second conditions, a sense 
of imminence may have been seen in China’s militarisation of an artificial island in the 
South China Sea over which it claims sovereignty, which largely jeopardised its 
neighbouring countries, including the US (New York Times, 2017). As tensions between 
the US and China have intensified, the increased likelihood of confrontation between 
the two directly increases the sense of imminence to Japan. Japan has faced a restrictive 
strategic environment since the 2000s, the degree of which certainly and sharply 
increased with time.  
 
 North Korea  
 
The similar pattern of increasing ‘restrictiveness’ of Japan’s strategic environment with 
regard to North Korea is seen, while a sense of imminence has been more acute than the 
case of China. North Korea emerged as a potential threat to destabilise the region in the 
1990s during which North Korea tested missiles twice over Japan (Michishita, 2010). 
This confirms North Korea’s potential to inflict harm on Japan despite the small size of 
its economy.  
 
In the 2000s, North Korea’s capability was not only confirmed but also strengthened by 
the development of its missile and official admittance of possessing nuclear weapons 
(Kang, 2013). North Korea officially withdrew from the negotiation table from the 
six-party talks and withdrew from the legally binding NPT, substantially increasing its 
perception as a threat (Niksch, 2010). In the 2000s, North Korea thus began to meet the 
first condition, together with the second condition, to evaluate the strategic environment 
and resulted in making the strategic environment ‘restrictive’ to Japan.  
 
The strategic environment worsened to a more substantial degree in the 2010s. Its 
constant development of missile technologies should be mentioned, as the tension 
between North Korea and the US was heightened. North Korea officially showed an 
intention to inflict harm on Japan without hesitation, even using nuclear weapons, 
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which added an acute sense of imminence as the third condition (Davenport, 2018). 
North Korean brinkmanship has intensified to the point where, in 2017, it implied an 
attack on Japan 17 times (Shiva, 2018). Thus, since the 2010s, North Korea—in the 
eyes of Japan—has met all the conditions and made the strategic environment more 
restrictive than ever.  
 
 Conclusion: Japan’s Behaviour in the Changing Strategic Environment   
 
Since the 2000s, Japan has faced an increasingly restrictive strategic environment in 
which theory dictates it should balance against the two threats. Since the 2010s, the 
environment is almost extremely restrictive to Japan. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, two theoretically driven behaviours are expected to be seen. In the name of 
defensive realism, Japan would focus on enhancing defensive capabilities through BMD, 
and constitutional revision would not be actively pursued (Lind, 2004). However, Japan 
would seek external balancing with the US, suggestive of the constitutional 
reinterpretation to eliminate some of the obstacles (Watanabe, 2016). This all depends 
on the restrictiveness of the strategic environment. Nonetheless, since the 2010s, the 
further restrictiveness indicates that the degree of enhancing BMD would be furthered 
and the likelihood of pursuing CSD will be substantially increased.  
 
Another path that Japan could theoretically take is driven by offensive realism. With the 
maximisation of power as a prime means to achieve security, Japan will not only 
enhance BMD but also pursue offensive capabilities, even in BMD, such as 
counter-strike capabilities, including cruise missiles and aircraft carriers (Takahashi, 
2005). Moreover, as the constitution prohibits the possession of offensive weaponry and 
CSD as well as resolving disputes through a threat of use of military force, a 
constitutional revision would be pursued, the likelihood of which would increase further 
during the 2010s.  
 
Japan proceeded with CSD and BMD since the 2000s by introducing BMD in 2003 and 
a limited allowance of CSD in 2015 with further development of BMD, including the 
potential acquisition of offensive capabilities, along with the increased efforts to revise 
the constitution (Oros, 2017). Nevertheless, how, to what extent, and why Japan 
behaves/balances as it did and does deviate from both defensive and offensive realist 
interpretations. The next two chapters delve into the case studies of CSD and BMD. As 
the broader impact of the structure on Japan is delineated in this chapter, the following 
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case studies particularly focus on the intervening variables, their respective roles in 
shaping Japan’s behaviour, and how these intervening variables mediate the impact on 
structure through their causal mechanisms. The first case is the constitutional 
reinterpretation/revision, which has surrounded the debate of Japan’s security policy for 
almost seven decades. Whilst many factors are argued to be influential, the case studies 
trace how the intervening variables come into play to explain Japan’s behaviour 
between 2004 and 2018.   
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5 Case Study I: Constitutional Reinterpretations/Revision  
 
5.1 Introduction: Evolution of Constitutional Reinterpretation  
 
This case study examines the relationship between Japan’s grand strategy and the 
constitution with its interpretations to argue that the accumulation of past 
(re)interpretations had been a prime means to adjust to the strategic environment. It also 
demonstrates that as the strategic environment has become more restrictive, the 
constitutional reinterpretations as the means have faced their limitations, leading to the 
evermore real possibility of the constitutional revision. The way in which the 
constitution is reinterpreted and the move towards the constitutional revision indicates 
Japan’s multiple grand strategic adjustments over the last two decades.  
 
The simple examination of the strategic environment does not tell us the degree to 
which Japan responded, which may have been considered a ‘structural anomaly’ or 
‘delayed’ in neo-realist perspectives. The case study therefore extensively investigates 
the intervening variables—domestic factors—to determine under what conditions Japan 
has (not) responded to the strategic environment. This chapter traces and establishes the 
link between the constitution with its interpretations and Japan’s security policy from 
the enactment of the constitution until 2004, when the Cabinet embarked on the actual 
planning of the constitutional revision. 
 
The Constitution as an Institutionalised Symbol of ‘Pacifism’ 
 
Given Japan’s imperial past and loss in WWII, the constitution was recreated during the 
US occupation. Article 9 of the constitution—the so-called pacifist clause—reads as 
follows: 
 
“ARTICLE 9. (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice 
and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 
(2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, 
as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized” (Cabinet, 1946a). 
 
Article 9 does not necessarily specify any concrete details and therefore has no 
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legally-binding effects; rather, it acts as guidance (Tsujimura, 2016). For instance, it 
does not mention the right of self-defence or even differentiate it between individual 
self-defence and CSD. Concerning the ‘political question’, in the famous Sunagawa 
case the Supreme Court in Japan admitted there is no unanimous interpretation of the 
constitution and it has to be interpreted by the government not the court (Oppler, 1961). 
This has left room for ‘interpretation’ of the constitution, which is how the government 
and policymakers reflect their views on the interpretation. Although there is ambiguity 
as to how the reinterpretation will take place, three acts are fixed and constitutionally 
prohibited: (1) the renunciation of war as a sovereign right, (2) the non-possession of 
‘war potential’ and (3) the renunciation of the right of belligerency of the state. In 
combination with the third act, Japan is constitutionally unable to behave in a hostile 
manner or engage in combat with aggressive or assertive intent (Hatake, 2006).  
 
Even this very constitution includes ‘the government interpretation’, which in the end 
allows the right of individual self-defence. The original constitution lacked the phrase 
‘to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph’; it was proposed by Hitoshi Ashida, 
who served as chair of the ‘Special Constitutional Revision Committee’, and was added 
by the Diet during a debate (Dower, 1999). This phrase was added to recognise the right 
of individual self-defence. Without it, the constitution implies that land, sea and air 
forces will never be maintained. However, adding this phrase specifies that Japan’s 
ultimate goal is to ‘aspir[e] sincerely to an international peace based on justice and 
order’, taking precedence over the second clause of non-possession of land, sea and air 
forces. This suggests that if a country wages war against Japan, then Japan can 
implement some military measures for the sake of international peace based on ‘justice 
and order’—a concept known as the ‘Ashida amendment’ (Urata, 2017).  
 
Arguably, this lack of specification of the right of self-defence and the ambiguity of the 
pacifist constitution as a whole serves as a malleable concept. Figuratively speaking, the 
very ambiguity and the means of constitutional ‘interpretation’ for the government 
planted a seed for later generations to nurture the state’s latent realist sense to full 
blossom with its substantial expansion through subsequent reinterpretations, which took 







Two Ways to Change the Implication of the Constitution: ‘Cabinet Decision’ and 
‘Enactment of Law’ 
 
The interpretation of the constitution changed substantially in two ways within 10 years 
of its enactment. First, there was the enactment of new laws to institutionally fix the 
reinterpretation of the constitution. It started in 1952 with the establishment of the 
predecessors to the SDF—the Coastal Safety Force and National Safety Force—which 
were created with the newly created law to recognise their entities (Dower, 1999). 
Inevitably, there was a discussion as to ‘war potential’ and non-possession of land, sea 
and air forces. At this point, Shigeru Yoshida, the then-prime minister, took a stand on 
non-possession of the right of self-defence and defined ‘war potential’ as military units 
or capabilities that could be used in ‘modern warfare’ (Kusunoki, 2009). In providing a 
definition, he stated these two forces were no different than the police force as a Cabinet 
decision (seihu kenkai).  
 
However, this interpretation soon changed due to the shifting strategic environment 
through the Korean War and the emerging ideological conflict between liberalism and 
communism. Known as ‘reverse course’, the US requested that Japan establish a 
military force given the dispatch of the US military to Japan for the Korean War (Sasaki 
& Nakanishi, 2017). Accordingly, in 1957 the Hatoyama Cabinet issued a decision to 
put forward a new reinterpretation of the constitution that recognised the right of 
self-defence, a stance almost permanently fixed through the enactment of the 
Self-Defence Law to create the SDF (Buckley, 1992). The huge difference lies in the 
interpretation: while the Yoshida statement did not anticipate Japan’s role against any 
foreign attacks, Hatoyama’s interpretation redefined the role of military forces for 
national defence (Inada & Satou, 2011). Due to the ambiguity of the constitution, such 
interpretation is not as constrained as it seems. Rather than revising the constitution, 
Japan chose to reinterpret the constitution to respond to the strategic environment.  
 
Japan’s Avoidance of the Strategic Environment: The Effective Use of the 
Constitution to Maintain Autonomy During the Cold War  
 
Post-WWII, policymakers often made the most of the ‘constitutional barrier’ to resist 
the incentives given by the strategic environment, which ultimately is firmly entrenched 
institutionally as the grand strategy of the Yoshida Doctrine. Yoshida, the then-prime 
minister, used the constitution as a shield and bargaining power (Pyle, 2007). Ultimately, 
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Japan upgraded the small military force to the SDF, which was half the size requested 
by the US. While the agreement of Mutual Defence Assistance (MDA) was signed, the 
Cabinet decision was issued to reassure there constitutionally would be no possibility of 
the SDF being dispatched overseas to help the US (House of Councilors, 1954),  
 
In the 1960s, Japan further institutionalised its resistance to establish a 
military-industrial complex by making the ban on arms export a Cabinet 
decision—known as self-imposed constraints (Tomita, 2011). This was further 
strengthened in the 1970s to restrict even the transfer of technology.  
 
In addition to the government, institutions also rallied around the constitution. For 
instance, the Science Council of Japan stated upon its establishment in 1950 that 
research about war would not be conducted. The statement was renewed in 1967 to 
include a prohibition on research for military purposes (Science Council of Japan, 
2017).  
 
To suppress US pressure to expand the SDF’s role and its size, the additional 
interpretation was given to Article 9, ‘the minimum necessary for self-defence’. It 
played a role in limiting Japan’s potential for enhancing military capability. In the Diet 
debate, questions arose as to the financial limit on the ‘security capability to the 
minimum necessary degree’ for the sake of the constitution because the ambiguity lies 
in the definition of itself (House of Representatives, 1962). Ikeda, the then-prime 
minister, stated that given the economic circumstances, the defence budget should 
always be the minimum degree necessary in the 5-year medium-term defence plan, 
issued in 1962 (House of Representatives, 1962).  
 
Since 1967, the defence budget has been less than 1% of GDP, which was 
institutionalised through a Cabinet decision in 1971 favouring a 1% ceiling on defence 
spending. The justification for this drove a wedge against US pressure as Michitaro 
Sakata, the then-chief of the DA, stated that as long as the US-Japan security alliance 
maintains, the defence budget obviates more than 1% of GDP on defence expenditure 
(House of Representatives, 1975). Given the increasing use of space for military 
exploration, later dubbed ‘Star Wars’, the Diet debate suggests there was a growing 
concern for Japan’s potential use of space for military purposes both domestically and 
internationally (House of Representatives, 1969a). This led to the Cabinet decision to 
restrict the use of space for only ‘peaceful purposes’ (House of Representatives, 1969b), 
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the definition of which is much stricter than the International Space Law that allows the 
use of space for military purposes, such as spy satellites, unless it is for nuclear weapon 
tests (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011). 
 
As Pyle (2007, p. 235) explains, ‘Japan would respond to US pressure with the 
minimum concessions necessary to maintain the alliance relationship, invoking the 
constitution to justify the minimalist approach’. Furthermore, ‘As the years of the Cold 
War system stretched out, his [Yoshida’s] successors took his tactical approach and 
made it doctrine. They elaborated it into a grand strategy that reverberated for many 
years to come’ (Pyle, 2007, p. 240). Japan eventually succeeded in avoiding 
involvement in the international system as it wanted and maintained autonomy despite 
the strong external pressure and the changing strategic environment during the Cold 
War.  
 
Japan’s nascent adjustment to the strategic environment through constitutional 
‘reinterpretation’ post-Cold War  
 
Although Japan resisted the incentives from the strategic environment given its 
unprecedented economic growth during the Cold War era, Japan finally adjusted to the 
strategic environment in the 1990s. This is primarily because Japan’s grand strategy was 
predicated on the reassurance of US security providence, which was a critical juncture 
after the disappearance of the Soviet Union, gave rise to US engagement in East Asia 
(Green, 2001). Japan’s substantial financial contributions to the Gulf War without ‘boots 
on the ground’—130 billion USD—were not appreciated by the US. In hindsight, this 
was a turning point for policymakers in Japan because its grand strategy based on the 
Yoshida Doctrine no longer justified an economy first and security second approach 
(Funabashi, 1997).  
 
Japan could not immediately respond to the post-Cold War era, however, because it had 
spent decades mobilising considerable political resources to establish a variety of 
constitutional barriers (Pyle, 2007). Japan, therefore, adopted a gradual process to 
change the self-imposed interpretation, such as the prohibition of CSD, that once served 
its national interests and again manipulate it for security purposes. This ‘reverse course’ 
was no mean feat because established interpretations are not only institutionally fixed 




The first attempt to revise the constitutional interpretation occurred in the midst of the 
Gulf War in 1991 to legalise ‘the dispatch of the SDF overseas’ to non-conflict zones in 
PKOs (Funabashi, 1997). The restriction to non-conflict zones lay in the constitutional 
interpretation. The constitution does prohibit the use of force per se and a means to 
settle international disputes, and most PKO missions involve the use of force.  
 
Now that the dispatch of the SDF was allowed, albeit at that time only for PKOs, it was 
not difficult to extend its application to the context of the US-Japan alliance. This 
attempt materialised in the US-Japan Defence Cooperation in 1997, along with the 
packages of legislation, as the Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan Law (The Law 
Concerning Measures to Secure Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas 
Surrounding Japan) (Fisher, 1999). The most significant part of this legislation in light 
of the past constitutional is the fact that ‘areas surrounding Japan’ were intentionally 
ambiguous; ‘areas surrounding Japan’ is not geographic but situational (M. Noda, 1998). 
Japan, depending on the ‘situation’, could provide logistical support, facilities such as 
airports and rear area support even when the US is engaged in combat operations 
(MOFA, 1997). The guidelines are criticised for the ‘erosion of Japanese pacifism’ 
(Fisher, 1999). Combined with the US alliance and PKO missions, there are virtually no 
geographical limits as to the role of the SDF as long as its involvement lacks the use of 
force.  
 
In addition, the Anti-terrorism Law and the Special Iraq Law allow the SDF to engage 
in US-led military operations via logistical support. This support includes the transport 
of military weapons and ammunition, which is controversial in the form of ittaika, 
whereby indirect participation in the use of force by other militaries violates the 
conditions against the use of force (Kliman, 2006). The use of force overseas was 
constitutionally prohibited because it is highly likely to violate the prohibition of CSD. 
Furthermore, the concept of the use of force was slightly expanded by the amendment 
of the PKO law. This allows the SDF to join the UN Peacekeeping Force by using the 
force not only for self-defence but also for the protection of military equipment, thereby 
expanding the areas of the SDF’s activity (M. Noda, 1998).  
 
In a nutshell, the constitutional reinterpretation evolved around the strategic 
environment. As an effective diplomatic shield, the constitutional interpretations had 
developed in a way in which policymakers kept the US pressure at bay during the Cold 
War. However, having been acutely aware of the incompatibility of the constitutional 
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interpretation regarding the expectation of the international security environment, Japan 
rose to the occasion by adjusting its constitutional interpretations step by step. It all 
began with the stretch of the constitutional interpretation to allow the possession of the 
right of self-defence and necessary quasi-military organisation and capability. Because 
the constitution does not specify the right of self-defence in any explicit manner, the 
concept of self-defence has been highly political where the interests and intentions of 
policymakers are wielded through the reinterpretation (Dower, 1999).  
 
One critical hindrance in the constitutional interpretation is the use of force. Due to the 
constitutional prohibition, unless it is for self-defence, it is far-fetched to expand the 
concept of the conditions regarding the use of force more than the current interpretation. 
While the use of force abroad could be allowed in the protection of military weapons 
and for self-defence, as long as the use of force is based on self-defence, its detachment 
seems unthinkable through further constitutional reinterpretation (Boyd & Samuels, 
2005). Unless policymakers identify an alternative way, there seems to be a certain 
degree of limitation on the constitutional reinterpretation without revision. 
 
As expected, the Koizumi administration finally went on to argue the need for the 
allowance of CSD in 2004 and the constitutional revision. This is arguably when all the 
major constitutional reinterpretations regarding Article 9 and the relevant enactment of 
legislatures were completed, which inevitably led to the CSD. Because the nature of 
CSD is so controversial, many argue it is not constitutionally possible without revision. 
The debate regarding potential constitutional revision also intensified. Koizumi asked 
LDP officials to draft the constitution by 2005 when the LDP would celebrate 50 years 
since its establishment (Asahi Shimbun, 2005o) .  
 
 Hypotheses  
First, as outlined, the assessment of the strategic environment surrounding Japan 
underlines the basic line to determine whether Japan shifts to a more realist-oriented 
grand strategy (either defensive or offensive) from hedging or soft-balancing. Moreover, 
depending on the permissive or restrictive degree, the strategy can shift from soft 
balancing to hedging and from defensive to offensive realist type behaviour, the 
determinant of which is left to the role of the intervening variables. Japan has a means 
for each grand strategy. The option for soft balancing is that Japan purely does not 
attempt the constitutional revision/reinterpretation; instead, it pursues security through 
non-military means, such as diplomacy and economic interdependence. Hedging 
82 
 
includes some initial attempt or consideration of both constitutional revision and BMD. 
Defensive realist strategy suggests the allowance of CSD (limited) while not 
aggressively pursuing the constitutional revision for a more active role in international 
security. Last, with an offensive realist strategy, Japan looks for the way to achieve the 
constitutional revision to attain a full degree of CSD.  
 
The hypotheses of the outcome of Japan’s constitutional revision/reinterpretation 
depend on the interplay of the three intervening variables. The two concepts help to 
hypothesise the intervening variables. In the case of CSD, political legitimacy plays a 
crucial role. As discussed, the socially accepted norm of anti-militarism has empirically 
shown the aversion to CSD. Therefore, the restrictive environment, as well as political 
stability, is a quintessential condition to pursue CSD. Table 5.1 shows the hypotheses to 
analyse Japan’s grand strategic adjustment and proceed with the process tracing of the 
constitutional interpretation/revision in the following chapter.  
 






H1  Soft balancing  A non-military tool to conduct Japan’s security policy. 
CSD is pursued because of the permissive nature of the 
given strategic environment. 
H2  Hedging CSD are under consideration but not actively pursued in 
the relatively permissive strategic environment. 
H3  Defensive 
realist 
In the restrictive environment, defensive capabilities are 
enhanced, and the constitutional revision may or may not 
be pursued depending on the need for external balancing.  
H4  Offensive 
realist 
In the more restrictive strategic environment, Japan 












5.2 Constitutional Reinterpretation/Revision Between 2004 and 2008  
 
As discussed in the previous section, CSD has long been a sought-after objective for the 
LDP (Kitaoka, 2008). The Cabinet successfully manipulated the interpretation of the 
constitution, such as the war contingency laws and the PKO laws, where geographical 
limitations for the SDF were eliminated, and the only fundamental restriction is in the 
area of ‘the use of force’ (Fisher, 1999). CSD, where the use of force is allowed not only 
outside Japan but also for other countries, is possible through two means: constitutional 
revision or interpretation. Nevertheless, based on the CLB’s interpretation and the 
Cabinet statement, the constitutional revision seems at first glance to be the only way 
(Sakata & Kawaguchi, 2014). A nascent aggravating strategic environment in this 
period kept incentivising Japan to upgrade its defence capabilities by strengthening the 
US alliance through CSD or possibly go on to hard-balancing through offensive 
capabilities.  
 
However, constitutional revision is far more difficult than policymakers envisioned and 
requires co-ordination at all levels, including the public, opposition parties and coalition 
partner. Constitutional revision is predicated on an entire revision rather than a partial 
amendment. The period saw the evolvement of the discussion, paving the way for the 
long road to constitutional revision through the enactment of the referendum law. 
Therefore, symbolic significance can be seen through the ignition of open debates for 
possible ideas of constitutional revision, suggestive of the fundamental overturn of the 
debate, from absolute taboo to actual possibility.  
 
With the aggravating strategic environment, close to the restrictive one and the evolving 
security relationship with the US, the public perception of threat has increased to the 
point where the idea of CSD is openly debated without any repercussions. This went in 
tandem with the dynamics of domestic politics where the ideological dichotomy 
between the LDP and the Socialist Party disappeared. However, in the end, CSD was 
not allowed in this period, suggestive of Japan’s inability to be engaged in balancing 
actively. Therefore, this chapter investigates why and how such momentum could not 
materialise in any way to reflect on Japan’s security policy despite the trend moving 





 Domestic Institutions: Involving every actor as a Policy-making Process  
 
While constitutional reinterpretation requires a majority in the Diet to materialise into 
revenant law(s)—or in some cases to ‘clarify’ the existing constitutional reinterpretation 
through the Cabinet statement—constitutional revision involves a wider range of actors. 
This is highlighted by the examination of the variable of a part of domestic institutions – 
an institutional framework for policy-making. Article 96 speculates on a basic procedure 
for the constitutional revision as follows.  
 
Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a 
concurring vote of two-thirds of all its members, and shall thereupon be 
submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote 
of a majority of all votes cast thereon at such election as the Diet shall specify. 
 
Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be proclaimed by the Emperor, 
in the name of the People, as an integral part of this Constitution. (Cabinet, 
1946) 
 
However, Article 96 remains ambiguous in many areas—the specification of procedure 
about the national referendum and its legislation has not even been attempted as a de 
facto taboo. Given the first attempt to enact the law to specify the procedure, the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) issued a statement opposing the law and laying out the basis 
for changing the 60-year intact pacifist constitution (Mataichi, 2007). Nevertheless, 
Article 96 does not specify, for instance, the procedure of national referendum, 
including the existence of ‘minimum turnout’ and how the constitutional revision is 
initiated (Asahi Shimbun, 2006e). Article 56 of the Diet Law normally stipulates at least 
20 members from the Lower House and 10 members from the Upper House are 
necessary (House of Representatives, 1947). Therefore, as a first step, the law 
concerning the procedure of constitutional revision must be enacted.  
 
Moreover, even though the constitutional procedure law is enacted, there is still a need 
for a supermajority to pass the Diet. During this period between 2004 and 2008, the 
political popularity enjoyed by the LDP ended. Thus, the only possible way was to form 
a bipartisan or non-partisan block to constitute a quasi-supermajority, which in theory is 




Therefore, the constitutional revision inevitably involves ‘everyone’ in Japan as 
important actors. First, a coalition-led supermajority or bipartisan/non-partisan groups 
need more than two-thirds of seats in both houses. Furthermore, sustainable public 
support is a prerequisite for a national referendum. As discussed, the prime minister’s 
view is also critical because it requires considerable political recourses. Without the 
prime minister’s advocacy or initiative, history suggests the agenda of constitutional 
revision did not even arise.  
 
 Leaders’ image  
 
Leaders’ image consists of two sides: a strategic cultural view of Japan’s security policy 
and a way of maintaining political legitimacy. In particular, given the longevity of the 
constitution, it is completely plausible that leaders who aim for constitutional revision 
simply surrender it to maintain political stability because they incorporate and calculate 
the unenthusiastic public attitudes and potential institutional difficulty. Although 
discussed in more detail later, the examination of leaders’ strategic views and their 
subsequent actions well capture this dilemma and the supremacy of political stability 
over strategic needs when it comes to the constitutional revision given the prerequisite 
support from the public.  
 
Koizumi (prime minister from 2001 to 2006) was known as a US ally due to his 
commitment to maintaining ties with the US, even during the US-led war on terror. 
After his inauguration, he chose the US for his first visit as prime minister to establish a 
personal relationship with then-President George W. Bush (Iijima, 2007, p. 18). His 
swift response and endorsement of the US-led war on terror with the relevant legislature 
to dispatch the SDF was considered a strengthening of the US-Japan alliance (Nakano, 
2015, p. 225). It took only 24 days from the 9/11 attack and 16 days after his 
announcement of support of the US for the legislation (Uchiyama, 2013). He gave a 
response to Bush’s statement about 9/11 just one hour after; subsequently, he held a 
Cabinet meeting to have an agreement, suggestive of his independent thought and action 
as a US ally (Uchiyama, 2013). Based on his emphasis of the US-Japan alliance, 
Koizumi organised a research committee to investigate whether CSD was possible 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2004e), and he held the position that CSD should be possible through 
constitutional revision (Asahi Shimbun, 2001b).  
 
As the direct successor of Koizumi, Shinzo Abe (prime minister from 2006 and 2007) 
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had a clearer and more explicit view on Japan’s security. Abe was a US ally with goals 
for Japan’s ‘departure from the post-war regime’ through a nationalist-oriented 
constitutional revision (Hughes, 2016). Although in his book Towards a Beautiful 
Country (utsukushii Kuni he) nationalistic sentiments are spread across the pages, Abe 
held the view of normalisation for a stronger, independent military with autonomy. 
However, he admitted that it is the ultimate goal; in the foreseeable future, Japan needs 
the US-Japan security alliance as a core security posture of Japan (Abe, 2006b, pp. 
132-134). Therefore, the US-Japan alliance is the means to achieve his goal and 
constitutes his strategic culture as a US ally. He has long advocated CSD and 
constitutional revision before he was prime minister and after his resignation and return 
to the premiership in 2012 (Sataka, 2016).  
 
Yasuo Fukuda’s (prime minister from 2007 to 2008) father, a prime minister in the 
1970s, advocated the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’, which emphasised Japan’s relations with 
South-east Asia. In contrast, the strategic culture of Yasuo Fukuda leaned towards a US 
alliance. While serving as the chief cabinet secretary for the longest time in Japan’s 
post-war history, Yasuo Fukuda took the lead to enact the terrorism special law for the 
dispatch of the SDF to the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support for the US military 
in 2001 (Asahi Shimbun, 2007r). When Japan decided to jointly explore the Azadegan 
oil field with Iran despite the US’s deep concern about the latter’s nuclear development, 
he repeatedly attempted to reconcile US reservations through diplomatic channels 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2007r). Although not as passionate as Koizumi and Abe, Yasuo 
Fukuda also advocated for constitutional revision on the ground that the concept of 
‘self-defence’ should be clarified in line with pacifism when he served as one of the 
chairs of the constitution research committee in the Lower House (House of 
Representatives, 2005b). 
 
Taro Aso (prime minister between 2008 and 2009) supposedly delineated the diplomatic 
vision under the Abe administration in 2006 (Nippon.Com, 2013). Through a media 
interview, Aso stated the same logic of allowing CSD as Koizumi and Abe: CSD to 
protect the US ships in military operations for effectively realising the arc of freedom 
and prosperity (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2006b). He preferred constitutional reinterpretation 
as a means to allow CSD (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2006c). Aso seemed less passionate than 
his predecessors; he implied constitutional revision possibly would take place in 30 or 
40 years while admitting it was the LDP’s long-held dream (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2006b). 




The LDP shares the same attitudes as the four prime ministers towards the constitution. 
Yomiuri Shimbun’s questionnaire conducted in 2003 (93% of returns from all the 
elected politicians) showed that 89% of elected LDP members favoured constitutional 
revision. After the 2005 Lower House general election, 81% of elected LDP politicians 
still supported revision (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2005b), as they did after the 2007 Upper 
House general election and the 2009 general election. Similar results are seen through 
Asahi Shimbun’s survey: 90% consistently support constitutional revision (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2004r, 2005p, 2009c). The surveys further asked about Article 9; 74% were 




Despite the party’s principle centring on pacifism and Seimei Sonchou (‘respect for 
human life’), the Komeito, as a vital coalition partner to the LDP, already had given 
greater leeway to the LDP in terms of constitutional revision: 77% of Komeito members 
showed positive attitudes towards revision in 2005 (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2005b). They 
held the stance of Kaken (adding a clause to the constitution) regarding Article 9, adding 
a third clause regarding the military and its role in international contributions (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2004p). However, there is a substantial chasm between the LDP and the 
Komeito over the first two clauses of Article 9. Despite the relative size of the Komeito, 
it is largely responsible for maintaining a majority in the Diet as the coalition in the 21st 
century. It, therefore, could be a veto player that the LDP must take into account.  
 
 Democratic Party of Japan (second biggest advocate for constitutional revision)  
 
The DPJ resulted from the mergers of multiple parties and constituted the second-largest 
party in the 2000s. As goes the nature of political mergers, the DPJ has several political 
ideologies regarding security policy and constitutional revision, ranging from 
socialist-oriented thinking and pacifist-leaning vision to hawkish realist ideology and 
even nationalism (Howe & Campbell, 2013). Nevertheless, the DPJ holds the stance of 
Souken (creation of the constitution). The difference between the LDP’s stance of Kaken 
(constitutional revision) and the DPJ’s stance of Souken is the approach towards the 
constitution. While the LDP addresses the revision article by article, the DPJ intends to 





However, opinions diverge internally. The Asahi survey reveals that in 2003, 61% of 
members leaned towards constitutional revision (Asahi Shimbun, 2003b), which 
increased to 72% in 2005 (Asahi Shimbun, 2005p). However, in 2007, only 30% of 
members favoured constitutional revision, while 30% of these in favour of the 
constitution did not seem to have a specific plan for revision (Asahi Shimbun, 2003a). 
While one-third of members constantly opposed constitutional revision, the views of a 
certain number of members fluctuated. Regarding Article 9, 57% of DPJ members 
consider it necessary to revise to allow CSD (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2004c). Given the party 
has the second-largest share of the seats in the Diet, the potential role of the DPJ in the 
constitutional revision cannot be ignored.  
 
 Koizumi’s foundations  
 
In the midst of enacting multiple security legislation during Koizumi’s premiership, he 
set in motion a discussion of constitutional revision at the Diet level, arguably for the 
first time in Japan’s post-war history. Koizumi himself led the party to facilitate the 
discussion regarding constitutional revision as well as the establishment of the 
procedure of constitutional revision (Asahi Shimbun, 2003d). Although the constitution 
research committee existed in the 2000s in both houses, under the Koizumi 
administration, the idea of a provisional constitutional revision was submitted to the 
party in 2004 (Asahi Shimbun, 2004e). Concrete full sentences of the constitutional 
revision were issued in 2005. The LDP’s constitutional revision of Article 9 recognised 
the SDF as the military, eliminated the second clause of ‘no possession of war potential’ 
and included CSD by acknowledging the role of international security contributions 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2005d). To push the political agenda further, Koizumi personally tried 
to orchestrate a foundation where the bipartisan group can be made with the DPJ 
because of its active participation in the constitutional revision debate (Asahi Shimbun, 
2004n). 
 
However, domestic political dynamics and ‘political legitimacy’ largely matter in 
determining the degree of momentum with which the constitutional revision is pursued. 
Despite the DPJ’s equally enthusiastic approach to revision—even issuing a mid-term 
report on the plan for it—the DPJ confirmed its party stance to prioritise the upcoming 
general election in 2005 and proceed with constitution revision later (Asahi Shimbun, 
2004i). Whilst the LDP tries to make progress and enact the law of the procedure of the 
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revision, such discordance in the schedule makes it difficult to proceed.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that many DPJ members previously belonged to the LDP and left 
in the 1990s due to frustration over the long-term view to taking over the position of the 
ruling party shows considerable hesitations towards co-operation with the LDP. The 
DPJ’s gradual growth in seats (177 seats in the Lower House between 2003 and 2005), 
makes the party evermore ambitious for ‘two-party politics’.  
 
For such a stance, Koizumi himself commented that with the DPJ constantly saying ‘no’ 
to any LDP proposals, there would be no progress (Asahi Shimbun, 2004s). Due to the 
very fixed position of the DPJ, Koizumi ceased the ideas of a temporary grand coalition 
and proceeding with constitutional revision under his term. This decision could be seen 
from his statement at the UN meeting in New York that Japan aimed to be a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council with the current constitution, despite the common 
understanding that CSD is prerequisite for membership (Asahi Shimbun, 2004m). 
During the run-up to the election in 2005, Koizumi officially made it clear that 
regardless of the election result, he intended to step back after serving his term and 
leave the agenda of constitutional revision to his successors (Asahi Shimbun, 2005o).  
 
This does not mean Koizumi stopped taking action completely. Even after the election, 
where the LDP was victorious over the DPJ, the idea of a grand coalition did not 
disappear. Koizumi still thought that incorporation of the biggest opposition is arguably 
the most effective and ideal way to push forward constitutional revision. Therefore, the 
LDP’s overall stance is that achieving agreement with the DPJ on the law concerning 
the procedure of revision is the first step (Asahi Shimbun, 2005e). This is exemplified 
by the collective decision of the LDP to postpone the submission of the bill regarding 
the law given the DPJ’s hesitation; despite having the seats, the LDP–Komeito coalition 
could railroad to enact the bill (Asahi Shimbun, 2006f). Thus, while Koizumi furthered 
the discussion of revision at the next level, nothing was materialised.  
  
 Abe’s initiatives  
 
The political legacy Abe inherited from Koizumi was favourable; the coalition had more 
than two-thirds of seats in the Lower House, a majority in the Upper House and a 
Cabinet support rate of 70% (generally, the support rate is about 60%) (NHK 
Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, 2018). With such political stability, 
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institutionally there would be no difficulty in at least passing legislation regarding the 
constitutional revision procedure. He showed more passion towards constitutional 
revision along with his revisionist slogan of ‘departure from the post-war regime’ and 
‘towards a beautiful country’. After his inauguration, Abe set a time line for the 
constitutional revision: achieve it during his term or two terms (6 years) at the most 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2006a).  
 
 The law concerning the constitutional revision procedure 
 
Abe made numerous ambitious proposals for not only constitutional revision but also 
other security policies such as the establishment of the NSC and upgrade of the DA to 
ministerial status. He first attempted to address the law concerning the constitutional 
revision process. Without the law, constitutional revision would be virtually impossible 
to initiate. Until Abe’s inauguration, there had been numerous attempts since the late 
1990s to enact the law (Asahi Shimbun, 2007l) (see Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.2 Past Attempts to Enact the Law Concerning the National Referendum  
Year  Actors  Co-actors Reason for failure 
1999  The Liberal Party Komeito and LDP  Hesitation of 
co-actors 
2000 LDP Komeito Sudden death of PM 
2002 Koizumi and LDP Komeito Prioritisation of a 
response to 9/11  
2004 LDP DPJ and Komeito Hesitation of 
co-actors 
2005  DPJ/LDP/Komeito  DPJ and Komeito Divergence of 
opinion/election 
focusing on other 
agendas  
 
Table 5.2 shows that despite the LDP’s enthusiasm for constitutional revision, responses 
to immediate needs in other policy areas or crises often took precedence (Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 2000). The LDP did not discard the idea of forming a bipartisan group with 
the Komeito and the DPJ, which led to a dilemma between compromise and being at 
their mercy (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2002, 2004a). If the three parties successfully agreed on 
how constitutional revision should take place through the enactment of the law, it would 
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create substantial momentum to pave the way for the constitutional revision. 
 
However, Abe’s rushing attitude and political miscalculations inevitably came with 
substantial costs: one step forward but two steps back. First, in 2006, he set a date, 3 
May, to enact the law that coincided with the Constitution Memorial Day (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2007i). For the date, the three-party negotiation started over relatively minor 
issues compared with the controversial Article 9. These issues included setting a 
minimum age for a referendum (over 18 versus over 20), how the vote is counted 
(inclusion/exclusion of faulty ballot as ‘no’) and media regulation during the run-up to 
the referendum (Asahi Shimbun, 2006e). The LDP was open to readjustment in 
accordance with the DPJ’s request and the Komeito’s concern. 
 
 Nevertheless, Abe rushed to imply the focal point of the coming general election was 
constitutional revision, suggesting the law of the constitutional revision procedure was 
not a preparation for open discussion of the revision but a necessary step towards 
revision (Asahi Shimbun, 2007i). This led to an inflated reservation of the DPJ; the 
negotiation of the law was no longer constructive but had become an arena where 
competition for political power took place and which was to take the lead. Immediately 
after Abe showed his intention to focus on the revision, Hatoyama, then-chief of the 
DPJ, stated that while there was not necessarily much to disagree over the details of the 
law, the LDP must take the DPJ’s stance into account and make a ‘political decision’ 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2007k). Similarly, Ozawa, the president of the DPJ, announced that 
the DPJ did not necessarily need to make a decision over the law; instead, it could 
co-submit the bill with the condition that all DPJ requests—regardless of past 
negotiation—be reflected in a new bill (Asahi Shimbun, 2007m).  
 
Thus, there was a dilemma for the LDP. On the one hand, reflecting DPJ’s request on 
the bill shows LDP’s compromise to the DPJ, which instead might allow the enactment 
of the law smoothly. On the other hand, Komeito showed dissatisfaction as it was 
largely left out the negotiation as the main coalition partner with the LDP. The 
frustration of the Komeito would increase the risk of dissolvement of the coalition 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2007j).  
 
This created division within the party as to the priority of the law: agreement with the 
DPJ or a shift towards unilateral enactment (Asahi Shimbun, 2007k). Before the LDP 
making a decision, through a representative meeting, the DPJ decided to adopt a 
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strategy to use the law to jeopardise the LDP by highlighting the fact that the LDP 
prioritised the revision over other more important issues, such as economic inequality 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2007j). Accordingly, there emerged a voice within the LDP that the 
original plan of the law should be submitted rather than the modified one with the DPJ, 
although the LDP ended up submitting a negotiated version, which partially satisfied 
needs from the DPJ and Komeito (Asahi Shimbun, 2007l). Nevertheless, the LDP also 
decided to compete with the DPJ over the issue of the constitutional revision procedure 
by pointing out the divergence and indecisiveness of the DPJ on any issue (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2007e). The initial promising situation of a grand coalition fell apart and a 
deep chasm formed between the LDP and DPJ.  
 
The disappearance of a plan to co-operate with the DPJ gave the Komeito leverage as its 
relative importance increased with its seats in the Diet to pass the bill, which caused a 
further delay in the constitutional revision process (Asahi Shimbun, 2007n). Because 
the Komeito were against the revision, it kept stating that it was premature to proceed 
the revision and further discussion was needed to manage its dilemma between weak 
coalition partner and party’s principle (Asahi Shimbun, 2007i). It made the most of this 
situation and put its request such as minimum age to vote on one part of the law, which 
both the DPJ and LDP had already agreed. This was the secured time for discussing the 
constitutional revision after the enactment of the law, although the DPJ and the LDP 
agreed on two years during which no submission or plan of the revision is allowed.  
 
In the end, the law was enacted in 2007. The newly enacted law of the procedure of the 
constitutional revision stipulated there could not be any attempt to plan or submit any 
revision plans for the next three years until 2010. Although the period was initially two 
years, the Komeito extended it by a year. This suggested that no attempt could be made 
until 2010, and given the time of Diet debate and the period (60–180 days) before the 
referendum, Abe faced substantial difficulty achieving the revision during his term. A 
premiership could only be extended to a second term, which meant Abe would have to 
step down in 2012. Considering how the law concerning the constitutional revision 
procedure took eight years to enact, it would not be likely that Abe would achieve his 
goal.  
 
 Collective Self-Defence  
 
Abe used different approaches to the constitutional revision and CSD, the former of 
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which focused on procedure while the latter focused on constitutional reinterpretation. 
The constitutional reinterpretation to allow CSD caused some suspicion and 
reservations within the LDP. Sadakazu Tanigaki, who competed against Abe for the 
LDP’s presidential election, explicitly advocated the need for revision to allow CSD 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2006n). He proposed a different angle that could be applied to find a 
de facto loophole to allow CSD. What he meant is that in cases of the US-Japan alliance, 
the consequence of ‘attack by others’ could damage Japan, such as a third country’s 
attack on US ships that jointly sail with Japan’s counterparts near the sea of Japan 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2006k). Thus, he tried to shift the attention on CSD to some practical 
hindrance as minor issues. However, while it could be wise to deal with CSD through 
reinterpretation as a separate issue from the revision, it would reduce the likelihood of 
the future constitutional revision. CSD had been a driving force for the constitutional 
revision; therefore, allowing CSD through the reinterpretation may lose the substantial 
motive for the revision.  
 
Nevertheless, Abe created a research team on CSD, which he argued should comprise 
members of the CLB, MOFA and MOD (Asahi Shimbun, 2006b). His ambitious vision 
to revolutionise Japan’s security policy during his term made him rush to proceed. He 
kept pushing the CSD timeframe by stating that the related research should not take so 
much time (Asahi Shimbun, 2007s). However, given the CLB’s stance to keep the 
current interpretation, which did not facilitate the discussion of the possibilities of CSD, 
Abe decided to recruit members who shared similar views on CSD (Asahi Shimbun, 
2007a). In the end, he chose political scientists and IR scholars such as Shinichi Kitaoka, 
Kazuya Sakamoto and Masamori Sase, all of whom expressed the need for CSD in the 
Diet or published articles (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2007a). This collection of scholars 
became the prime minister’s private advisory board.  
 
Acute criticism arose regarding such an approach with a foregone conclusion from the 
coalition partner (Asahi Shimbun, 2007n), the public, opposition parties (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2007o) and even hawkish LDP members such as Ishiba (Asahi Shimbun, 
2007q). Abe temporarily shifted his focus on political stability during the run-up to the 
election in 2007 by not making it a campaign focal point (Asahi Shimbun, 2007t). This 
was done even though the advisory board kept organising meetings to finalise cases 
where CSD should and can be allowed. The advisory board proposed four major 
scenarios where CSD was in line with the current interpretation or where individual 




(1) When Japan and the US are conducting joint exercises in international 
waters, SDF warships may strike back if U.S. ships come under attack. 
(2) Japan may use its missile defence system to intercept a ballistic missile if it 
is believed to be targeting the US. 
(3) SDF members carrying out U.N. peacekeeping activities may counterattack 
if armed forces of other countries are being attacked. 
(4) SDF personnel, while unable to provide support through force, can provide 
logistic support, such as transporting supplies and materials, to armed forces of 
other countries. (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2007b) 
 
The report published by the panel argued that points (3) and (4) could deal with the right 
of individual self-defence. First, Article 9 emphasised ‘a means of settling international 
disputes’ as the condition under which the renunciation of war as a sovereign right was 
promised and land, sea and air forces and other ‘war potential’ will never be maintained. 
In other words, the panel considered UN peacekeeping activities as not ‘a means of 
settling international disputes’ and hence ‘collective security’ should be possible under 
the current constitutional interpretation. Regarding (4), it argued there were past 
interpretations to only allow logistic support to armed forces of other countries, such as 
participation in the US-led Iraq war in 2003, as legislation of specified duration. Thus, 
the attempt to interpret the constitution to allow such support was not unconstitutional 
(Cabinet Office, 2008a).  
 
However, even before the official report was submitted to the Cabinet, Abe resigned for 
health reasons, which rendered the attempt abortive simply because the subsequent 
prime ministers did not take the agenda forward with the report. It may, however, be 
important to note that despite his short premiership, even less than a year, arguably the 
degree of progress per see was the most substantial in post-war history by breaking the 
two taboo subjects: CSD and the enactment of the constitutional revision procedure. 
 
 The hesitation of leaders: Fukuda and Aso  
 
The LDP’s loss in the 2007 general election created a Nejire Kokkai (divided Diet) due 
to the ruling coalition losing a majority in the Upper House while holding it in the 
Lower House (Shinoda, 2013). Because an attempt at enacting law can be rejected by 
the sheer number of members of the opposition parties in the Upper House, this made 
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the revision more difficult. Accordingly, subsequent prime ministers strategically 
hesitated to take a step further in the constitutional revision. Furthermore, the newly 
enacted law of the procedure of the constitutional revision stipulated there could not be 
any attempt to plan or submit any revision plans for the next three years until 2010.  
 
Yasuo Fukuda, Abe’s successor, decided to discard most of Abe’s initiatives. In his 
inauguration speech, unlike Abe who without hesitation talked about CSD and the 
constitutional revision in his speech (Abe, 2006a), did not even touch these issues, and 
he first proposed the slogan ‘recovery of trust of politicians and bureaucracy’ (Seiji to 
Gyosei ni Taisuru Shinrai no Kaihuku) (Fukuda, 2007). As with LDP’s strategy of 
adapting and absorbing opposition parties’ policy, Yasuo Fukuda emphasised social 
welfare, childcare and inequality. At the Diet meeting, when asked about CSD, he 
simply answered there was a need to discuss it but with care and caution (Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 2008d).  
 
Yasuo Fukuda was—or pretended to be—not only disinterested in the issue of 
constitutional revision but also overly hesitant in CSD. The way he dealt with the 
Abe-led private panel further signified his hesitation. He first arranged to receive the 
final report from the panel after closing the Diet to avoid criticism by delaying the 
submission for more than nine months in June 2007 (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2008d). Even 
though the report was ‘final’, he commented they would conduct research on the report 
further, suggestive of the absence of the implications of the report. The media was even 
prohibited from taking a picture of when he received the final report to minimise their 
respective media report (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2008c). Nevertheless, even before the next 
Diet opened in September, Yasuo Fukuda resigned because the Cabinet support rate 
plummeted from less than 60% to just above 20% after seven months of his premiership 
without any sign of improvement (FactoBox, 2016).  
 
In comparison with Fukuda, Aso had a stronger view to support CSD through the 
constitutional reinterpretation. However, he showed no intention of addressing the issue 
of CSD at the media interview at the time of his inauguration (Yomiuri Shimbun, 
2008b). This seemingly contradictory stance stemmed from the leaders’ dilemma 
between their strategic culture and political legitimacy, which is often clearer when the 
general election approaches.  
 
The general election occurred the following summer in 2009. Allegedly, the Cabinet 
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considered CSD a long-term issue after the election. Nevertheless, Abe, having close 
ties with Aso, apparently took the liberty of arranging a meeting between Aso and Shuji 
Yanai, the chair of Abe’s private panel that submitted the report in 2006 to allow CSD 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, 2009c). Abe tried to talk Aso into including CSD in the LDP’s 
manifesto for the upcoming election (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2009c). However, Aso did not 
take any particular action even though his private advisory panel was supposed to 
consider Japan’s next National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) and advocate 
similar views to allow CSD (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2009d). This is, in fact, natural because 
some of the members of Aso’s panel consisted of members of Abe’s panel as well as 
Shinichi Kitaoka (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2009a). The Aso administration finally begins to 
proceed. However, the landslide victory of the DPJ in the 2009 general election ended 
such an attempt and made the LDP descend from political grace. Thus, none of the three 
ministers was given time to proceed CSD in the end.  
 
 State-society relations  
 
State-society relations—both the public and social/economic groups—did not play a 
particularly important role. For the public, the state of the constitutional revision did not 
develop to the point where the public had substantial weight (i.e. the constitutional 
revision referendum did not occur). The public indirectly influenced the Cabinet 
through its ‘Cabinet support rate’, making the ruling coalition prioritise political 
stability over a controversial agenda, which, however, has little to do with the Cabinet 
stance regarding the constitutional revision and CSD. Nevertheless, one thing is clear: 
pushing for the constitutional revision or CSD is considered an unideal means to 
maintain or increase the political stability of the government. In this sense, public 





Figure 5.1 The Proportion of the Public Supporting the Constitutional Revision  
 
 
Figure 5.2 The Proportion of the Public Opposed to the Constitutional Revision 
 
The overall public view on constitutional revision has been positive regardless of its 
progress (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2008a). There are simply more who support the revision 
than those who do not (see Figure 5.1 and 5.2). Nevertheless, Figure 5.1 and Table 5.2 
suggest there is not much of a relationship between the Cabinet support rate and the 
public support rate for constitutional revision. In other words, the public view on the 
constitution does not seem to play a direct role in preventing the Cabinet from pursuing 
the constitutional revision. However, this concurrently suggests that leading the 
discussion of the constitutional revision is nowhere near a valid policy initiative to gain 
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and political legitimacy. Leaders are quiet about constitutional revision during an 
election because of other more appealing focal points to gain public support, not 
necessarily because of the taboos of constitutional revision.  
 
Table 5.3 The Highest and Lowest Cabinet Support Rates of Prime Ministers Between 
2004 and 2009 (FactoBox, 2016) 
Prime minister Period Highest Cabinet support Lowest Cabinet support 
Koizumi 2004–2006 56% (May 2004)  40% (February 2005) 
Abe 2006–2007 70% (September 2006) 24% (August 2007) 
Fukuda 2007–2008 56% (September 2007) 18% (May 2008) 
Aso 2008–2009 50% (September 2008) 17% (June 2009) 
 
However, the revision of Article 9 and CSD remains unpopular amongst the public. For 
Asahi’s survey, amongst those who favour constitutional revision, only 7–9% believe 
the revision of Article 9 is the prime reason to support the revision during the period 
between 2004 and 2009 (Asahi Shimbun, 2004f, 2005c, 2008, 2009i). On the other hand, 
Yomiuri's poll suggested the preference on the way to allow CSD was roughly divided 
equally; (1) 30% CSD through the reinterpretation, (2) CSD through the revision and 
(3) no allowance of CSD in any way (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2004b, 2005a, 2006, 2007e, 
2008a, 2009b). Thus, it is difficult to argue that the attempt of revising/reinterpreting the 
constitution is a trigger for the decline in the cabinet support rate and hence the three 
short-lived prime ministers What hindered leaders from advancing the issue of the 
constitutional revision was their own political performance as the Cabinet. In this sense, 
the socially accepted norm of anti-militarism does not exert a direct influence on the 
outcome (the absence of materialisation of the revision/reinterpretation of CSD)  
 
Similarly, social/economic groups did not exert any substantial influence on the 
constitutional revision despite their active endorsement. For instance, almost all major 
economic groups issued a proposal or similar kind to advocate constitutional revision 
and CSD. The most obvious case is Keidanren (2007), which issued a concrete policy 
proposal named after the president, Mitarai Vision, Kibou no Kuni (‘A Country of 
Hope’). It constantly submitted requests to the Cabinet for the revision in 2004 (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2004h) and for CSD in 2005 (Asahi Shimbun, 2005n) and 2006 (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2006l). Likewise, Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Asahi Shimbun, 
2006m), the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI) (Asahi Shimbun, 2004j) 
and Keidanren constituted the three biggest economic groups in Japan, and they 
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individually issued a proposal-like document to argue the need for the constitutional 
revision to stipulate the role of the SDF. However, these are in line with the LDP’s 
long-held goal, and it is needless to say that the LDP did not put these (or its) visions 
into practice. Thus it can be said that the influence of these groups was not substantial 
enough or these were not so crucial actor on this matter.  
 
Arguably, Nippon Kaigi helped spread the view to support the constitutional revision. It 
has a prefectural branch all over Japan, holding a conference, meeting and public speech 
to promote the revision on national memorial days, such as National Foundation Day 
and Constitution Memorial Day, each year (Asahi Shimbun, 2004c, 2006g, 2007d, 
2009a). However, anti-constitutional revision groups such as 9Jou no Kai (‘Article 9 
Association’) (9Jou no Kai, 2018) organised the same type of meetings for an opposite 
purpose. These active groups might have intensified the division further without so 
much change in the public view on CSD. Thus, the influence of these groups offset with 
each other or these were not so substantial.  
 
 Reflection on the Strategic Environment and Intervening Variables 
 
The aggravating strategic environment with the role of the intervening variables resulted 
in a unique development in terms of CSD and constitutional revision. Due to the acute 
need to enhance external balancing with the US, Abe decided to address the prohibition 
of CSD through constitutional interpretation, which had been long been only possible 
through revision (Asahi Shimbun, 2007a). However, no significant material change was 
observed. The reason for the absence lies in domestic politics. The LDP’s support rate 
since Koizumi plummeted in every administration, caused the victory of the DPJ 
through the 2007 election and the so-called twisted Diet (Shinoda, 2013). Through the 
political power competition, the LDP and the DPJ did not choose to co-operate despite 
their enthusiasm for CSD and the revision. Neither party could have a majority, not to 
mention a supermajority/bipartisan group, in both houses.  
 
This institutional obstacle made leaders prioritise political legitimacy over strategic 
culture. Given the prime ministers such as Fukuda and Aso who endorsed CSD and 
revision, being deliberately quite over them during their premiership despite their 
relative enthusiasm, leaders’ image matters in explaining the absence of progress: the 
triumph of political legitimacy over strategic culture. That constitutional revision was an 
openly discussed topic created a more difficult situation to achieve it. Every party saw it 
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as an opportunity to take the lead, thereby creating competition rather than co-operation. 
In particular, Article 9 remained the least popular amongst other agendas for revision 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, 2007a). The LDP, which considered the revision of Article 9 a 
long-held dream, had no options but to address an entire revision of the constitution as a 
disguise albeit not so effective. Therefore, in this period, the leaders’ image and their 
action were largely responsible for Japan’s response to the strategic environment 
through the case of CSD and constitutional revision. 
 
Nevertheless, the enactment of the law concerning the procedure of the constitutional 
revision suggests that, institutionally, the Cabinet finally was able to submit the proposal 
of the revision after the three-year non-submission, no-planning period. 
Economic/social groups, however, would continue to have a minimal influence on the 
process of CSD and constitutional revision.  
 
The following section focuses on the regime change and the DPJ and addresses the 
issue of CSD and the constitutional revision between 2009 and 2012.  
 
5.3 Collective Self-Defence and the Constitutional Revision Between 2009 and 2012  
 
The law concerning the procedure of the constitutional revision required a three-year 
inactive period of planning the idea or details of the potential revision, which was to 
finish in 2010. Thus, after 2010, Japan was, in theory, capable of pushing forward the 
constitutional revision under the newly emerged ruling party, the DPJ. In tandem with 
institutional readiness, the strategic environment surrounding Japan had become further 
aggravated with continuous assertiveness of North Korea and evermore growing China 
that overtook Japan’s GDP in 2010. The environment kept sending signals for Japan to 
engage itself in balancing behaviours. However, Japan did not engage in balancing 
behaviours as it did not materialise any of such by pursuing either CSD through the 
interpretation of the constitution or the revision. In terms of Japan’s security policy 
concerning its constitution, Japan failed to respond because of its domestic politics.  
 
Three Cabinets in this period between 2009 and 2012 were not particularly 
pacifist-oriented in relation to security policy. Main leaders favoured CSD regardless of 
the means to materialise it. Each Cabinet constantly failed to maintain its political 
stability, however, to secure enough seats to pass the relevant legislation; therefore, this 
rendered any attempt pointless. A further difficulty lies not only in the loose unity of the 
101 
 
party in relation to the constitutional revision or reinterpretation but also its lack of 
experience and hence capacity to deal with domestic affairs. This chapter examines how 
the non-response of Japan to the changing strategic environment can be explained by 
the intervening variables.  
 
 Leaders’ Image  
 
Amongst the DPJ leaders, Hatoyama had a relatively vivid vision regarding Japan’s 
security policy. He thought that one of the problems of the current constitution was 
based on his strategic vision of Japan’s universal inability to use of force, which he 
believed was necessary for PKO missions (Hatoyama, 2005, p. 9). Hatoyama’s strategic 
vision was arguably UN centrist and further aimed to create a UN-like community in 
East Asia based on the principle of international co-operation. To contribute more to 
PKOs, he advocated the amendment of the constitution to allow the use force at least for 
PKOs (Hatoyama, 2005, p. 18). Hatoyama produced his own constitution plan for the 
revision, published in 2005 as Shin Kenpou Shian (A Proposal for the New 
Constitution), with an idea to create a new military force that could be only operated 
under the UN (Hatoyama, 2005). Thus, compared with the conservative politicians in 
the LDP, such as Abe, Hatoyama’s strategic vision was unique and yet progressive to 
the extent to which the SDF’s capability should be practically enhanced.  
 
On the other hand, Naoto Kan, who succeeded Hatoyama as prime minister, had a 
malleable view on the constitution and Japan’s security policy. While he was a 
self-declared realist, his inauguration speech did not have much substance to it—at least 
theoretically—because he emphasised the importance of the US-Japan alliance and 
economic and cultural ties with Asia (Kan, 2010). As a member of the DPJ, which 
advocated the position of ‘creation of the constitution (souken)’, Kan was once a 
supporter of the constitutional revision to recognise the SDF as a military to justify and 
enlarge its contributions to PKO missions. This stance was likely to assume the idea of 
collective security that was prohibited constitutionally at the time (Hatoyama & Kan, 
1997). Moreover, along with the idea of ‘creation’, Kan supported the unique idea of 
creating ‘United Nations Standby Units’ in addition to the SDF (DPJ, 2004). According 
to him, the Units are independent of the SDF and similar to an international civil servant 
like international volunteers. He argued that their dispatch in PKO missions was not 
unconstitutional. However, he revised these visions in light of Abe’s attempt to revise 
the constitution and allow the CSD by stating that he opposed CSD and revision per se 
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(Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2014). Leaders such as Kan, who lacked explicit views and 
objectives regarding Japan’s security policy, are likely to prioritise ‘political legitimacy’ 
to maintain political stability.  
 
The last DPJ prime minister was Yoshihiko Noda. Although he did not often publicly 
state his vision on Japan’s security policy and the constitution, he had a moderate view 
of nationalism and normalisation. Like Koizumi, he advocated the justification of the 
visit to the Yasukuni Shrine where A-class war criminals are enshrined; the visit always 
causes international criticism, in particular from Japan’s neighbouring countries (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2012j). Noda further argued the need to exercise CSD in relation to the 
territorially disputed areas against China. In his publication, ‘Enemies for democracy’ 
(minshu no teki), Noda, like Abe, mentioned the SDF should be recognised as the 
military domestically and internationally (Y. Noda, 2009).  
 
However, his view seems personal not a vision or a goal as a politician. Noda neither 
publicly stated his views nor reflected them on Japan’s security policy. As an interview 
of Naoki Minezaki, who once served as vice minister of finance when Noda was the 
minister of finance, revealed, Noda separated his personal ideology from ‘national 
interests’ (Yamaguchi & Nakakita, 2014). His malleable views could be seen further in 
his efforts to establish a new political party—the Constitutional Democratic Party of 
Japan—in 2017 (Japan Times, 2017c). This is despite the fact that he was once 
advocating for CSD and the constitutional revision in the 2000s. This new party 
officially opposed CSD and the constitutional revision led by the LDP. In this way, 
Noda, along with Kan, seemed likely to prioritise political legitimacy over his strategic 
vision.  
 
As discussed previously, the DPJ consists of politicians with a variety of ideologies and 
many previously belonged to different political parties, ranging from conservative 
parties, such as the LDP, to leftist parties, such as the Socialist Party. This inevitably 
results in inconsistencies related to the constitution. An Asahi survey in 2009 acutely 
reflected this background: while 44% of DPJ members favoured revision, 22% opposed 
it and 31% neither supported nor opposed it (Asahi Shimbun, 2009j). Examining the 
DPJ’s coalition partners strengthens the diverse view on the revision. Its coalition 
partners, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the People’s New Party (PNP), are not 
particularly keen on security policy (Japan Times, 2010). The SDP inherited the legacy 
of the past Socialist Party opposing Japan’s active contribution and participation in 
103 
 
international security as well as constitutional revision. The PNP is a somewhat 
normalist party due to its pursuit of constitutional revision and independence from the 
US-Japan security alliance (Asahi Shimbun, 2005f). The PNP comprises the former 
LDP members dissatisfied by the Koizumi administration over the issue of postal 
service reform (Asahi Shimbun, 2005h). Despite its size—five politicians at the 
start—the view of PNP members is close to that of the LDP.  
 
 Domestic Institutions 
 
At the time the DPJ became the ruling party, the coalition met the minimum 
requirement to pass a bill with 320 seats, meaning the coalition had two-thirds of the 
seats in the Lower House. However, the coalition did not have a similar presence in the 
Upper House, having slightly less than half the seats (Shinoda, 2013). This composition 
suggests it is institutionally possible to railroad a bill even the Upper House opposes it. 
Therefore, if the DPJ wanted to reinterpret the constitution to allow CSD, it would have 
been possible. On the other hand, in relation to constitutional revision, because of the 
requirement to have two-thirds of seats in both houses, unless forming a supermajority 
or a bipartisan group, the ruling coalition would not have enough seats to proceed the 
constitutional revision.  
 
That said, the coalition could have allowed a progression of the constitutional revision 
because three years had passed since the law concerning the constitutional revision 
procedure. As discussed, the law, enacted in 2007, requires three years, not allowing the 
discussion or planning of the constitutional revision. As planned, the Commission on 
the Constitution in each house was established in (Commission on the Constitution, 
2007a) not only to investigate the current constitution for planning potential revisions 
but also to examine ideas of revisions to determine whether a bill should be submitted.  
 
The Commission serves as a quasi-Legislative Bureau that is considered ‘the guardian 
of the constitution’ (Commission on the Constitution, 2007b). The Commission consists 
of 50 members from political parties but not bureaucrats; the number of members from 
each party is proportionate to each party’s seats in the house. When discussing any 
potential revision ideas, the Commission must hold an open hearing to which all 
members are invited. On the other hand, if the ruling party pursues CSD through 
constitutional reinterpretation, as examined in the previous chapter, the idea of 




In summary, the ruling DPJ coalition, at the time of starting the Cabinet, was able to 
proceed with the issue of CSD by revision or reinterpretation at least institutionally.  
  
 Hatoyama’s Inability or the DPJ’s Lack of Experience?  
 
Despite its size, the DPJ did not seem to have much expertise on how to plan and 
implement policies. In particular, it has been somewhat traditional for the LDP and 
bureaucrats to go hand in hand to construct policies, while the DPJ considered it a 
corrupted custom and eradicated it by excluding bureaucrats from the policy-making 
process (Shinoda, 2013). This does not only mean there was inefficiency in making the 
most of political resources, but also the DPJ had to be responsible for virtually all 
policy-making on its own. Given the very diverse views on the constitution, the ruling 
coalition apparently considered passing an annual budget plan more of a priority than 
pursuing constitutional revision (Asahi Shimbun, 2009j). The Hatoyama administration 
seemed to have two means to address CSD: allowing CSD through constitutional 
reinterpretation as an immediate task or ‘creating the constitution’ to stipulate the roles 
of the SDF. Two months after the Cabinet started, Hirobumi Hirano, the chief Cabinet 
secretary, stated that the administration did not see the absolute need to abide by past 
constitutional interpretation made by past LDP administrations (Asahi Shimbun, 2009f).  
 
Hatoyama himself did not hide his intention to revise the constitution. When he 
appeared on a radio programme, he showed his strategy to address the constitutional 
revision by focusing on the part in relation to decentralization, following the party’s 
principle of ‘people’s politics’. Depending on how the discussion evolved, he then 
intended to move on to addressing Article 9 (Asahi Shimbun, 2009e). These statements 
notwithstanding, this strategy was not attempted. In reality, no activity was seen in the 
Commission on the Constitution in either house. Moreover, members of the 
Commissions were yet to be submitted and selected at the time.  
 
In the meantime, the LDP descended for the first time to the position of an opposition 
party, seeking an effective means to influence policy-making and looking for an 
opportunity to show its suitability as the ruling party by acting as a shadow Cabinet. The 
LDP unilaterally organised a meeting, promoted the constitutional revision and issued a 
summary of main points of the constitution (ronten seiri), which not only included 
Article 9 but also extensively covered areas such as the emperor and the right of 
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foreigners residing in Japan (Asahi Shimbun, 2010q). Given Hatoyama’s attempt to 
relocate the US military base outside Japan under the name of ‘equal partner to the US’, 
the LDP distinguished itself from the DJP by appealing for a ‘truly equal partner[ship] 
with the US with the party’s intention to allow CSD to strengthen the alliance (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2010k). While the DPJ was stuck in implementing policies, the LDP saw a 
favourable opportunity to push for their policy ideas.  
 
For the LDP, the situation could not be ignored. Proceeding with the constitutional 
revision as an opposition party helped avoid criticism because all eyes were on the DPJ, 
even though the topic itself was not particularly popular. This made it easier to discuss 
once-considered taboo subjects. Furthermore, making progress on the issue of the 
constitution and appealing to the public served to undermine the DPJ’s reputation as the 
ruling party by creating the image of a ‘sluggish party’. The image was soon dubbed 
kimerarenai seiji (‘politics in which nothing can be decided’) (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 
2012c).  
 
Hajime Nakatani, the director of the division promoting the constitutional revision, 
stated that each plan for constitutional revision should be submitted one by one when 
agreed within the LDP. One plan critically reflected the LDP’s intention: the revision of 
Article 96 for further revision such as Article 9. That is, the LDP intended to lower the 
minimum requirement to submit the constitutional revision as a bill from two-thirds to 
one-half of the seats in both houses (Asahi Shimbun, 2010l). Lowering the hurdle for 
the revision made it far easier to revise the unpopular parts of the revision, such as 
Article 9. Given the LDP’s active involvement in the constitutional revision, when each 
party issued a statement on the constitutional revision on Constitution Memorial Day (3 
May), the DPJ, instead of the ambitious slogan of ‘creating the constitution’, leaned 
towards the LDP that aimed for the constitutional revision. The statement implies that 
the constitution should be added or revised if there are inadequacies or parts that need to 
be revised (Asahi Shimbun, 2010m). 
 
Thus, within a year, the DPJ was put into a rather awkward position. While the largest 
opposition party actively pursued constitutional revision, which was one of the DPJ’s 
objectives, the DPJ could not maintain two-thirds of seats in the Lower House without 
the SDP, which was dead set against the revision. Before it went any further, Hatoyama 
resigned due to his failure to fulfil his responsibility to reach an agreement on the issue 
of the relocation of the US military base in Okinawa.  
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 The Kan Administration: Lost Opportunities and Unfortunate Disaster  
 
The Kan administration faced a difficult restart as the ruling party. When Hatoyama 
ceased his ambitious relocation plan and compromised by following the existing plan, 
which required unanimity amongst the Cabinet, the head of the SDP refused to accept. 
This resulted in her dismissal, and the SDP left the coalition. Any future attempt of the 
coalition to submit a bill could be institutionally blocked because the two-party 
coalition had less than two-thirds of the seats (Japan Times, 2010). Furthermore, the 
Cabinet was shuffled just two months before the general election, which worsened the 
DPJ’s position. The DPJ failed to secure more than half of the seats in the Upper House 
election, keeping the ‘twisted’ Diet. Thus, the DPJ was unable to put forward CSD 
through constitutional reinterpretation or revision unless it formed a grand coalition 
with the LDP.  
 
In the end, Kan was betrayed by his former coalition partner at the Diet over CSD. 
Mizuho Fukushima, the head of the SDP at the Diet, persistently asked Kan about the 
new administration’s stance on CSD because the Hatoyama administration had implied 
the government should not be confined by the previous interpretation of CSD. Kan was 
forced to admit that the current administration did not consider allowing CSD (House of 
Councilors, 2010). Although having the SDP as a coalition partner is no mean feat, 
having it as an enemy shackled the DPJ.  
 
Furthermore, the Kan administration faced a substantial difficulty within a year: the 
great earthquake—known as ‘3.11’—took precedence over every political issue. 
Although 3.11 led Kan to consider forming a grand coalition with the LDP for a swift 
response to the disaster, the LDP rejected the offer (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2011). 
Nevertheless, since the enactment of the law concerning the procedure of the 
constitutional revision, it took four years to put the regulations of the Commission on 
the Constitution into practice in May 2011. The regulations dictate the number of 
Commission members, the minimum requirement to make a decision, and so on. Due to 
the emergent need to address the subsequent problems arising from 3.11, Yuichiro 
Haneda, the chair of the Diet Affairs Committee, stated at a press conference that 
members of the Commission were not to be chosen, and no further discussions of the 
constitutional revision would occur until there was some level of political stability 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2011b). Arguably minimal progress—determining how the 




There is also another reason the DPJ hesitated to pursue the constitutional revision, even 
though the largest opposition party favoured it. In the past, the DPJ rejected the LDP’s 
attempt to enact the law concerning the procedure of the revision (Asahi Shimbun, 
2004s). Since then, the DPJ changed its stance from pro-constitutional revision to 
anti-LDP-led revision. Thus, the fact that the DPJ follows what the LDP tried to proceed 
regarding the revision is self-contradictory (Asahi Shimbun, 2011d).  
 
Too Late to Act? The DPJ: Towards a LDP-like Party Under the Noda 
Administration 
 
As described previously, Noda personally held a normalist view on Japan’s security 
policy; he believed Japan should be allowed to exercise CSD and the constitutional 
revision should recognize the SDF as the military. With his view and the DPJ’s gradual 
compromise with the LDP, the Noda administration largely shifted its party stance to 
engage in these issues (Asahi Shimbun, 2012g). This reignited debate over the 
constitution and CSD amongst political parties. Although the Noda administration lasted 
just a year, the period may have laid foundations for the succeeding administration to 
emphasise the agendas.  
 
Within a month of Noda’s inauguration, the DPJ finally submitted the members of the 
Commission on the Constitution. Azuma Koshiishi, the secretary-general of the DPJ, 
publicly admitted the reason for the submission was largely due to the LDP pushing for 
debate on constitutional revision (Asahi Shimbun, 2011c). Given the twisted Diet where 
no party could single-handedly pass a bill, the DPJ concluded that it must compromise 
to some extent to receive support from the opposition parties. It ultimately took five 
years from the enactment of the law of the constitutional revision procedure to start the 
actual discussion of the revision. However, the DPJ still hesitated because it wanted to 
prioritise the recovery from 3.11 (Asahi Shimbun, 2011d).  
 
Moreover, one small practical issue had to be addressed that remained unresolved: the 
regulation of the minimum age to vote in a national referendum. The law concerning 
national referendum, which was part of the law of the constitutional revision procedure, 
stipulated the minimum age to vote was 18; however, the minimum age to vote in a 
general election was 20 (Asashi Shimbun, 2011d). Thus, laws related to the minimum 
age for voting in a general election should have been revised but did not happen. 
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Because the DPJ itself forced the LDP to lower the minimum age with respect to 
national referendums in 2007, the DPJ must first address it as its own agenda (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2011d). The DPJ’s attempt to revise the relevant laws ended up an abortive 
attempt.  
 
Nevertheless, this did not necessarily directly relate to the discussions in the 
Commission on the Constitution. Thus, in November 2011, the first meeting at the 
Upper House was held during which each party stated its stance on the revision. Apart 
from the Communist Party and the SDP—two parties that are against the revision but 
held only a combined ten seats in the house—most of the parties had a positive attitude 
towards the revision (Asahi Shimbun, 2011e). Each party actively promoted its idea and 
fuelled the discussion.  
 
For instance, the LDP—utilising its own constitutional revision plan implemented in 
2005—issued a revised version of the plan, which reflected its stance recognising the 
SDF as the military and self-defence, including CSD (Asahi Shimbun, 2012d). The 
newly established Osaka Restoration Party, whose membership included Toru 
Hashimoto, a famous celebrity in Japan, and other former LDP members, also 
advocated for constitutional revision with a focus on revising Article 9 (Asahi Shimbun, 
2012c). Small parties, such as the Your Party and the Sunrise Party of Japan, advocated 
revision with similar views on Article 9 (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2012b). While these 
parties proposed specific plans to revise the constitution, the DPJ had yet to come to any 
conclusion and only issued a summary of points for discussion as to how to deal with 
the SDF and the right of self-defence in the revision (Asahi Shimbun, 2012f). It seems 
the DPJ was the only party that could not determine its position.  
 
At this point, the opposition parties were more active than the ruling coalition as the 
objective of the LDP was to prepare for the next election for taking over the position of 
the ruling party. This aim was particularly conspicuous for the LDP, which actively 
sought to form bipartisan/non-partisan groups in preparation for future co-operation on 
the revision. The LDP presidential election was imminent. Thus, Abe, who aimed to run 
for the election, emphatically acted through secret meetings to promote the idea to 
co-operate with the Osaka Restoration Party (Asahi Shimbun, 2012a). 
 
The reason for this early preparation for the election, which was to be held in 2013, 
resided in a pact between the DPJ and the LDP with the Komeito. When it came to a tax 
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increase bill submitted by the DPJ, which was also in line with the LDP’s stance, the 
DPJ and the LDP made a pact: in return for endorsing the DPJ bill, the DPJ agreed to 
LDP’s request to dissolve the Diet in 2012. Therefore, the LDP had a chance to make a 
comeback, while the DPJ was cornered as the motion of non-confidence was submitted 
(Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2012a). Therefore, the LDP prepared not only for the election 
but also for a swift start as the new ruling party post-election.  
  
While the DPJ was on the verge of collapse, it successively compromised and gave 
away its policy initiatives to the LDP, even those regarding CSD. Despite being hesitant 
towards CSD at the time of inauguration, Noda stated to welcome the active debate of 
CSD (Asahi Shimbun, 2012j). In the meantime, the LDP already moved on to drafting 
relevant bills to allow CSD through constitutional reinterpretation for a swift 
submission when it took over the DPJ after the election (Asahi Shimbun, 2012g). The 
DPJ’s inability to decide and increasing propensity to follow the LDP was well pointed 
out. Hatoyama evaluated that the Noda administration was no different from the LDP 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2012i). In the end, as following the promise, Noda dissolved the Diet 
at the end of 2012, achieving nothing notable with no conceivable progress on both the 
revision and CSD by letting the LDP win the election. 
 
 State-society relations: outstanding absence  
 
State-society relations refers to the cohesion between the government and 
societal/economic groups. In this period, first, because nothing was even attempted to 
materialise in the form of a law or bill where the public may exert substantial influence 
over policy-making, the public, as part of this variable, was largely absent in a direct 
way. Nevertheless, it was the public that judged the DPJ as incapable of handling not 
only security policy but also domestic policies, which resulted in the resurgence of the 
LDP. Arguably, the Japanese public might be more sensitive and responsive towards 
seiken uneinouryoku (‘administration capability’). For instance, Hatoyama resigned 
largely because he failed to fulfil his promise to relocate the Futenma air base outside 
Okinawa (Shinoda, 2013). However, up to then, the issue itself had been the main 
political objective in Okinawa, not particularly receiving national public attention. The 
LDP took ten years to finalise the relocation plan, during which the sluggish process of 
determining relocation plan was not the target of criticism. The same can be said of the 
Kan administration, which collapsed due to its alleged inability to respond to the natural 
disaster and nuclear meltdown. However, it is questionable that the LDP would have 
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made a substantial difference provided that the ruling party had been the LDP. As 
Samuels (2013) argues, at the point where two years had passed since the disaster, the 
overall political dynamics, structure and policies remained largely status quo. 
 
The point is that the Japanese public shows a propensity to make a rushed evaluation 
and judgement, which here resulted in a number of very short-lived administrations and 
made it extremely difficult to have a consistent and constructive discussion of 
constitutional revision in the long run. This is particularly because, be it regime change 
or change in the prime minister, the newly elected prime minister is somewhat expected 
to be ‘different’ from the predecessors (Kitaoka, 2008), which is acutely seen in the 
three administrations in this period. Albeit indirectly, this public tendency has created 
tradition of politicians to prioritise political legitimacy over realising strategic needs. 
This is indirectly incorporated by the leaders’ dilemma to maintain public support and 
not only security policy. The public defined in the variable was a direct response to a 
particular security policy initiative. The inability of leaders to establish stability was a 
key feature. And yet, the chapter shows the public has been concerned not necessarily 
with radical remilitarisation but seiken-unyo nouryoku (‘administration capability’) with 
a few scandals, corruption and smooth implementation of policy since the mid-2000s. 
The same applies to the three short-lived LDP prime ministers in the previous period.  
 
Societal/economic groups also were insignificant. As with the previous period, the 
grassroots movement was both anti- and pro-constitutional revision, and both sides 
engaged in organizing a meeting, particularly on Constitution Memorial Day (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2011a). If anything, Nippon Kaigi, the largest organization to promote 
constitutional revision, accelerated its activities. Their meeting started online live 
streaming in 2009, so people all over Japan can watch and see famous celebrities or 
intellectuals talk (Tawara, 2016). However, among the members of Nippon Kaigi, of 
which 252 are elected politicians in the Diet as of 2013, almost all belong to the LDP 
(Chuo Nippou, 2013). There is not a strong linkage between Nippon Kaigi and the DPJ. 
Reported members from the DPJ are Seiji Maehara (a notable hawkish politician) and 
Satoshi Morimoto, (the former defence minister in the Noda administration and a retired 
SDF member) (Shiomi, 2016). It is thus hard to speculate that Nippon Kaigi exerted 
substantial influence over policy-making on the constitution, all the more so given no 
progress materialised during the DPJ era.  
 
Similarly, Keidanren was rather quiet because it has strong ties with the LDP. The DPJ 
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suggested different economic and industrial policies from what Keidanren wanted, 
which often coincided with those of the LDP. In the previous period, Keidanren 
repeatedly lobbied the LDP to push for constitutional revision and CSD, which was not 
seen in this period. Furthermore, even before the LDP won the election, at the LDP 
party convention, the president of Keidanren appeared and showed his support for the 
LDP (Asahi Shimbun, 2012k). Thus, there was no particular influence or connection 
with the DPJ administrations.  
 
 The Reflection of the Strategic Environment and the Intervening Variables  
 
In the end, no progress was made under the Noda administration, despite the 
aggravating strategic environment. As Noda had agreed, the Diet was dissolved in 
December 2012 and the LDP achieved a landslide victory while the DPJ lost more than 
173 seats and secured only 57. Also striking was the emergence of the Osaka 
Restoration Party, which secured 54 seats, the second-largest opposition party after the 
DPJ (Asahi Shimbun, 2012b). The LDP, the Osaka Restoration Party, the Komeito and 
the Your Party more or less favoured revision and won 397 seats out of 480. Given 40% 
of the DPJ agreed with the revision, approximately 420 members could be categorised 
as pro-constitutional revision. Now that the ruling party was the LDP, the largest 
advocate of the revision, the situation is a largely favourable one for those who aim to 
revise the constitution. 
 
Japan again did not particularly respond to the strategic environment by either 
extending the current constitutional reinterpretation or the revision to allow CSD for 
external balancing. Virtually no substantive material change was seen. The absence of a 
response was largely due to the domestic political chaos and political game for power 
competition. The first administration under Hatoyama was busy adjusting to the position 
of a ruling party. The Kan administration faced 3.11. The Noda administration seemed 
to be ready to address issues of CSD and revision, although it already had lost 
popularity amongst the public, which could not be restored. Therefore, leaders’ image 
and subsequent behaviours led by individual image accounted for the absence of any 
substantive change.  
 
Domestic institutions, such as the constitution and CSD, by definition, remained intact, 
while state-society relations did not play a particular role in this period. Political 
stability is key in terms of CSD, without which the DPJ was unable to even act towards 
112 
 
CSD. Compared with the previous period, despite the further aggravating strategic 
environment, the level of progress regarding CSD was far less.  
 
Overall, this section gives an account of the absence of Japan’s balancing behaviour 
from the perspective of the constitution using the intervening variables and comparing 
relative importance as an explanatory variable. The next section focuses on the period 
between 2012 and 2018, where a different level (far more drastic) of progress is seen. It 
explains how the constitutional revision debate took place in the proceeding years with 
the strategic environment becoming more aggravated. 
 
5.4 Collective Self-Defence and Constitutional Revision Between 2012 and 2018  
 
The analysis in this period examines the two continued parallel initiatives regarding the 
constitution: the constitutional reinterpretation to allow CSD and the constitutional 
revision with a particular focus on Article 9. During the period between 2012 and 2018, 
the strategic environment saw an aggravating change with the further rise of China and 
increased imminence of North Korea as a threat. Officially North Korea started 
signalling to Japan as a potential target of its missiles; this tension was intensified by the 
election of a new US president, Trump, who showed an intention to engage in a direct 
military confrontation with nuclear weapons (Shiva, 2018). Japan could only increase 
its external balancing through the allowance of the CSD. Japan was incapable of 
materialising the revision of Article 9. Depending on how it is revised, the revision 
would potentially enable Japan to engage in first-strike, possess offensive military 
weapons and form an alliance with neighbouring countries other than the US. This 
would theoretically help Japan make a substantial commitment to internal balancing. 
And yet, the probability of revising the constitution became more and more realistic as 
the ruling coalition secured two-thirds of seats in both houses with the several 
opposition parties, supporting the coalition (Asahi Shimbun, 2016d). This section 
explains the intervening variables and how, why and which ones are responsible for the 
partial response of Japan to the strategic environment, namely, the increase in external 








 Explanation of the Intervening Variables  
 
 Leaders’ image  
 
As discussed, CSD was first attempted by the Abe administration as a policy initiative 
in 2007 when he organised his private advisory board of academics and influential 
individuals to suggest the need for CSD. Abe’s strategic vision has not changed since 
then. Immediately after his re-inauguration as prime minister in 2012, he again stated 
the same revisionist stance by rearticulating his aim to revise the constitution and allow 
CSD (Asahi Shimbun, 2012h). Similar views on the constitution and CSD are shared 
not only amongst the LDP’s Cabinet members, such as Taro Aso (vice prime minister), 
Itsunori Onodera (minister of defence) (Akahata Shimbun, 2013), but also within the 
LDP. An Asahi survey suggests that 89% of the politicians elected through the Lower 
House general election in 2012 favour constitutional revision, while 79% leans towards 
the allowance of CSD (Asahi Shimbun, 2013b). The data, in fact, are reflected in the 
newly emerged parties—the Japan Restoration Party (55 seats) and the Your Party (18 
seats) (Sankei Shimbun, 2014)—which advocate the need for revision and CSD. These 
two parties arguably have a more normalist view than the LDP, as they both suggest an 
autonomous security policy.  
 
The Komeito has not changed its stance of pacifism despite the long position of its 
coalition partner, the LDP, to allow many changes in Japan’s security policy. In 
particular, the president of the Komeito, Natsuo Yamaguchi, publicly states the party’s 
position of strong hesitation towards both the revision and CSD, institutionally making 
it a potential veto player (Asahi Shimbun, 2013g).  
 
Domestic institutions  
 
As examined throughout the case study, the variable of domestic institutions refers to 
the domestic policy-making framework for actors which are delineated by both the 
constitution and regulations. Another aspect of it is institutional practice in the 
policy-making process. In this case study, the policymaking framework refers to the 
constitutional interpretation and the constitution that serves as the core of the variable, 
and it involves regulations, such as how the constitutional reinterpretation could be 
revised (i.e. two-thirds of seats in the Diet) or the revision (the same condition with a 
national referendum) (Neary, 2002). This section also considers ‘elections’ a key aspect 
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in relation to explaining leaders’ dilemma between strategic needs and maintenance of 
political stability because winning the elections are prerequisite conditions (Catalinac, 
2016). This period between 2012 and 2018, the number of elections is exceedingly high 
for one administration (three Lower House elections, two Upper House elections, three 
Tokyo gubernatorial elections and one Japanese unified local election) . 
 
In comparison, for the last six administrations (Abe, Fukuda, Aso, Hatoyama, Kan and 
Noda), each had at most two elections, the result of which often has been the resignation 
of the prime minister. In the previous two periods, the election shows that attempt of 
revising/reinterpreting the constitution at least is not an ideal way to win the election. 
Most importantly, the elections provide us with a key to examining the disparity 
between the unpopularity of the revision of Article 9 and CSD and the long-lasting Abe 
administration with its popularly known objectives to achieve both.  
 
 State-society relations  
 
State-society relations as an intervening variable look at the interaction among the 
government, the public and relevant economic/societal groups. As the agenda of 
constitutional revision requires a national referendum and CSD, as well as the 
substantial popularity of the ruling party, the relative weight of state-society 
relations—particularly the public and societal groups—that are for/against these might 
be increased. Notably, Nippon Kaigi—one of the largest nationalistic organisations in 
Japan to which many politicians, including Abe, belong—has expanded and enlarged its 
activities to promote the idea of constitutional revision and CSD.  
 
Domestic Institutions vs Leaders: Towards the Constitutional Reinterpretation to 
Allow Collective Self-Defence 
 
Until 2012, despite the growing appearance of the debate regarding CSD, nothing had 
been attempted to implement the constitutional reinterpretation. At most, the research 
was conducted to investigate as to whether CSD could/should be allowed in the past 
administration, including Abe’s first Cabinet. It was right after the 2012 general election 
that Abe tried to contact Tsuneyuki Yamamoto, the director-general of the CLB, which 
is primarily responsible for checking any drafts of law and their constitutionality (Asahi 
Shimbun Seijibu, 2015). Abe also immediately reconvened his private advisory body for 




This is when the direct confrontation between domestic institutions and leaders’ image 
can be seen as the intervening variables. The CLB’s institutional practice for 
maintaining the constitutionality is such that it is dubbed as ho no bannin (‘the guardian 
of the constitution’) (Sakata & Kawaguchi, 2014). Thus, pacifism is institutionalised 
into the practice of the CLB.  
 
Yamamoto answered Abe’s question—whether the constitution could be reinterpreted to 
allow CSD—as constitutionally impossible (Asahi Shimbun Seijibu, 2015). The hurdle 
was substantial even if the coalition party had two-thirds of seats in both houses, which 
was institutionally enough to railroad any policy initiative. Therefore, the coalition party 
could not exercise such institutional power as long as the CLB said ‘no’. Further contact 
was made with Yamamoto before the 2013 Upper House election, though it was in vain 
given the same answer for the impossibility of CSD (Asahi Shimbun Seijibu, 2015).  
 
The CLB did not just say no, however, but proposed an alternative to meet Abe’s 
objective, which revealed Abe’s strong interests in CSD per se. His advisory board 
issued broad four scenarios where CSD should be allowed: (1) defence of US vessels on 
the high seas, (2) interception of a ballistic missile that might be on its way to the US, 
(3) participation in UN PKOs and other international peace operations and (4) logistics 
support for the operations of other countries participating in the same UN PKOs and 
other activities (Cabinet Office, 2008a). Yamamoto, as the representative of the CLB, 
offered that three of the four scenarios (excluding the second) were possible through the 
reinterpretation of the constitution by stretching the implications of the individual right 
of self-defence without allowance of CSD (Asahi Shimbun Seijibu, 2015). However, 
Abe (2006) saw CSD as a symbolic constraint on Japan’s departure from ‘the post-war 
regime’. Accordingly, Abe rejected Yamamoto’s offer.  
 
Authority over institutional practice  
 
There is some inconsistency between institutional practice and regulation, both of which 
fall within the variable of domestic institutions, that stems from the superiority of the 
prime minister as regulated by law. Article 2 (The law of the establishment of the CLB) 
stipulates that the director-general of the CLB is appointed by the Cabinet (Cabinet 
Legislative Bureau, 1952). As a regulation, the prime minister has the authority to 
supervise the Cabinet and to appoint Cabinet members and the heads of the relevant 
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bureaus, including CLB, according to the law of the establishment of the Cabinet 
(Cabinet, 1952). However, conventionally the CLB has adopted the institutionalised 
practice of yon shou sekinin taisei (‘four ministerial rotation system’) to appoint the 
director-general amongst the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry 
of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications. The purpose is to avoid the influence of the prime minister to appoint 
since its establishment in 1952 (Makihara, 2018). Thus, although the Prime Minister has 
the right to appoint the personnel, up until 2012, he only signed the prior-arranged 
appointment by the rotation system. This tradition is due in part to the name of the 
guardian of the law given to the CLB.  
 
Although the breaking of the tradition seems to give an impression of political 
interruption, Abe exercised his authority to replace Yamamoto with Ichiro Komatsu 
from the MOFA after the 2013 general election (Asahi Shimbun, 2013f). As a disguise, 
Yamaguchi was not simply dismissed but transferred to the Supreme Court as a judge. 
Nevertheless, given the abnormal attempt to exercise the authority to interfere with 
personnel transfer in the CLB, it would be obvious to see Abe’s intention to railroad his 
plan to allow CSD. Komatsu did not have any experience working in the CLB and was 
involved in Abe’s private advisory panel in 2007 to draft plans for CSD, which was 
suggestive of his agreement with the idea of CSD through constitutional reinterpretation 
(Asahi Shimbun Seijibu, 2015).  
 
However, this does not mean the CLB became blindly obliged to follow whatever the 
Cabinet orders. It simply made it easier for both CLB and the Cabinet to reach an 
agreement with Komatsu who is not against CSD to bridge the gap between the two. 
The negotiation between Komatsu and Yusuke Yokohata, the deputy director-general of 
the CLB who was on path to become director-general, revealed that the CLB could not 
possibly be tolerated in any way because CSD has little to do with individual 
self-defence (Asahi Shimbun, 2013l). In other words, in the eyes of the CLB, it is 
impossible to reinterpret the constitution in a way that Japan can participate in any 
conflict or war that has no geopolitical risks to Japan just for the sake of protecting 
other countries.  
 
Given that both Komatsu and Yokohata are lawyers, and Komatsu was critically aware 
of Abe’s strong desire to allow CSD, they agreed to propose the idea of gentei younin 
(‘limited acknowledgement’) of CSD. The name itself is CSD, which is a stretched 
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interpretation of individual self-defence to the extent to which an attack or conflict in 
another region may pose a future danger to Japan. This arguably meets the conditions of 
the exercise of individual self-defence: (1) the existence of an imminent act of 
aggression, (2) there are no appropriate means to repel it and (3) a minimum degree of 
the use of force (Cabinet, 2008a) This is because the first two conditions are very 
‘subjective’ and vary depending on the Cabinet. Furthermore, given the US military 
presence in Japan and its critical role in the US-Japan alliance, the logic of this stretch 
of the interpretation of self-defence is that an attack on the US military bases in Japan 
substantially weakens the alliance and imposes a direct threat on Japan. This is how the 
long-lasting institutional practice came to an end through the exercise of the authority of 
the Cabinet to overcome arguably the biggest and immediate hurdle, thus paving the 
way for CSD.  
 
 Resource extraction and planning 
 
Consideration and priority were given to the Upper House election in July 2013 where 
the LDP finally gained full status as a ruling party and gained more than half of the seats 
with the Komeito. During the run-up to the election, the LDP did not take any particular 
action, and even Abe’s private advisory board, which is designed to push CSD, stopped 
its activity (Asahi Shimbun, 2013d). The board restarted its meetings soon after the 
election almost every month before the coalition negotiation started (October 2013, 
November 2013, December 2013 and February 2014, after which the negotiation started 
to put forward the final plan of the board; (Cabinet Office, 2008b). Following the 
election and the replacement of Yamamoto, the Cabinet and the members of the board 
began to gain public acceptance through public statement, interviews and media 
appearances. In doing so, with the co-operation of the CLB, they aimed not only to 
promote CSD but also to plan ‘detailed scenarios’ that served to convince the Komeito 
with its pacifist ideology.  
 
Komatsu reiterated the superiority of the Cabinet over the CLB regarding the 
constitutional interpretation, even for CSD (Asahi Shimbun, 2013l). The chair of the 
board, Shinichi Kitaoka, attempted to securitise the strategic environment and 
re-promote the four scenarios of CSD through Asahi Shimbun’s interview (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2013r). Each meeting of the advisory board organised a press conference to 
answer questions from journalists to clarify the need for CSD (Cabinet Office, 2008b). 
Abe also pointed his focus outside Japan by organising four lectures and speeches in the 
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US and Canada (Asahi Shimbun, 2013a), while Onodera, the minister of defence, 
visited Thailand and met with the president to ask for understanding of allowing CSD 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2013m). On the other hand, Onodera also gave a speech at the UN 
general assembly to promote CSD through future participation in PKOs (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2013n). Through the investment of resources, the relevant actors promoted 
CSD until the end of 2013.  
 
The Cabinet then planned the best strategy to proceed with CSD after the annual budget 
plan of the government passed through the Diet in April 2014. Although the budget plan 
can be institutionally passed with the seats of the ruling coalition with ease, there is a 
symbolic significance of the process. The Diet debate about the budget is not 
necessarily about the budget. Due to the public attention and media coverage, 
opposition parties often take the opportunity to appeal to the inability of the ruling party 
(Agora, 2016). If the finalised CSD plan was submitted before the budget plan was 
passed, it would be an effective way to frame CSD to the public as a ‘war bill’. Thus 
Abe stated that he planned to proceed with the discussion and start negotiations with the 
Komeito when the private advisory board submitted a final report in April—after the 
budget plan was to be passed—to avoid making CSD a focal point of discussion in the 
Diet (Asahi Shimbun, 2014f). 
 
 Coalition Politics: The Ideological Clash of Two Leaders’ Images  
 
Although the Komeito was publicly opposed to CSD and raised concerns through media 
interviews (Asahi Shimbun, 2013o), public speeches (Asahi Shimbun, 2013p) and 
appearances on TV (Asahi Shimbun, 2013q), the two parties did not have an official 
party meeting until the budget plan was passed in March. Finally, a month before the 
advisory board issued a final report, the two parties started negotiations that lasted more 
than two months with some progress and compromise from the LDP’s view. Secretly, 
the two parties organised a meeting with Masahiko Koumura (vice president), Shigeru 
Ishiba and Gen Nakatani (former minister of defence) from the LDP and Natsuo 
Yamaguchi, Yoshihisa Inoue (secretary-general), and Yuichi Kitagawa (vice president) 
from the Komeito (Asahi Shimbun Seijibu, 2015). While the LDP contended that CSD 
was allowed under international law, which is not explicitly denied by Article 9, the 
Komeito maintained that CSD is only possible through constitutional revision, thus 
making the chasm clearer. However, the media discovered the secret meeting and 
reported that the LDP and the Komeito started the ruling coalition negotiation towards 
119 
 
the Cabinet decision of CSD (Asahi Shimbun, 2014d). As nothing was decided nor 
agreed, it may show a wrong signal to both LDP members, and in particular Komeito’s 
supporters, most of whom belong to the pacifist Soka-gakkai. To be fair, the argument of 
both parties is correct because there is a number of interpretations of CSD, the right of 
individual self-defence and the overarching right of self-defence. For instance, the 
Komeito’s view is based on the 1981 interpretation under the Suzuki administration that 
CSD refers to the use of force that occurs to a close ally and Article 9 prohibits it 
(House of Representatives, 1981). On the other hand, the LDP used the logic of the 
Ashida amendment that interpreted Article 9 as for the solo purpose of aspiring an 
international peace based on justice and order, under which the right of 
self-defence—arguably including CSD—is allowed (Asahi Shimbun, 2018c).  
 
The secret meeting halted soon, and a smaller scale negotiation began secretly between 
Kitagawa and Koumura to look for a way to reach a settlement (Asahi Shimbun Seijibu, 
2015). Having failed to convince the Komeito with the Ashida amendment, Koumura 
first needed another reason that convinced the LDP members. Thus, he organised a 
study group with different reasoning to allow CSD based on the Supreme Court 
judgment in the Sunagawa case. The protesters trespassing the restricted US military 
bases in the town of Sunagawa was charged with the violation of the special criminal 
act upon the treaty of mutual co-operation and security between Japan and the US 
(Oppler, 1961). It went on to a trial at the Supreme Court. However, the focal point of 
the trial was based on the first trivial verdict that they were not guilty because the 
presence of the US bases themselves is ‘unconstitutional’ and constituted ‘war potential’, 
prohibited by the constitution, acquitting the protesters. This was appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which decided to convict the protesters based on the ruling that the 
constitution did not deny the right of self-defence and therefore the US presence for the 
sake of Japan’s defence was not unconstitutional.  
 
Like other proponents, Koumura picked up the part of the judgment referring to the 
right of self-defence, suggestive of both individual and CSD to show the superiority of 
the Supreme Court over the CLB and justification regarding CSD (Asahi Shimbun 
Seijibu, 2015). Both Kitagawa and Koumura at least agreed that the judgment neither 
admitted nor denied CSD, and they also understood there should be some further push 
as what the Komeito sought is hadome (‘brake’) on CSD. In other words, while the 
Komeito did not deny the role of PKOs and any such activities to maintain peace, it was 




With that basis established through the secret meeting, the coalition party negotiation 
started with the involvement of the CLB, which has been responsible for drafting all the 
Cabinet statement of the change in the interpretation of Article 9 (Asahi Shimbun 
Seijibu, 2015). There is still a difference in stance between the Komeito and the LDP. 
While the LDP put forward scenarios, now extending to 15 detailed cases from 4, the 
Komeito counter-argued that many of LDP-proposed scenarios to allow CSD can deal 
with the current interpretation of individual self-defence.  
 
It has been clear that the term CSD has a substantial symbolic significance for both. To 
the Komeito, the term suggested the departure from pacifism (Sakata, 2016). For the 
LDP, the allowance of CSD is the long-desired aim in any form. With the co-operation 
of the CLB, this time Kitagawa passionately sought a settlement by examining every 
interpretation issued in the past. He found the Cabinet statement on CSD issued in 1972 
convenient and convincing as it had aspects of hadome (break). It read that the right of 
self-defence was not denied by the constitution because Article 13 prioritises the 
Japanese people’s right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and in case the right 
was fundamentally threatened, Japan could exercise the right of self-defence, albeit not 
admitting to an unlimited extent (Asahi Shimbun Seijibu, 2015). With Article 13, 
Kitagawa thought that by adding the explanation that due to the change in the security 
environment where an attack on other countries might lead to the fundamental overturn 
of the constitutional right, the limited degree of CSD can be convincing to both parties. 
Ultimately, this plan was adopted and the basis of the following Cabinet decision issued 
on 1 July 2014. 
 
 Endurance from the relentless and powerless opposition parties  
 
The Cabinet statement on CSD did not automatically allow Japan to exercise the right 
of CSD, which was just a statement of the constitutional reinterpretation. Based on it, 
the Cabinet had to submit relevant bills to institutionalise them into laws, which the 
opposition parties tried to stop. However, given the institutional strength of the ruling 
coalition (two-thirds of seats) in both houses, there was no way to discard the Cabinet 
statement unless there was a regime change through the general election.  
 
In fact, the general election was held at the end of 2014 where the Cabinet tactically 
shifted the focal point of the election from CSD to the decision regarding the 
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postponement of a tax increase from 8% to 10% from 2015 to 2017. In the LDP’s 
manifesto for the election, only one page was spared for security policy out of 27 pages, 
which furthermore focused on diplomacy and did not mention CSD at all (LDP, 2014). 
Despite the DPJ’s efforts—it was the largest opposition party—to challenge CSD as a 
priority of its manifesto, the LDP again won the election, singlehandedly securing more 
than half of the seats (DPJ, 2014). Relentless and powerless attempts made by the 
opposition parties to change the Cabinet statement did not stop after the election, which 
was in vain. The time spent on the diet discussion where the opposition parties 
counter-argue the lack of necessity of CSD was the longest in the post-war Japanese 
politics in the area of security policy, amounting to 216 hours in both houses, followed 
by 193 hours spent on the PKO law in 1993 (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2015).  
 
State-society relations: Self-contradictory public and non-influential societal 
groups  
 
In the previous period under the DPJ, the acute decline of the Cabinet support rate, 
despite its deliberate attempts not to provoke any controversial security policies, was 
responsible for short-lived Cabinets. This resulted in an inevitable difficulty following 
the discussion of CSD, which took years to finalise. The assumption was that the 
facilitation of the issue of CSD would lead to a drop in public support. However, in this 
period, the way in which the public acted was somewhat the other way around. That is, 
while the public continued to be opposed CSD, the Cabinet support rate was 
comparatively higher than previous Cabinets throughout this period. Those who 
opposed CSD had been more than 50% since the second Abe Cabinet started in 2012 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2014e). Even after the submission of the relevant bills to legalise CSD, 
more than half were against them, which in fact did not use the term CSD (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2015). On the other hand, the Cabinet support rate was constantly higher than 
40%, which was above the disapproval rating (NHK Broadcasting Culture Research 
Institute, 2018).  
 
The relationship between public opinion on CSD and the Cabinet support rate was in 
fact not so significant. Only the support rate in September 2015, when the laws to allow 
CSD were passed, marked the disapproval rate overtaking the support rate, which 
recovered within a month. This may reflect on the deliberately prolonged CSD 
proceeding by the Abe Cabinet, due to the elections, with the view of maintaining 
political stability. Therefore, the public did not play any substantial role in terms of CSD 
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debates and legalisation.  
 
The societal groups such as Keidanren and Nippon Kaigi, both of which promoted and 
lobbied CSD to the government, did not play any particularly notable role primarily 
because the planning and negotiation took place among a small number of groups: the 
LDP, the Komeito and the CLB. There is no evidence of direct involvement of 
Keidanren and Nippon Kaigi. For Keidanren, although it has long waited for CSD, what 
all it could do was prepare for the expansion of the indigenous defence industry when 
CSD was allowed. Immediately after the passage of the bill to allow CSD, Keidanren 
issued a policy proposal for the defence industry, which referred to the mid-term plan 
upon the allowance of CSD (Keidanren, 2015). On the other hand, Nippon Kaigi was 
known to be engaged in a nationwide grassroots movement to promote the 
constitutional revision, which includes CSD. However, no apparent influence such as 
the boost of public support for CSD was seen, which may be offset by the 
anti-CSD/constitutional revision movement, such as 9jou wo mamoru kai (the 
organisation to protect Article 9) (Tawara, 2016).  
 
Constitutional revision: An attempt to lower the hurdle through the revision of  
Article 96 
 
From this section, the analysis focuses on constitutional revision. In parallel with CSD, 
the Abe Cabinet began to take a step towards the revision of the pacifist constitution 
since 2012. Thus, Abe—whether it was his idea or suggested by others—decided to 
address the revision of Article 9 in a rather roundabout way by the revision of Article 96. 
Article 96 is about the procedure of the constitutional revision: ‘Amendments to this 
Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds of all 
its members’ (Cabinet, 1947b). Even before the general election in 2012, Abe stated that 
it is necessary to revise Article 96 to be revised first to revise the other articles (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2012b) as the hurdle of the revision with two-thirds of seats in both houses is 
simply too high (Asahi Shimbun, 2012e). Furthermore, he already established a 
bipartisan group as a caucus of the Diet regarding Article 96 during the DPJ, which 
served as the ruling party (Asahi Shimbun, 2014c). The idea is that lowering the hurdle 
of the constitutional revision to the half of all the Diet members not only makes it 
institutionally easier for the subsequent revision, such as Article 9 but also serves as the 
revision with the expectation that the symbolic hurdle of the 70- year intact constitution 
was to dwindle. However, lowering the hurdle was not well supported, even by the 
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voters for the LDP: 41% of LDP voters opposed it whilst 54% of the public also 
opposed it (Asahi Shimbun, 2013i). Given the Komeito’s hesitation, priority was given 
to the allowance of CSD by devoting political resources to it. In the end, any plan was 
not concretised and submitted to the Diet, and the discussion of revising Article 96 
gradually faded whilst the discussion shifted to CSD.  
 
Challenging the constitutional revision in a standard way: Leaders vs domestic  
institutions 
 
In the end, it took a while to start the discussion of the constitutional revision until the 
bills related to CSD were put into practice on 29 March 2016 (Mainichi Shimbun, 2016), 
almost two years from the Cabinet decision to propose the constitutional reinterpretation. 
The opposition parties theoretically could attempt to scrap the bills until these took 
effect; in fact, five opposition parties submitted to do so, which was a failure due to 
their lack of seats (Japan Times, 2016).  
 
Nevertheless, before finally embarking on the planning phase of the constitutional 
revision through the Commission on the Constitution in both houses, there was an 
immediate challenge: to secure more than two-thirds of seats in the Upper House 
through the upcoming general election on July 2016. While the coalition already had 
enough institutional power in the Lower House to initiate and submit the constitutional 
revision, it still needed the same proportion of seats in the Upper House. Because the 
coalition or the ruling party had never secured this level of influence through the Upper 
House election, Abe himself admitted it would be next to impossible for the ruling 
coalition to do so (Asahi Shimbun, 2016j). This inevitably led the coalition to seek 
parties to form a bipartisan group. As discussed before, there are two parties that leaned 
towards the constitutional revision: the Restoration Party and the Party for Japanese 
Kokoro (spirit), which was formed by former members of the Restoration Party. As 
one-half of the members of the Upper House are elected for every Upper House election, 
the four parties in total had already secured 84 seats, which meant at least 78 seats 
needed to be obtained through the election (Asahi Shimbun, 2016g).  
 
While the LDP put constitutional revision into its manifesto for the upcoming election, 
albeit slightly touching on it amongst other promises, again the LDP did not attempt to 
make it a focal point for the election. Abe’s campaign speech mentioned his economic 
policy, Abenomics, but not the revision (Asahi Shimbun, 2016f). On the other hand, the 
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opposition parties, such as the Democratic Progressive Party, explicitly showed the 
intention to prevent the revision throughout the election campaign (Asahi Shimbun, 
2016d). As expected, the ruling coalition with the two parties secured two-thirds of the 
seats, thereby guaranteeing the institutional capability to submit a plan of constitutional 
revision at last (Asahi Shimbun, 2016i).  
 
Discussion set in motion  
 
Because the discussion and determination of the final plan of the revision are left to the 
Commission of the Constitution in both houses, which occurs during the Diet session, 
discussion of the detailed context of the revision started in September 2016. Although 
the LDP already issued the original draft of the revision, which stipulated the SDF as 
the military with the allowance of full-degree of CSD, the LDP decided not to use it as 
the basis of discussion due to the expected difficulty in getting a consensus (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2016c). Abe himself allegedly stated that his statement would confuse and 
delay the process; therefore, he did not intend to weigh in the discussion of the 
Commission (Asahi Shimbun, 2016c).  
 
First, the Commission mainly started to address the overarching framework beyond 
constitutional revision, such as ‘constitutionalism’, the ways to judge unconstitutionality 
and the limitation of the constitution (House of Representatives, 2016). This is mainly 
because the constitution in light of Article 9, in particular, was neglected and 
interpretation of it played a crucial part in Japan’s security posture, which has been long 
considered a problem of the current constitution. The diet meeting for both 
Commissions occurred on a monthly basis; each session was devoted to a particular 
topic ranging from education to human rights. It, therefore, took a while to start 
debating Article 9. Be it deliberately or not, there was not a single session solely 
devoted to the discussion of Article 9, the right of self-defence or the SDF in 2016 and 
even 2017, while there was for local governance (House of Representatives, 2017b) and 
human rights (House of Representatives, 2017a).  
 
Extension of the deadline for the revision  
 
There seems to be a reason the LDP did not rush to revise the constitution while the 
ruling coalition had institutional momentum with two-thirds of the seats in both houses. 
This stemmed from the lowering support for the revision, which resulted in revising the 
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LDP regulation on presidency term limits. Until then, the president of the LDP—by 
definition, the prime minister when the LDP is the ruling party—could serve up to two 
consecutive terms (3 years per term).  
 
Given the prolonged process, the LDP decided to extend the term limit to three terms 
and revised it in March 2017, which means Abe will serve as prime minister until 2021 
(Sankei Shimbun, 2017c). While Abe stated that revising the constitution by 2018 
during his term was the goal, after the change in the LDP’s regulation, he set a new 
deadline of 2020 when the Tokyo Olympics will take place on Constitution Memorial 
Day in May (Asahi Shimbun, 2017m). He again advocated his plan of the revision of 
Article 9. At this point where the discussion of the revision of Article 9 saw no progress 
and strong opposition for a substantial revision on Article 9, Abe compromised on his 
original idea and proposed a plan in line with the Komeito: kaken (adding a clause to 
Article 9). That is to add a clause to stipulate the existence of the SDF as the military 
(ibid).  
 
Reliance on the past-successful strategy  
 
The relaxed deadline for the revision notwithstanding and given the lack of 
advancement on the revision of Article 9, Abe and like-minded policymakers again used 
the strategy to organise a small group to reach consensus with the Komeito. This tactic 
was used to enact laws to allow CSD, which included a secret negotiation between 
Koumura (the LDP) and Kitagawa (the Komeito), to plan a revision idea that satisfies 
both members (Asahi Shimbun, 2017h). The tactic was supposedly advocated by Abe 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2017f). This attempt largely ignores the critical role of the 
Commission on the Constitution, which is primarily responsible for the relevant 
discussion and planning. Furthermore, Abe gave the order to the LDP’s committee to 
promote constitutional revision to hasten the pace to finalise the draft of the revision 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2017d).  
 
At this point, Abe’s initial revision plan was largely compromised, from the one to allow 
the full-degree of CSD with revision of the clauses of Article 9 to the non-revision of 
the clauses with the mere stipulation of SDF existence. While one can say that his goal 
is to achieve—be it material or symbolic—the revision itself, in accordance with the 
leaders’ dilemma, it seems to him a necessary compromise to realise his strategic vision 
to avoid achieving nothing (Asahi Shimbun, 2016j). The LDP’s drafts of the revision 
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issued in 2005 and 2012 both base the revision of Article 9 on changing the contexts of 
both clauses contained therein. In particular, the second clause refers to the 
unconstitutionality for Japan to possess any war capability, the revision of which would 
theoretically enable Japan to possess a nuclear weapon as well as offensive capability. 
However, Abe already agreed that adding a clause to Article 9 to stipulate the existence 
of the SDF as the military was a valid means to achieve the revision. This is not only 
because the revision of both clauses is unpopular amongst the public, but also the LDP 
executives thought it would be much easier to reach a consensus with the Komeito and 
some members of the opposition parties who more or less favour the revision (Kokubun, 
2017).  
 
Although this seems a reasonable decision, it is not necessarily supported by LDP 
members. Ishiba, for instance, sticks to the idea of deleting the second clause and 
rewrite by questioning ‘consistency’ of the current LDP plan for the revision with the 
past LDP drafts of the new constitution (Asahi Shimbun, 2017b). On the other hand, 
Seishiro Endo, the former chief of the then-DA, cast doubt on the idea (Asahi Shimbun, 
2017g). Abe’s admission of the idea seemed even surprising to one of his close 
like-minded politicians, Hakubun Shimomura, who serves as deputy chief of the LDP’s 
Commission of the Constitution, as revealed through a media interview (Asahi Shimbun, 
2017k). With these compromises, Abe stated at a press conference in July 2017 that he 
aimed to submit a draft of the revision by the end of the year (Asahi Shimbun, 2017i). 
 
 
 Unexpected delay? A series of political scandals  
 
While the discussion regarding Article 9 stagnated, resulting in the LDP-led initiatives, 
there has been a series of political scandals that account for the loss of momentum of the 
ruling coalition to push for the revision. First, the alleged concealment of the SDF daily 
activity logs regarding the UN PKOs in South Sudan, which allegedly was conducted in 
a ‘conflict zone’ and beyond the constitutional interpretation. This inevitably raised a 
question for the MOD on handling information and civilian control, causing an 
immediate setback on the revision of Article 9 (Japan Times, 2017a). The controversy 
lasted until Tomomi Inada, the then-minister of defence, resigned in July 2017.  
 
The list of scandals did not stop there. The government allegedly sold a 
government-owned tract of land in Osaka to Moritomo School at a substantially 
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discounted price, which was reported as cronyism linked to Abe and his wife (Reuters, 
2014a). Similarly, Kake Gakuen (university) won approval from the government to 
open a new department, the founder of which was a close friend of Abe. The document 
that shows the distortion of the administrative process due to Abe’s cronyism was 
disclosed (Yoshida, 2017). Scandals in relation to Abe, who thus far played a crucial 
role in advancing the constitutional revision, placed an additional hurdle to pursuing the 
revision.  
 
 Asking for the public  
 
In the midst of the attack from the opposition parties regarding the abovementioned 
scandals and the dropping Cabinet support rate, the Abe administration decided to hold 
a snap election in October 2017. The scandals are largely a factor triggering the election 
(Repeta, 2017). While considering constitutional revision as the ultimate goal, Abe 
prioritises political legitimacy through the leaders’ dilemma. The aim of the election is 
to stabilise the Cabinet and ask the public to let these scandals slide. The latter can be 
achieved by asking the public to evaluate the government on its achievements and 
manifesto, including constitutional revision. While Abenomics and the issues of North 
Korea are the main focal points, this time the manifesto clearly mentions the revision of 
Article 9 on the stipulation of the SDF in the constitution under the slogan of ‘protecting 
this country’ (LDP, 2017). Abe ultimately won the election five consecutive times since 
2012, securing the supermajority in the Lower House with Komeito. Through the 
election and scandals throughout the Abe Cabinet, the progress has been two steps 
forward and one step back.  
 
 
 Unresolved issues  
 
Winning the election and having the institutional basis for constitutional revision does 
not mean sound progress. Still, there is a huge divide in terms of how Article 9 is to be 
revised, not only amongst political parties but also within the LDP. As there was no 
attempt yet to negotiate with the Komeito directly, the Komeito still showed an obvious 
hesitation even for the compromised plan of revising Article 9 (Asahi Shimbun, 2017c). 
Given the strongly remaining LDP hawks, such as Ishida, within the LDP, there is yet to 
be any consensus; this resulted in the LDP committee of the constitutional revision 
giving up on issuing the LDP’s plan in 2017 (Asahi Shimbun, 2017j). Thus, there have 
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been two unilateral processes: intra- and inter-party consensus. Nevertheless, if the 
constitutional revision takes place and effect as planned, not so much time is left. The 
law concerning the procedure of national referendum stipulates that it must take place 
between 60 and 180 days after the submission of the revision plan (House of 
Representatives, 2007), and Article 100 states that the constitution takes effect at least 
six months after the results of the national referendum (Cabinet, 1947c). This means 
that there should be at least eight months necessary for completing the revision after the 
submission of the constitutional revision to the Diet.  
 
While the clock is ticking, the LDP decided to finalise the plan of revising Article 9 by 
the day of the annual party convention in March 2018 (Asahi Shimbun, 2018f). 
Although the Commission of the constitutional revision occurred in February to discuss 
the LDP’s compromised plan it was yet not agreed officially upon within the LDP. The 
discussion seemingly did not even show the slightest sign of reaching a consensus. This 
is particularly because the discussion again fell under the ‘interpretation’ of the revision 
plan and what it implies (House of Councilors, 2018).  
 
Given so divergent opinions, the LDP’s committee proposed seven versions of the 
revision plan of Article 9. Two approaches can be found in the seven versions. On the 
one hand, two of them advocates the revision of the second clause in the way that it 
stipulates the SDF as the military. The five patterns stipulate that the second clause 
remains and a new one is added while the details of additional clause vary. Overall, it is 
as to whether the new clause admits the SDF or the right of self-defence, largely 
allowing the limited degree of CSD or full degree of it (Asahi Shimbun, 2018d). 
However, this could be a mere gesture of contemplating all the opinions, and the plan 
that the committee and Abe advocated most is adding the clause that Japan possesses 
the SDF, minimum degree necessary under the authority of the prime minister. This 
suggests the continued civilian control and following the past interpretation as to the 
degree of military capability and CSD (Asahi Shimbun, 2018a). In the end, the chair of 
the committee railroaded the original plan and suppressed the other opinions with the 
compromise of ‘minimum degree necessary’ (Asahi Shimbun, 2018e). The final draft so 
far is to add ‘Article 9-2’ that states the SDF shall be maintained ‘as an armed 
organisation’ for Japan to take ‘necessary self-defence measures’.  
 
By eliminating the part ‘minimum degree necessary’, this revision plan implies that 
Japan could take up full-degree of CSD, facilitating the possession of offensive 
129 
 
capabilities and lifting the hurdle of the use of force, such as a first-strike measure. This 
is because, given a possibility of a newly revised constitution to override the past 
interpretation, one of the conditions to use force—minimum degree necessary—would 
no longer be in effect. However, this is just speculation; nothing has yet to be finalised, 
even within the LDP.  
 
 The absence of the public and societal/economic groups: State-society relations  
 
Due to the insufficient progress of the constitutional revision where the national 
referendum has not taken place, the public did not play a direct role in the constitutional 
revision planning. However, it does not mean that the substance of the public should be 
overlooked. This is because there is a discrepancy between a voter’s preference of 
parties and their opinions on the constitution. Asahi’s survey reveals that only 14% of 
voters consider the constitutional revision as a prime factor for their votes (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2016h). In terms of the overall view on the constitution, those who are in 
favour and those who are against are more or less neck and neck throughout this period. 
Asahi Shimbun, known to protect the constitution, conducted surveys on the view of the 
constitutional revision with a little more than 50% against it and a little less than 50% in 
favour of it, although after CSD was allowed, the proportion against the revision rose to 
55% temporarily (Asahi Shimbun, 2016e). On the other hand, Yomiuri, which is a 
pro-constitutional revision and even suggests its original revision plan in the past, 
reveals that more than half prefer the revision, whilst around 40% oppose it (Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 2017).  
 
The influence of the public has been arguably reduced because the LDP’s plan had been 
compromised largely to accommodate the opposition and the coalition partner, the 
Komeito. After publicly promoting the idea of adding a clause to stipulate the existence 
of the SDF, the number of the public opposing the revision of Article 9, according to the 
Asahi survey, dropped to 53% from 65% between 2016 and 2018 (Asahi Shimbun, 
2016e, 2018b). Similarly, the Yomiuri survey shows that 55% favour the revision plan 
of Article 9 (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2018). The NHK (2018) survey shows that 31% favour 
it, 23% oppose it, and 40% chose the answer ‘hard to say’. On the other hand, in 2017 
when the revision of Article 9 still implied a possibility of radical revision, the same 
type of survey conducted by NHK shows 57% against it and 25% in favour of it (NHK, 
2017). Although there is remaining uncertainty, it is clear that the moderate version of 
revising Article 9 seems more popular amongst the public, and the Cabinet in this sense 
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effectively addressed the concerns of the public in advance despite comparatively fewer 
changes in the revision. Thus, the public was effectively incorporated into the 
policymakers’ mind as well as their strategy to maintain political legitimacy while the 
public per se did not seem to have a direct influence.  
 
Turning to the socio/economic groups, while economic groups such as Keidanren did 
not seem to get involved in passionate lobbying activities to the government, which 
only showed support publicly (Asahi Shimbun, 2016a), Nippon Kaigi facilitated its 
influence on not only the government but also the public. Nippon Kaigi is likely to have 
created a platform where a bipartisan group for constitutional revision is formed. The 
meeting of Nippon Kaigi became enlarged at the national level where politicians from 
the LDP, the then-DPJ, and the Restoration Party gathered to promote the constitutional 
revision and call for co-operation. This type of meeting is organised periodically. The 
organisation apparently was established under Nippon Kaigi, the organisation with the 
view to creating what it calls a beautiful Japanese constitution. The significance can be 
seen at the grass-root level. It organised a meeting for the constitutional revision where 
10,000 people attended all over Japan (Utsukushi Nihon no Kenpou wo Tukuru 
Kokumin no Kai, 2015).  
 
The organisation collected more than 10 million signatures as of 2018. It has apparently 
aimed to collect 30 million, which was considered a minimum number to win the 
national referendum given the low voting rate for the general election at around 50-60% 
(Tawara, 2016). In so doing, the number of local offices has substantially increased 
since 2006 and has now reached 300, which provides a platform for local politicians to 
participate in the promotion of constitutional revision (Tawara, 2016). Although the 
signatures do not guarantee and reflect a potential outcome of the national referendum 
at all, it is remarkable for an organisation to collect the signatures on such a 
controversial topic from more than 10% of the entire population. While the direct 
influence of the group has yet to be seen in this period, the existence cannot be 
neglected.  
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
The chapter considers the two parallel initiatives of Japan’s response to the strategic 
environment, centred on the constitution. The first is the allowance of CSD. First and 
foremost, the acute strategic environment incentivises Japan to be engaged in internal 
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and external balancing. CSD is a direct response to external balancing because it 
strengthens the interoperability and expansion of the role Japan could play in the 
US-Japan alliance. In the end, it took more than seven years to be approved because 
Abe first made it a political agenda in 2007. In this sense, leaders’ image, in particular, 
the prime minister’s image, was defined as an intervening variable and is crucial in the 
allowance of CSD. He invested his enormous political resources to push for it by 
organising his private advisory panel with like-minded individuals while other prime 
ministers showed obvious hesitation despite their stance to allow CSD (Asahi Shimbun, 
2007s). He was also engaged in the negotiation with the Komeito and the CLB despite 
CSD being a political risk given its unpopularity amongst the public.  
 
In so doing, the CLB, as part of the variable of domestic institutions is partially 
responsible for the outcome of allowance of the limited degree of CSD. Ultimately, it 
succumbed to the variable of leaders’ image with the authority of the prime minister and 
the Cabinet as it has control over the CLB personnel (Asahi Shimbun, 2013l). The 
Cabinet broke down the institutional practice of the personnel by choosing the top of the 
CLB in Abe’s favour. The institutionally embedded pacifism based on the constitution 
was not fundamentally challenged. The negotiation to renew the interpretation to allow 
was solely based on the past interpretation and, in this sense, the CLB and its 
accumulated institutional practice played a part in the policy outcome.  
 
Another interplay of the intervening variables (leaders’ image and domestic institutions) 
played a part in the analysis. Institutionally, submitting the bill to allow CSD requires at 
least half of the seats in both houses or the two-thirds of the seats in the Lower House, 
the ruling coalition managed to maintain enough political stability by emphasising 
aspects besides CSD when it comes the general elections (Asahi Shimbum, 2013d). 
Therefore, leaders in this period are adept at striking a balance between strategic needs 
and political stability, defined as leaders’ dilemma.  
 
Similarly, strategic culture, constituting leaders’ image, has a key role in analysing 
constitutional reinterpretation. That is the so-called hadome (‘brake’) brought by 
Komeito. As a coalition partner with its relatively small number of seats, it could play a 
veto player, which Komeito arguably made the most of. The two leaders’ image fiercely 
clashed between the LDP (normalist and the US ally) and Komeito (pacifism) where 
arguably Komeito somewhat represent the public view partially (Sataka, 2016). The 
Komeito incorporated its principle of protecting fundamental human right into the 
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conditions to exert CSD. Thus, the structure is that the strong ruling party and its leaders’ 
image against the domestic institutions (CLB) and the Komeito, both of which represent 
pacifism.  
 
Regarding state-society relations, at the point where the public voted for the ruling 
coalition, the public was institutionally incapable of influencing the CSD policy-making. 
This did not enable the opposition parties to pull strengths to challenge the ruling 
coalition. Similarly, the economic groups did not play any substantial role in pushing for 
CSD. This was probably because the LDP did what these economic groups wanted. 
When previous discussions of CSD prolonged in the 2000s, economic groups such as 
Keidanren issued a statement or policy proposal to the government to lobby, which was 
not particularly seen in this period.  
 
As for the constitutional revision, there has been a strong influence of socially 
constructed norms of pacifism (state-society relations) and again Komeito (leaders’ 
image) despite the increased possibility of constitutional revision in comparison with 
the past. The initial plan of constitutional revision of Article 9 advocated by the LDP is 
the stipulation of the SDF as the military without any constraints on the capacity of the 
SDF and possessions of military capability towards what is called a normal country. 
However, at an early stage, leaders made a decision based on the leaders’ dilemma to 
construct a much more moderate version. Although it is remarkable as to how many 
political resources of the Cabinet and Abe himself was invested, there is still a long way 
for the constitutional revision.  
 
The reason lies in all the intervening variables. First, again, in the form of leaders’ 
image, the Komeito played the role of hadome in preventing the LDP from advocating 
the radical/original version of revising Article 9. It has kept casting doubt on revising 
Article 9 despite the ruling coalition with some opposition parties, forming a 
supermajority to submit the plan of the revision (Sataka, 2016). It did not even show 
intention for negotiation. Institutionally, the commissions of constitutional revision in 
both houses were incapable of reaching a consensus, the outcome of which seems fairly 
reasonable. This is because each party has the different constitutional vision and their 
ideological incompatibility such that simple discussion of the diet where all the party 
just stated their views seems significantly insufficient. This led to the secret negotiation 
again between the Komeito and the LDP which, this time, did not work as a certain 
amount of the LDP members did not compromise their strategic views on revising 
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Article 9 (Asahi Shimbun, 2017c). In the end, even before starting the negotiation with 
the ruling partner like the case of CSD, the LDP at most forcibly made the party 
members agree with the compromised vision of Article 9.  
 
In comparison with CSD, the state-society relations have a relatively strong influence 
on the process of the constitutional revision. This is particularly because it requires a 
supermajority in both houses and the national referendum, leaders seem more conscious 
of their duty to maintain political stability. Although the ruling coalition and leaders 
managed to have an institutional foundation to push for the revision, the public view on 
supporting the revision still lacks momentum for the national referendum (Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 2017). In this sense, the socio-economic groups, in particular, Nippon Kaigi 
not only played a part but also will be a critical actor for influencing the public view to 
accept the revision. Its engagement in public at the grass-roots level already had 
signatures from more than 10% of the entire population to support it.  
 
However, as of 2018, more than ten years after Abe took initiatives to revise the 
constitution through his first administration in 2007, the progress of the revision was yet 
to be achieved despite the changing strategic environment. Leaders’ image, particularly 
prime minister’s image, again confirmed its importance as a fundamental factor that not 
only made it possible to allocate substantial political resources but also maintained 
political stability enough for initiating the constitutional revision. Nevertheless, the idea 
of the constitutional revision was such that it seems extremely hard to reach a consensus 
even within the LDP, which long advocated for the revision. In terms of constitutional 
revision, the influence of the Komeito as a quasi-veto player was crystallised through 
the variable of domestic institutions. It again played a substantial role in explaining the 
absence of Japan’s response to the strategic environment, which seemed compounded 
by leaders’ image and incorporated the public as part of their dilemma.  
134 
 
6 Case Study II: Ballistic Missile Defence  
 
6.1 Introduction: A Brief History of Ballistic Missile Defence in Japan 
 
First, this chapter is dedicated to explaining what BMD is and what are its implications 
for Japan with the operationalisation of NCR in the case of BMD by applying the 
intervening variables. Second, it briefly traces the initial development of BMD in the 
1990s to understand the foundations for the decision surrounding BMD. Third, it traces 
how the government came to issue the Cabinet decision to acquire and develop BMD in 
tandem with the US. Most importantly, this chapter is engaged in the subsequent 
development of BMD and its surrounding institutional barriers—known as the 
institutionalised form of anti-militarism—with a discussion of the grand strategic shift. 
The chapter is divided into three phases: legal preparation phase (2004–2008; defensive 
realist strategy), qualitative development and the completion of deployment phase 
(2009–2012) the consolidation of defensive realist strategy), and the revolution of 
defence structure and the change in BMD-related issues (2012–2018; a nascent 
offensive realist strategy).  
 
What Is Ballistic Missile Defence, and What Are Its implications for Japan?  
 
BMD is a system through which an incoming ballistic missile is tracked, intercepted 
and destroyed, which has been continuously developed during and after the Cold War 
(Ota, 2009). As the US ambitious plan, the Strategic Defence Initiatives, had its roots in 
BMD, it is the US-led globally covered defence system that required the participation of 
other countries with the more integrated multilayered system. It aimed to defend against 
virtually any missile attacks regardless of the geographical location of such launches. As 
such, Japan’s participation and the actual context of its contribution may fluctuate 
depending on the US strategic shift. For instance, when the US did not clearly 
differentiate National Missile Defence from Theatre Missile Defence—a regionally 
focused missile defence system—Japan showed hesitation towards active participation 
due to the concerns of violating ‘CSD’ under such a highly integrated defence system 
controlled by the US (Jinbo, 2002). 
 
In general, there are several phases to addressing incoming missile attacks: boost, 
midcourse and terminal (Kaneda, 2016). The boost phase refers to the period between 
the launch of a missile and its motors firing until reaching peak velocity. The 
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destruction of a missile in the boost phase is the earliest and arguably the most ideal 
because it minimises potential damages despite practical problems. First, the action time 
is very limited—roughly within one minute—during which it must be determined 
whether the launch is directed towards the territory of a state in question (National 
Research Council, 2012). Second, to destroy the missile in the boost phase, it is vital to 
deploy the relevant defence system—be it ground-, air- or sea-based interceptors—close 
to the location of the launch. Third, and most relevant to Japan, ordering the destruction 
of the missile is predicated on the assumption that the missile’s trajectory must be 
known. In the case of Japan, unless the missile is headed directly towards its territory, 
attacking the missile clearly violates the limit of individual self-defence (Ota, 2009).  
 
The second phase is called midcourse, which refers to the period between the missile 
achieving peak velocity and re-entering the atmosphere (Kaneda, 2016). This comprises 
most of the flying time of a missile and is the longest time to intercept it. 
Notwithstanding the allowance of time to receive signals from sensors, it is arguably the 
most difficult phase to destroy a missile. Gronlund, Wright and Young (2002) observe 
that the ‘discrimination’ of a missile from other objects, such as decoys or debris in 
outer space, is a huge hindrance to the current BMD system.  
 
The final phase is terminal, in which a missile starts descending and re-entering the 
atmosphere to hit the actual target. Because it is the very last phase of a missile’s 
trajectory, one could argue that attacking it in this phase is the simplest in terms of 
technology and practicality, which in turn reduces the reaction time (Kaneda, 2016). 
 
Some technologies involved in BMD overlap each phase of the ballistic missile. One of 
the most critical elements of BMD is sensor devices (Morimoto, 2002). Because a 
single sensor is never sufficient to properly detect and accurately track a missile, many 
sensors are integrated into BMD. They can be satellite, aircraft, sea-based, land-based 
sensors, a role of which should be different for each type of sensor. For instance, to 
detect the launch of a missile, radars and sensors are used to track the rapidly increasing 
thermal level or the heat of the missile fuel. Therefore, using an infrared-based sensor 
that is currently loaded in satellites or military aircraft is the main way to approach the 
missile.  
 
To destroy an incoming missile, there are also many types of attacking systems. For the 
boost phase, Wilkening (2004) argues that ground, naval and airborne platforms 
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equipped with boost-phase interceptor can be an effective way to destroy the missile. A 
boost-phase interceptor generally suggests kinetic-kill vehicles, which with its kinetic 
energy hits the missile to neutralise it. In a more developed form, Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) appears effective, which is now jointly deployed in 
South Korea. It is designed to address multiple phases of a missile attack, including 
high altitude and long-range missiles (Yingbo & Yong, 2003). In the midcourse phase, 
Ground-Based Interceptor is a common land-based missile (Ota, 2009). As for the 
terminal phase, patriot missiles—now Patriot Advanced Capability 3—and Aegis 
system with Standard Missile (SM-3) are commonly deployed. The way in which BMD 
is developed and how it can be co-ordinated with other countries are not necessarily 
fixed but rather depend on the strategic and military reasons concerning the type and 
significance of a threat.  
 
 
 Figure 6.1 The Operational Concept of BMD (retrieved from the MoD)  
 
 Key Actors in and Domestic Hurdles to Ballistic Missile Defence for Japan  
 
There are many actors and institutional hurdles for Japan to pursue BMD that can be 
effectively categorised with reference to intervening variables. As discussed, 
leaders—the prime minister, the relevant Cabinet ministers, and relevant and so-called 
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kokubō-zoku—face a dilemma of political legitimacy because there is a need to maintain 
political stability or perceive the sufficient imminence of an attack. The ideal way to 
respond to the structural incentives is heavily influenced by ‘strategic cultures’ that 
individuals hold: the US ally, normalist, UN centrism and pacifism. It is also possible 
that amongst leaders, depending on whether bureaucrats or politicians, there can be a 
significant information asymmetry that gives bargaining power to those who are in an 
advantageous position to construct a policy.  
 
BMD is a critical opportunity for those who lean towards the US ally because it was 
initially US initiatives and request for Japan to participate. Many prime ministers, such 
as Koizumi and Abe, recognise the importance of BMD to the US-Japan security 
alliance (Shinzo Abe, 2006a) the MOFA, 2006). Normalists such as Ishiba Shigeru (an 
influential kokubō-zoku and minister of defence between 2002 and 2004) and Seiji 
Maehara from the DPJ under the Kan administration (then-minister of foreign affairs) 
saw how BMD is crucial for Japan’s security policy and advocated for ‘counter-strike 
capability’ to be able to protect Japan independently (Asahi Shimbun, 2003i). 
Categorised by Samuels (2006) as a ‘middle power UN-centrist’, Yōhei Kōno, 
then-deputy prime minister in the Murayama administration (1994–1995) and minister 
of foreign affairs (1994–1996 and 1999–2001), was sceptical about BMD; he 
emphasised the need for diplomatic dialogue with North Korea (Yomiuri Shimbun, 
1999) and argued for cautious discussion with the US to clarify for what BMD is 
needed (Yomiuri Shimbun, 1993). Political parties, established on pacifist ideology, 
such as Komeito and the SDP, have denied active participation in BMD initiatives based 
on the common position that the CSD should not be allowed (Asahi Shimbun, 1995b).  
 
The institutionalised form of anti-militarism can be considered a barrier to pursuing 
BMD that is defined here as one of the intervening variables: domestic institutions. 
Domestic institutions are regulations, laws and constitutions that constrain a particular 
policy-making or policy area. In the case of BMD, a number of institutional constraints 
would potentially prevent it from developing (Jimbo, 2002). First, based on the 
technical aspects explained at the beginning of this chapter, the US military is an 
integral part of BMD deployment in Japan. Associated with the development phase of 
BMD, the ban on arms export was enacted in the form of danwa (official statement of 
the Cabinet) in 1967 under the Satō administration, which later in 1976 prohibited not 
just the export of arms but also military-related technological transfer (T. Morimoto, 
2015). Because the US requested initially joint R&D that may involve the exchange of 
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military technology and equipment, this regulation is a potential barrier.  
 
Second, there is a regulation regarding the use of space. Japan did not have a specific 
law concerning the use of space. The National Space Development Agency of Japan 
(NASDA) therefore was established in 1969 for the use of space for ‘only peaceful 
purposes’, which excluded military usage or exploration (Asahi Shimbun, 1997b). This 
regulation is significant because BMD essentially comprises radars and sensors, some 
of which are space satellites. Military spy satellites or reconnaissance satellites for 
military purposes thus are restricted, placing substantial constraints on BMD 
deployment (Hughes, 2009).  
 
The third aspect is that the issue of CSD, in the actual deployment of BMD developed 
in accordance with the US, suggests integral usage of the BMD system of the two 
countries are expected (Asahi Shimbun, 2001a). One critical concern is that, for 
instance, in the case of attacking an incoming missile from the boost phase, it is hard to 
recognise the direction of the missile—be it Japan or the US. This implies deploying 
Japan’s BMD to address a missile aimed for the US, which, by definition, means the 
exercise of the right of CSD. The fourth aspect is the loose definition of ‘the 
renunciation of the possession of war potentials’ and the interpretation of ‘the right of 
self-defence’. The current government interpretation allows the ‘possess[ion of] the 
minimum level of armed force needed to exercise that right’ (Urata, 2017). BMD can be 
regarded as a defensive system that may obviate the need for reinterpretation to deploy 
BMD. However, the possession of counter-strike ability as part of BMD is questionable 
in the interpretation of the constitution (Takahashi, 2005).  
 
Finally, the restriction of military research by academics or universities is regulated by 
the Science Council of Japan. It issued a statement in 1950 that research in relation to 
war would not be conducted. In 1967, the statement was renewed to prohibit research 
involving military purposes. Thus, ‘dual-use research was not possible (Science Council 
of Japan, 2017), which may result in a lack of progress/facilitation in BMD 
development. The above factors may serve as institutional barriers to the development 
of BMD and its deployment.  
 
In the case of BMD, not only leaders who may or may not challenge these constraints to 
pursue but also other actors with vested interests surrounding BMD and its relevant 
institutional constraints may give further impetus or incentives to act in favour of BMD 
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development. The METI—famously known by the work of Johnson (1982) for its 
influence on industrial policy—supports BMD because it not only strengthens the 
defence sector and R&D with technology acquisition capabilities but also provides 
‘spin-off’ benefits to commercial sectors (Swaine et al., 2001).  
 
As with other countries’ defence industry, there were concerns about weakening 
indigenous defence production in Japan. The post-Cold War movement of disarmament 
and reform of the European and US defence industries has led to mergers and 
acquisitions and joint business partnerships for research (Samuels, 2007). In Japan, 
some withdrawal of relative minor defence-related firms was seen; due to the ban on 
arms export, the Japanese defence industry faced particular difficulty maintaining its 
business. Unless there was a lift of the ban, many faced a deadlock in the defence 
industry. Concern about lagging behind technological co-operation and transfer and 
shrinking production capacity of indigenous defence industry was raised by 
Keidanren—a representative of industries in Japan in the form of ‘proposition’ to the 
government (Keidanren, 2004). Economic interests are effectively noted in the case of 
BMD. As analysed in more detail later, these actors may have their connection either 
with politicians or bureaucrats who will be able to push for particularly because there 
can be mutually beneficial incentives, such as corruption or amakudari (‘descent from 
heaven’) where senior bureaucrats are given a position in the private sector after 
retirement as an institutional practice (Gaunder, 2011).  
 
The way politicians and other actors interact can be examined through the intervening 
variable of state-society relations that captures the economic interests of particular 
group or individuals whose influence on policy-making cannot simply be ignored. The 
cost of BMD development and deployment is unrivalled to other military equipment 
simply because it is a comprehensive system that integrates numerous military 
technologies, equipment and weapons (Kaneda, 2016). Therefore, as Samuels (2007) 
suggested, what matters in the decision-making of BMD is not necessarily the public 
response but its costs, which proved correct with subsequent increase in budget in 
additional aegis destroyers and new BMD equipment such as Aegis Ashore. This 
suggests there should be a window of opportunity for the domestic defence industry 
with substantial profits if they can get involved in the production by receiving orders 
(Noda, 2005). Furthermore, if they failed to join in this business opportunity, Japan 
would have to simply put up with a sheer amount of military expenditure without any 





Such a backdrop was well recognised by the defence industry, as Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries demonstrated the very initial interests in the Anti-Ballistic Missile system in 
the 1980s by conducting research. In fact, the thrift of the defence industry brings about 
benefits to politicians and bureaucrats as well as some SDF members in the form of 
amakudari (‘corruption’) that serves as a mechanism through which the voices of the 
defence industry are represented by bureaucrats or politicians (Igarashi, 2018).  
 
 Table 6.1 The Details of Intervening Variables for the Case of BMD 
Variables  Strategic 
environment  















minister of the 







Ban on arms 
export, 
Ban on CSD 
Peaceful use of 
space 
1% ceiling on the 
Defence budget 








*Leaders’ image is categorised and analysed with reference to the four strategic 
cultures: the US ally, normalist, UN-centrism and pacifism 
 
 
 The late 1980s and early 1990s: Confusion and resistance against BMD under the 
Cold War  
 
The discussion of BMD was relatively intense in the Diet debate in the 1980s after the 
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Regan administration issued the SDI in 1983; however, the context under which such a 
discussion occurred should be considered in the then-strategic environment (Wilkening, 
2000). Although most of the initial plans failed, such as particle-beam weapons, and the 
concept of BMD had not yet emerged, the idea of the SDI was such that the US-led 
defence system should cover the entire globe against missile attacks (de facto). Most 
importantly, the strategic plan of the US was predicated primarily on the assumption 
that the Cold War and bipolarity would have continued for the next decade (Lennon, 
2002). Therefore, Japan, which had preserved the involvement in the Cold War with the 
Yoshida Doctrine, was rather sceptical of the SDI. The examination of the Diet debate 
seems to suggest that active involvement in the US overarching defence project is a 
far-fetched idea.  
 
Though the transfer of military technologies from Japan to the US was allowed in 1983, 
concerns arose in the Diet debate regarding potential indirect involvement in the US 
SDI through the transfer in the mid-1980s, even before the US requested to participate. 
At this time, even leaders with the view of US ally found it hard to pursue the strategic 
cultural stance due to the firmly entrenched domestic institutions stemming from the 
pacifist constitution and relevant self-imposed constraints (O’Donogue, 2000).  
 
Without any specific plans or objectives in terms of BMD due to the ongoing research 
of the missile defence system by the US and the lack of specificity, policymakers were 
cornered in the Diet debate. Yasuhiro Nakasone, the then-prime minister, who is 
famously known as a US ally strategic culture, was accused of a lack of ‘autonomy’ 
vis-à-vis the US (House of Representatives, 1984b). Concerns were raised regarding the 
potential transfer of military technology to the US, leading to the further expansion of 
the space race (House of Representatives, 1984b). Related to this, the lack of 
government stance regarding space use surfaced (House of Councilors, 1984a); with the 
emphasis of ‘autonomy’, some said the government urged the US to drop the SDI due to 
the UN General Assembly’s decision to limit space exploration (House of 
Representatives, 1984c).  
 
Because the US defence system plan was phrased ‘space ballistic missile defence 
system’ (Uchū Dandō Misairu Bōei Shisutemu), it was interpreted by policymakers are 
closely linked to ‘Star Wars’ between the US and the USSR (House of Representatives, 
1984a). Despite a clear absence of Japan’s action, there were many attempts to give the 
warning to prevent any further actions under the Cold War, which is also manifested in 
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the form of West Pacific Missile Defence Architecture (WESTPAC).  
 
After the end of the Cold War: The temporal absence of ‘threats’ 
 
North Korea tested a missile, known as a Nodong-1, on 29 May 1993 and fired it into 
the Sea of Japan. Despite the proximity, it did not impose a significant threat to Japan in 
the sense of policy-making. Arguably this is because North Korea aimed to show its 
missile capacity so that it could export the missile to Iran in exchange for oil (D. Sanger, 
1993). However, it was indeed two weeks later when the relevant news was reported, 
even though Isao Ishizuka, the then chief of staff in the SDF, was aware of the threat 
and told the media that if North Korea launched the missile towards Japan, there was no 
way to deal with it so far (Asahi Shimbun, 1993b). Together with the absence of a 
meeting of the UN Security Council, Japan did not take a specific action or response.  
 
Accordingly, policymakers in Japan were concerned with the further proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. Kabun Mutō, then-minister of foreign affairs, stated in the Diet that it 
would be ideal if the US addressed the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT 
through negotiation (House of Representatives, 1993a). Tadashi Ikeda, then-chief of the 
Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, represented the MOFA and stated there had been no 
evidence to suggest that North Korea would attack or invade South Korea; therefore 
regarding its withdrawal from the NPT, it would be better to cautiously observe how the 
negotiation went (House of Councilors, 1993). However, the US and South Korea at the 
time had already agreed to recognise North Korean nuclear issues as significant threats 
(Asahi Shimbun, 1993). In the end, it has been nearly three months since the missile test 
when Naoaki Murata, then-administrative vice minister of the DA, raised concerns 
about North Korea as a potential threat with the consideration of acquiring an AWACS 
(airborne warning and control system) which enables the SDF to detect potential missile 
launches (House of Councilors, 1984b).  
 
It is also important to note that the absence of discussion of the potential threat is 
accounted for by the political instability, which enhanced the grand strategy of soft 
balancing in 1993 when the LDP finally handed over the baton to the grand coalition of 
eight parties. Amongst these were the Socialist Party, the SDP and the Komeito, all well 
known for pacifist strategic culture (Krauss & Pekkanen, 2011). Concurrently, Japan 
attempted to overcome the trauma of the Gulf War criticism through active participation 
in UN-led humanitarian assistance—UN centrism as a strategic culture—through which 
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the conventional pacifist parties came to recognise the existence of the SDF (Funabashi, 
1997).  
 
Therefore, even after the gradual recognition of North Korea as a potential threat in the 
latter half of 1993, mainly pointed out by the LDP as the opposition party, there was 
hesitation towards action. Sadao Yamahana, the then-Cabinet member of the Hosokawa 
administration in 1993, hoped to normalise ties with North Korea and insisted on a 
diplomatic dialogue with accordance with the three non-nuclear principles (Funabashi, 
1997). On the other hand, the then-prime minister advocated the need to co-operate with 
neighbouring countries to address the North Korean missile issues and stated there was 
no concrete discussion regarding the participation in TMD (House of Representatives, 
1993b). Tsutomu Hata, then-minister of foreign affairs, also showed the stance of 
observing the efforts of the IAEA, the US and South Korea (House of Representatives, 
1993c).  
 
 1998: The second North Korean missile is a game-changer  
 
Japan prolonged and extended the deadline to answer the US request to participate in 
BMD deployment. In 1994, the Hatayama administrative vice minister, at the press 
conference, stated that the Cabinet would decide as to whether Japan should join BMD 
initiatives (co-deployment) by the end of the next year, which did not happen (Krauss & 
Pekkanen, 2011)a. TMD US-Japan working group meeting had occurred on an almost 
biannual basis since 1996 (Asahi Shimbun, 1996). However, the meeting did not lead 
Japan’s conclusion as to whether it would introduce such an anti-ballistic missile system. 
The same goes for the 2+2 meeting (two ministers from the DA and the MOFA and the 
US counterparts) in 1997 (Asahi Shimbun, 1997c). In the end, what changed is the 
structural incentives through the second launch of a North Korean missile in August 
1998. The second missile launch by North Korea on 31 August 1998, facilitated the 
process of BMD acquisition to a substantial degree by altering the perception of leaders, 
inflating public anxiety and giving leverage to those who already showed strong interest 
in it (the New York Times, 1998).  
 
From this incident, North Korea was regarded as ‘a threat’ to Japan. Two days after the 
missile launch, Masahiko Takamura, then-minister of the MOFA, ‘express[ed] the 
deepest regret’ (kiwamete ikan), one of the severest expressions in Japanese diplomacy, 
exceeding the degree of expression of the US which used ‘raising concerns’ (House of 
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Representatives, 1998). The same statement is seen by the minister of the DA, 
Fukushiro Nukaga (House of Councilors, 1998). Even opposition parties accused the 
ruling party of lacking severity in response to North Korea (House of Councillors, 
1998). The media itself showed unparalleled attention to it in comparison with the 1993 
missile launch. Taking Yomiuri Shimbun as an example, and including morning and 
afternoon newspapers, there were 24 individual articles dedicated to the missile launch 
the day after it.  
 
That the information related to the missile launch was given by the US (Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 1998a), the LDP held a meeting with kokubō-zoku and relevant members to 
decide to acquire a multipurpose satellite; one goes as far to say it was a spy satellite 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, 1998b). Within two weeks, the US-Japan 2+2 meeting concluded to 
proceed with the joint research with further emphasis on the need for BMD. On 21 
September, both agreed on the initiation of research about the SDF’s Aegis destroyers 
with the capability to launch ballistic missiles as part of a BMD system (Jinbo, 2002).  
 
This announcement was officially made in December and included a request for a 960 
million yen research budget in 1999, a considerable increase from 20 million yen in 
1996 (Yomiuri Shimbun, 1998d). Accordingly, the government got in first the taboos by 
making a Statement of Chief Cabinet Secretary that the joint research with the following 
acquisition of spy satellites does not conflict with the peaceful use of space and the ban 
on arms export (Yomiuri Shimbun, 1998c). Furthermore, the Cabinet phrased BMD as 
the ‘irreplaceable means’ although it still hedged as to whether Japan would develop, 
acquire, and deploy BMD (Yomiuri Shimbun, 1998c). The details of the future research 
were also finalised. There were four major areas: (1) an infrared sensor to detect 
missiles, (2) a cover to protect such sensors from friction and heat from the atmosphere, 
(3) a ballistic missile to directly attack incoming missiles and (4) a missile motor and 
engine (Asahi Shimbun, 1999b). These are rather supplemental research which does not 
directly lead to the acquisition of BMD.  
 
Between 1999 and 2001, after the initial decision to join the research with the 
US-Japan’s stance was ‘see how others react the decision’ and ‘what the US would do’ 
as the continued stance of ‘hedging’, given China and Russia’s intensive opposition and 
the revision of ABM. It was until the point when the US withdrew from the ABM, 
which was virtually terminated when Japan moved on to the next grand strategic shift to 
defensive realism. The ABM treaty, signed by the US and the Soviet Union in 1972, 
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aimed to limit each country’s sites for missile defence to two and to 100 ABMs. 
Because the US at the time also was engaged in R&D, the deployment of BMD as part 
of National Missile Defence would be likely to violate the treaty.  
 
The US, therefore, began negotiations with Russia along with the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty I (START I), which did not come to fruition. Until the US did not 
differentiate TND and NMD, Japan could do nothing but wait for the outcome of the 
negotiation (Swaine et al, 2001). Proceeding with the research with the US would shift 
the focus solely to NMD, and Japan would be on the verge of violating the CSD. 
Hajime Nakatani, then-chief of the DA, stated that Japan should cautiously observe and 
wait whilst carefully considering the opinions of NATO, European countries, and Russia 
and China (House of Representatives, 2001). In fact, China repeatedly raised concerns 
regarding Japan’s participation in the BMD research as well as the US initiative itself 
because the development would be able to neutralise Chinese ICBMs (Morimoto, 
2002).  
  
Japan chose to continue the research before making a decision to deploy BMD and 
improve what it already possessed whilst making efforts to gain understanding from its 
neighbours. Noroda (then-DA minister) went to Seoul to discuss BMD and enhance its 
understanding of Japan’s participation with BMD (Asahi Shimbun, 1999a). Prime 
Minister Obuchi showed his intention to have a chance to explain Japan’s BMD-related 
activities to China (Asahi Shimbun, 1999c). Japan could enhance its capabilities rather 
than change its content. It decided to improve the existing radar and sensor system for 
information gathering, which facilitated the analysis of suspicious North Korean 
activities, albeit not substantial military capability development (Asahi Shimbun, 
2000a).  
 
China’s increasing defence budget and 9/11 facilitated the DA to create an additional 
threat to Japan. In 2000, it was the first time since the publication of the defence white 
paper that stated Japan was within the range of Chinese ballistic missiles, recognising it 
as a threat (Defense Agency, 2000) and promoting a further need for BMD. In June 
2002, the US withdrew from the ABM after its 6-month notice. 
  
Although it took another year to issue the Cabinet decision to finally deploy and 
develop BMD, its development was already underway after US withdrawal. Relevant 
actors with parochial interests moved first. The MOFA-funded organisation, the 
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Japan–American Cultural Society, and the exchange of Japan-US Lawmakers on 
National Security Issues organised a meeting between kokubō-zoku and Donald 
Rumsfeld, then-chairman of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to 
the United States. The LAND Institute invited a Japanese researcher from the DA 
(Kouji Kawakami) and issued a report on ‘Japan and BMD’ to promote its need (Noda 
& Tanaka, 2009). The Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, where the main members were 
kokubō-zoku, including those retired, was established as a think-tank to promote US 
security ties and the relevant rearrangement of legal barriers. The Japan Foundation 
annually organised the official visit of the kokubō-zoku, including Kyuma, Maehara and 
Ishiba, to the US since 1997 to meet US counterparts. In 1999, Keidanren also 
established a new committee, the US-Japan Industry Forum for Security (IFSEC), 
which termed itself as an ‘unofficial advisory group’ and whose chair came from 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Jinbo, 2002). It even began to issue a proposal regarding 
the Medium-Term Defense Force Buildup Program, identifying the problems as to 
developing and deploying jointly with emphasis on co-operation between the US and 
Japan’s defence industries. This includes the need to lift the ban on the export of arms 
and a proposal for active participation in Japanese firms beyond the defence industry.  
 
The DA and the Cabinet initiated the materialisation of BMD development before the 
Cabinet decision. The Cabinet showed its intention to consider the acquisition of PAC3, 
one of the main missiles for BMD (Asahi Shimbun, 2003k). A spy satellite was 
launched (H2A) in 2003 before settling the issue of space use. The plan of deployment 
seemed concretised: two phases of BMD with SM3 on Aegis destroyers and PAC3 
identified through the DA budget request (Asahi Shimbun, 2003j). Inevitably the legal 
arrangement began as well, which is discussed in more detail in the following section 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2003h).  
 
In the end, the Cabinet passed the defence budget for BMD, which was 140 times 
higher than the budget for BMD in 1998 (1 billion yen) (Asahi Shimbun, 2003f), whilst 
the DPJ planned to ask for 550 billion yen as part of a manifesto (Asahi Shimbun, 
2003e). The Cabinet finally decided to introduce and deploy BMD on 19 December 
2003. It is important to note that even though the joint research would finish by 
2005–06, Japan decided to deploy BMD before that and aimed to complete the 
deployment in 2007 (Asahi Shimbun, 2003g). With acquisition and development, the 
grand strategy shifted from hedging to a defensive realist state.  




This section first outlines a brief explanation of BMD as a defence system and its 
implications for Japanese acquisition using the intervening variables. As expected from 
the hypothesis, the strategic environment did matter for BMD development. In the late 
1980s and up until 1998, Japan did not see any particular threats that required the need 
to develop BMD. The examination of the Diet record shows that initially BMD was 
discussed with the absence of threats such as North Korea and China (House of 
Councillors, 1998). This stance was not altered even when North Korea conducted its 
first missile launch in 1993. In particular, the early 1990s saw the nascent emergence of 
the strategic culture of UN centrism along with the SDF’s participation in PKOs, which 
was well supported by the Hata, Hosokawa and Murayama administrations. The 
distance between the DA and defence industry and the Cabinet was so substantial that 
none of the attempts materialised, such as the defence industry’s activities to join the 
SDF. Arguably, the DA was well aware of North Korea as a threat, which led to the 
establishment of relevant research units in the mid to late 1990s (Asahi Shimbun, 
1997b). However, Japan never showed the attitude to decline the US request, which 
characterises the grand strategy of hedging in this era, stemming from the nuanced 
mixed strategic cultures of UN centrism and US ally.  
 
Whilst leaders’ view is important in formulating the government’s stance, the DA and 
defence industry—the latter of which is a part of the variable of state-society 
relations—also played a crucial role, even in this stage. In particular, the actors with 
vested interests of ‘maintaining the indigenous defence industry’ were actively engaged 
in the promotion of BMD ahead of leaders. They constantly attempted to identify areas 
for participation and lobbying to abolish self-imposed constraints, such as the ban on 
the export of arms (Noda, 2005). In this sense, even before the discussion about them as 
a legal arrangement began, these domestic institutions—legally institutionalised form of 
anti-militarism—kept functioning as a barrier to them.  
 
However, the aggravating strategic environment substantially facilitated the discussion 
of potential BMD deployment since 1998 when North Korea conducted its second 
missile launch near the Sea of Japan. Hypotheses regarding the relations between the 












H1  Soft-balancing  A non-military tool to conduct Japan’s security policy. 
BMD is not pursued because of the permissive nature of 
the given strategic environment. 
H2  Hedging BMD is under consideration but not actively pursued in 
the relatively permissive strategic environment. 
H3  Defensive 
realist 
In the restrictive environment, defensive capabilities are 
enhanced through BMD. 
H4  Offensive 
realist 
In the more restrictive strategic environment, Japan 
actively pursue offensive capabilities through BMD 
 
The discussion of the media, public and policymakers was incomparably intensified, 
furthering activities of the DA and the defence industry along with establishing new 
institutions and think-tanks (Swaine et al, 2001). The decades-long efforts of the DA 
paid off in the early 2000s when the government decided to introduce BMD. Without 
the DA’s dedication to the concretised plan of the introduction, in the form of eight 
years of research, it would not have been possible for Japan to have a clear vision of 
how to deploy BMD at that time. Last, as part of state-society relations, the public 
reaction—a socially accepted norm of anti-militarism—did not appear, although it 
might have been under consideration by each administration.  
 
Despite the constant concerns in the media and the Diet regarding BMD’s potential to 
trigger an arms race in East Asia, the public did not have a considerable aversion to or 
interest in it. This may have stemmed from the technicality of BMD.  
 
In summary, Japan underwent a grand strategic shift, from a decade of hedging to now 
defensive realism, thereby enhancing its defensive capabilities. The following section 
explores how the defensive realist strategy continued to shape Japan’s defence policy 
between 2004 and 2008 with NCR to examine when, how and why each intervening 





6.2 Ballistic Missile Defence: Materialisation of Defensive Realist Strategy between 
2004 and 2009 
 
Due to the institutionalised form of anti-militarism—part of the intervening variable of 
domestic institutions, stemming from Article 9, the actual deployment of BMD requires 
legal rearrangement that leads to the weakening of anti-militarism or ‘remilitarisation’ 
(Hughes, 2007). In the process together with technical aspects of the BMD deployment 
between 2004 and 2009, Japan completed the shift of its grand strategy from hedging to 
defensive realism. At the point at which the Cabinet issued a decision to deploy BMD, 
some of the domestic institutions must be amended, such as the use of space and the 
civilian control that is represented through the SDF law (Hughes, 2004). Further 
necessity arose to reconsider the ban on arms export and the CSD as the US is an 
integral part of BMD system in Japan.  
 
Under the law about civilian control at the time, the limited action time—approximately 
10 minutes from North Korea to reach Japan—made it virtually impossible for 
gathering approval from all the Cabinet members (T. Morimoto, 2002). Because 
comprehensive and precise information gathering and monitoring are essential in 
detecting missiles, necessitating the use of space for security purposes, the space law 
that was restricted for only ‘peaceful use’ needs revision (Swaine et al, 2001). Japan, 
engaged in joint research of BMD with the US since the late 1990s, would not be able 
to embark on its development and co-production without the US unless it could afford 
to purchase all the relevant equipment and system from the US. Given the limited 
budget and 1% GDP ceiling on the defence budget, the ban on arms export that 
prohibits technological transfer to the US is naturally a scope of reconsideration.  
 
Practical deployment and utilisation of BMD touch the issues of CSD, and the current 
interpretation presupposes that Japan is constitutionally unable to address missiles 
towards the US with the BMD system in Japan (Hughes, 2001). Furthermore, BMD in 
Japan is not functional without US radars and Aegis destroyers, part of the US forces 
based in Japan. The period between 2004 and 2008 is arguably characterised as the 
starting point at which Japan has set in motion to be free from many of the 
long-standing constraints. Surrounded by those domestic constraints on the matter of 
BMD, it is quintessential to grasp the shift of domestic politics together with leaders and 
the public as well as continuous strive of actors in the defence industry. The chapter 
argues that while acknowledging the critical role played by the strategic environment, 
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without the close examination of the intervening variables, one cannot see how and why 
Japan shifted and materialised the grand strategy of defensive realist-oriented policy.  
 
The convergence of leaders’ image in the realm of quasi-two-party politics  
 
Taking advantage of information asymmetry of BMD with the potential threat of North 
Korea and non-partisan effort by Kokubo-zoku, leaders came to agree on the 
importance of BMD (Noda, 2005). As part of an initial research budget in the 1990s, 
there seemed a certain amount allocated for ‘study group’ for BMD for Kokubo-zoku (a 
non-partisan group) where they and DA officials could deepen their understanding of 
BMD. Be it a conference or small meeting, the US officials were often invited to give a 
talk, which, given US keenness on Japan’s participation, it can be speculated to be more 
of a sales and promotion talk (Akiyama, 2002). Seiji Maehara (the DPJ) and Akio 
Kyuma (the LDP) visited the US annually to attend the meeting for US-Japan security 
co-operation under the fund made by the Japan Foundation and administered by the 
MOFA (M. Noda & Tanaka, 2009). The young Kokubo-zoku, such as Maehara, were 
dubbed with Neo-Kokubo-zoku in the sense that these had a more escalated view on 
security policy advocate counter-strike capability and constitutional revision and 
considered the self-imposed constraints as outdated (Asahi Shimbun, 2003l).  
 
With the explanation of the US request and BMD as the only means for a ballistic 
missile, the consensus was gradually made. The then-prime minister, Koizumi whose 
view on security policy was influenced by the strategic culture of the US ally, not only 
saw the importance of the joint research for BMD but also decided to deploy together 
with his enthusiasm for the Cabinet-led policy-making (Green, 2006). He organised a 
private advisory body for Security and Defence in 2004, which later issued the Araki 
report. Based on the report, the concept of integrated use of Air, Ground and Marine 
SDF led to the revision of the National Defence Programme Outline for the first time in 
nine years since 1995 (Defense Agency, 2004a). Makiko Tanaka, as the then-minister of 
MOFA, who had strong concerns and doubts about BMD, seemed to yield to the 
consensus of the LDP and the prime minister’s view because it did not reflect the 
Cabinet’s decision (Asahi Shimbun, 2001c). Ishiba served as the director of the DA, 
who, as discussed, was an enthusiast for BMD, went a step further to argue the urgent 
need to lift the overall ban on arms export, the statement of which was later denied by 




The leaders of the subsequent administrations shared more or less the same view on 
BMD, although since then each administration was rather short-lived. Abe made 
numerous attempts to revolutionise areas surrounding BMD. He quickly organised a 
private advisory group to discuss the possibility of CSD to address missiles directed 
towards the US (Asahi Shimbun, 2007b). The initiative regarding the secrecy law was 
taken by Abe, which enhanced the intelligence communication between the two and led 
to closer and better co-operation of BMD (Asahi Shimbun, 2007f). The acquisition of 
counter-strike capability was one of his thoughts, as demonstrated by his agreement 
with the LDP Defence Committee to propose the acquisition (Asahi Shimbun, 2009m). 
Although none of these came to fruition, Abe’s image was essentially embedded in 
revisionism or normalisation. However, his means of achieving his goal was to 
strengthen the US alliance to a greater degree, which confirms his strategic vision as a 
US ally.  
 
The subsequent Fukuda administration did not pursue any of Abe’s initiatives, arguably 
with the view to creating ‘de facto regime change’ within the LDP to maintain its 
position of the ruling party. This does not necessarily mean that Fukuda was against 
BMD. In fact, as the chief Cabinet secretary in 2003, he issued a danwa under his name 
to announce that BMD did not violate CSD and the ban on arms export in 2003. His 
administration did not even last for a year, during which there was corruption in the 
midst of upgrading the DA to a ministerial level and scandal in the SDF’s mission 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2007c, 2007g).  
 
Aso, as a successor to Fukuda, had long been involved in the Cabinet decision-making 
as the minister of foreign affairs in both the Koizumi and Abe administrations. In 
comparison with Fukuda, he was keen on lifting the ban on arms export (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2009b).  
 
Domestic political structure: Part of domestic institutions 
 
Japanese politics until 1993 had always been labelled as one-party dominance or a 
quasi-two-party system—known as ‘the 1955 system’ (Kitaoka, 2008). Holding the seat 
of the ruling party for 38 consecutive years, the dominance of the LDP was prominent. 
However, it did not mean the LDP always held sway in every policy, particularly 
security. The reason for this was not just the strong public sentiment of anti-militarism 
but the LDP’s non-ideological flexibility to absorb opposition parties’ policy and the 
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very existence of parties that echoed with such a view, most notably the Socialist Party 
(Pempel, 1982). The two parties had long represented two ideological camps in a unique 
way: the opposition of the Socialist Party was reflected in the LDP’s policies.  
 
The virtual disappearance of the Socialist Party and its ultimate acknowledgement of the 
SDF as constitutionally legitimate, together with the LDP stepping down as an 
opposition party, led to the transformation of domestic politics (Kitaoka, 2008). First, 
the DPJ emerged as a major opposition party with the potential to be the ruling party 
after several mergers of minor parties. The DPJ holds a comparatively similar view on 
security policy, such as the promotion of BMD, because Ichiro Ozawa, who was known 
for a strong connection with defence industry with his influence and normalist view, left 
the LDP and helped form the DPJ with some kokubō-zoku such as Hideaki Tamura 
(Noda and Tanaka, 2009). Therefore, the DPJ, despite its de facto conglomerate of 
different ideologies, favoured BMD. Second, the LDP, because of its inability to 
single-handedly collect enough votes to be the ruling party, formed a coalition with the 
Komeito, whose security view was almost opposite that of the LDP. The Komeito 
placed a strong emphasis on maintaining the current constitution and was against 
remilitarisation; it was a potential veto player despite its rather small size as a party. 
Accordingly, the newly emerged structure of domestic politics was two major parties 
sharing a similar view whilst the small opposition integrated into the coalition. As of 
2005, for instance, the LDP and the DPJ held 409 (296 and 113, respectively) seats out 
of 480 in the Lower House. The third was the Komeito with only 31 seats, albeit as a 
coalition partner.  
  
Although the Komeito with its party’s principle—the stance was even originally against 
the US-Japan security treaty in the 1960s—could be a potential veto player, no evidence 
suggests the Komeito was actively involved in the decision-making process for BMD 
and the Cabinet decision to deploy BMD at the time of research. This arguably stems 
from the fact that usually one to two Cabinet members are selected from the Komeito, 
though not in the ministerial position for the MOFA or the DA. Under the Koizumi 
administration, one from the Komeito took the position of the minister of health, labour 
and welfare. Often, the president of the Komeito represents the party to raise concerns 
about the LDP-led security policy, such as the ban on arms export and constitutional 
revision (Asahi Shimbun, 2007n) . However, the Komeito succumbed relatively easily 
to the LDP’s decision and admitted the exceptional treatment of technological transfer 
to the US in the case of BMD (Asahi Shimbun, 2004q). As with other opposition parties, 
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the Komeito did not accept every suggestion or plan that surfaced. Although complete 
denial was not seen, it always raised concerns and urged the need to discuss more 
deeply areas such as counter-strike capability and the CSD (Asahi Shimbun, 2006h).  
 
 State-society relations: The inflated perception of threat in the public and the  
 constant pursuit of vested interests  
 
The variable of state-society relations—consisting of the public response and economic 
actors’ involvement in BMD-related policy-making—shows the inflated perception of 
threats that facilitates BMD development. This was accelerated by the efforts made by 
the actors such as Keidanren and related defence industry. The poll and survey 
described below suggest an interesting picture of public perception and how the 
discourse of an exclusively defence-oriented policy keeps the public at bay.  
 
In 2005, the Asahi poll (1,782 answers) suggested that 56% were ‘largely concerned’ 
and 36% were a little concerned about North Korean nuclear development, whilst 67% 
considered BMD necessary (Asahi Shimbun, 2005a). The poll went so far as to ask 
whether a member of the SDF should appropriately be able to address missiles, and not 
the prime minister (the erosion of civilian control), and 50% were in favour of this idea. 
For the sake of political neutrality, a look at other newspapers suggests similar results. 
Yomiuri Shimbun (2004b) also conducted a poll (3,000 answers) in the same year, the 
result of which was 69% found it more or less ‘appropriate’ to deploy BMD against 
North Korean missile launches. The Nikkei survey suggests that 45% were in favour of 
the current BMD system, whilst 26% thought BMD should be equipped with 
counter-strike capabilities (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2006).  
 
Interestingly, in the issue of the CSD, the poll shows overall opposition to it: 44% were 
against CSD, whilst only 28% were in favour (Asahi Shimbun, 2004d). On the other 
hand, no poll was conducted on institutional constraints on BMD, such as the ban on 
arms export and the use of space for military purposes. This perhaps reflects the lack of 
public interest, which may stem from the technicality of the area itself and the potential 
difficulty in connecting them with the overarching theme of militarisation. Overall, like 
the Komeito, the public shows a propensity to largely acknowledge BMD as an 
effective means to enhance Japan’s defence capability as long as it sticks to a loosely 
defined, publicly evaluated stance of ‘an exclusively defence-oriented policy’ that 




Economic groups in relation to BMD, such as the defence industry, are in general keen 
on BMD on the conditions that it benefits them. Thus, what they pursue is not mere 
development in BMD but the qualitative and quantitative improvement in BMD in the 
way in which there is a business opportunity. This is why the actors with vested interests 
advocate the ban on the export of arms by band-wagoning the discussion surrounding 
BMD, even though the lift on the restriction creates fruitful opportunities in other areas, 
such as international co-operation and arms export to other countries besides the US. 
Under the banner of kokusanka (‘indigenous defence industry’), actors such as 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Keidanren did not welcome the idea of purchasing 
equipment from the US (Samuels, 1994). The same goes for counter-strike capabilities, 
as cruise missiles could be developed by the domestic defence industry; in particular, 
the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries has been responsible for similar missiles SSM-1B 
(Sankei Shimbun, 2017a). In the area of space, the Society of Japanese Aerospace 
Companies (SJAC) and Keidanren was passionate to expand the latter’s area to military 
use with the view to enhancing business. The defence industry also saw space 
exploration as an opportunity because Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is responsible for the 
production of the rocket engine.  
 
Keidanren was known as a strong lobbying group for the ban on arms export; a 
restriction on export makes the defence industry only benefit in the domestic market, 
which has the DA as the sole ‘customer’ (Sasaki, 2016). It attempted lobbying to lift the 
ban on arms export together with kokubō-zoku’s backup in 1995 when the idea of TMD 
came up with the US, which obviously did not materialise (Asahi Shimbun, 1995a). The 
logic of promoting to loosen the restriction was the same for the shrinking defence 
industry and technologically left behind with the lack of international 
competitiveness—the same logic for liberalisation of the Japanese domestic market in 
the 1990s. However, there is an apparent incompatibility with Japan’s security policy 
stance as concerns arise with an ‘arms race’ and indirect support to countries engaged in 
conflicts and wars. Therefore, BMD is a window of opportunity for Keidanren to lobby 
because Japan already participated in joint R&D, which eliminated one hurdle for the 
lift of the ban on the export of arms (Noda, 2005). In 2004, Keidanren submitted a 
proposal to the Cabinet and attended LDP’s executive meeting to directly appeal, 
together with the resurgence of a political donation to the LDP although the donation 
ceased ten years ago. Keidanren went so far to advocate the taboo area—constitutional 
revision—for the first time in its history (Asahi Shimbun, 2005m). Such constant efforts 
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are fairly understandable given that the chair of the committee of the defence industry in 
Keidanren consistently has come from the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Sataka, 2008). 
 
As discussed before, politicians (kokubō-zoku) and bureaucrats in the DA represent 
these economic groups because of the corrupted relationship, such as settai (hosting 
guests with dinner or golf) and amakudari (retired officials landing jobs in the private 
sector; (M. Noda & Tanaka, 2009). In fact, there was a purported settai in one of the 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ properties to gather kokubō-zoku in 2004 (M. Noda, 2005).  
Accordingly, despite the more expensive costs of producing PAC3 in Japan rather than 
buying it from the US, the government signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
for licence production (Asahi Shimbun, 2005j), which Kyuma might have led by 
negotiation.  
 
There is a further added joint research/development project—a sea-based missile that is 
to be equipped with Aegis destroyers (Asahi Shimbun, 2005i). As Samuels (1994) 
reveals through interviews with the officials from the Bureau of Equipment Acquisition, 
the general principle of acquisition of military equipment starts with the survey as to 
whether there are Japanese firms technologically capable of producing parts and if not, 
they start an investigation whether such parts can be domestically developed and 
produced. Furthermore, if it is not plausible, the bureau starts contacting Japanese 
trading companies that can bring ‘license production’ and then looks for imports 
(Friedman & Samuels, 1993). For instance, PAC-3 is a quintessential example where 
initial technological transfer from the US led to virtually the complete domestic 
production (Friedman & Samuels, 1993). The potential return from producing PAC-3 
domestically is approximately 100–300 billion yen (Sataka, 2008). It is quite natural 
that the DA decided to use PAC-3 missiles as part of BMD system and not the Kinetic 
Energy Interceptor and Multiple Kill Vehicle, in which the US invested for more than 30 
years (Hildreth, 2007). As if representing their interests, Moriya, then-vice 
administrative minister, stated that he was utterly surprised that PAC-3 was initially 
based on FMS, and he aimed to continue to negotiate with the US to settle with license 
production (Asahi Shimbun, 2004t). 
 
 Erosion and resistance of institutionalised forms of anti-militarism: Domestic  
 institutions  
 
As with one of the central themes of this chapter—legal rearrangement surrounding the 
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institutionalised form of anti-militarism—there was a substantial degree of erosion. This 
includes the loosening of civilian control, the enactment of the space law that allows for 
the use of space for security purposes, the exceptions on the ban on arms export in the 
case of BMD and the signing of several General Security of Military Information 
Agreements (GSOMIAs) (Asahi Shimbun, 2007h). Seemingly, one can assume 
anti-militarism has faded so much so that Japan has departed largely from the 
conventional security posture of the Yoshida Doctrine; however, this view is not 
necessarily true. Despite leaders’ consensus and the public acceptance of BMD together 
with the more radical pursuit of this area by the DA and economic groups, some, and 
yet most, central pieces constituting anti-militarism have remained: the CSD and the 
ban on arms export. 
 
Whilst much of them are related to BMD posture, what distinguishes those that changed 
and those that remained is the ‘comprehensibility’ of each. In other words, the more 
implications the change in domestic institutions might have, the more difficult it could 
be to materialise. As discussed later in more detail, for example, the civilian control and 
the basic use of space for security purposes are arguably prerequisite conditions in 
BMD because deployment requires quick decision-making and monitoring requires 
satellites (Swaine et al, 2001). On the other hand, the ban on the export of arms is useful 
but not an absolute necessity in terms of co-operation and technological transfer to 
countries besides the US. The key variable of this chasm is arguably political stability 
with leaders’ dilemma between political legitimacy and strategic culture under the 
strategic environment in which Japan is situated.  
 
 Civilian control  
 
As of 2004, civilian control was a hindrance to the actual deployment of BMD. 
Addressing missiles is a use of force and therefore the Cabinet approval which is 
requested by the Chief of the DA. As pointed by experts, if North Korea launches a 
missile towards Japan, then it is estimated to take approximately 10 minutes to reach 
Japan (T. Morimoto, 2002). The current procedure to maintain tight civilian control is 
not enough to secure timely action to conduct operations to address the missiles. 
Therefore, the revision of the SDF law is more or less a prerequisite.  
 
It is natural that none of the political parties explicitly opposed the idea of revision, 
which led to the discussion of how to maintain civilian control in the BMD operation. 
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The initial idea put forward by the LDP and the DA concerned the way in which the 
prime minister gave prior approval to the SDF official with the strict adherence to the 
two patterns and procedures prepared in advance. First, in case there is a sign that a 
missile will be launched to attack Japan, the chief of the DA requests the prime minister 
to approve it before such attacks. The second is that when a surprise attack occurs, with 
the Guidelines for Emergency Response, the authority to address missiles is left to the 
SDF (Asahi Shimbun, 2005b); however, at this point, the details of the Guidelines were 
not to be included in the bill to enact the relevant law but are dealt with ‘government 
decree’ (Asahi Shimbun, 2005k). This means that how civilian control is maintained is 
unclear in the case of addressing surprise attacks. Moreover, the bill does not require an 
ex post facto announcement in the Diet, which is arguably to maintain ‘secrecy’ in 
BMD.  
 
There are a couple of suggestions to amend during the Diet debate, which did not 
materialise except for a coalition partner’s request for the ex post facto announcement. 
The DPJ advocated the need for ex ante facto approval. This is obviously not desirable 
by the DA or the LDP, which pursues BMD as the decision to address missiles—if that 
happens—and whether it is justifiable (Asahi Shimbun, 2005b). This was not even 
negotiated; in the end, only the Komeito’s request as an intra-coalition adjustment is 
included in the final draft of the bill—an ex post facto announcement in case of surprise 
attacks. The Diet debate focuses on which relevant laws to revise—be it police or the 
SDF— for addressing missile attacks to minimise potential damages to civilians (House 
of Representatives, 2005a). It is interesting to note that at this point—two years after the 
Cabinet’s decision to deploy BMD—there has been no discussion as to the 
importance/necessity of BMD. Regarding civilian control, arguably the conditions of 
exercising individual self-defence—no other means available, attack with the possibility 
to threaten Japan’s survival and restricted use of force to a minimum degree—are met in 
the case of BMD. The justification of BMD and not violating the CSD was largely 
accepted. The loosening of civilian control did not face a significant hindrance such as 
the constitution.  
 
 General Security of Military Information Agreement  
 
One of the US’s concerns regarding joint deployment of BMD was the treatment of 
militarily classified information, which was further enlarged by the leak of Aegis 
destroyers-related information by the SDF member in 2006 (Asahi Shimbun, 2007p). 
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Japan did not have an established intelligence organisation without a set of legal 
frameworks on how to handle classified information. In the case of another leak of the 
DA’s information through file-sharing software, the approach was to ask not to use such 
a thing without any actual solutions (Asahi Shimbun, 2006o). For deeply concerned 
leaders and bureaucrats, such a scandal would jeopardise the US-Japan security alliance.  
 
It, therefore, was Japan that initiated the actual discussion on GSOMIA, particularly 
Abe, the then-prime minister, who was keen on materialising protection of classified 
information to establishing a Japanese version of the US NSC. GSOMIA is an 
agreement between two countries, the decision-making of which is not subject to Diet 
debate or the law-making process. As acknowledged by MOFA officials, given the fact 
that enactment of the secrecy law might take time with potential public aversion, with 
the urgent need to materialise to protect information, GSOMIA was chosen as the means 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2006i). Accordingly, the agreement was signed in the summer of 2007.  
 
Practical problems are solved with this agreement. There was an alleged report that the 
US stopped providing parts with classified information on SM3 with Japan after the 
incident of the SDF member’s leak of Aegis destroyers (Asahi Shimbun, 2007h). 
Nevertheless, there seems to be another reason to choose GSOMIA. In essence, an 
MOU was possible, and it can be applied case by case. In each BMD research project, 
information is classified to a specific party. Furthermore, it would also be possible to 
strengthen the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement as one example. In the case of 
BMD, the information regarding BMD-related equipment is classified to the 
government, the DA and relevant firms.  
 
GSOMIA is more comprehensive and includes strict adherence to information from not 
only both governments but also private companies. The scope of information is 
substantially wider, ranging from a military operation to military technology. This 
brings about benefits to the defence industry (Asahi Shimbun, 2006i) because it not 
only enables more comprehensive participation of Japanese companies in BMD 
development but also allows Japanese private firms to fix US military equipment 
through information sharing. Until then, the US military equipment had to be 
transferred back to the US for repair. It is also interesting to note that Kyuma—the 
then-chief of the DA who was also known for his strong connection with the defence 
industry—was an advocate and actively involved in the negotiation with the US on the 
issue of the 2+2 meeting with the US, suggestive of the shadow of vested interests 
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(Yomiuri Shimbun, 2007c).  
 
 Basic Space Law  
 
As of 2008, the use of space was limited to ‘peaceful use’ as a Diet resolution, which 
meant the ‘non-military’ use of space (House of Representatives, 2006). However, in the 
1980s, after the Diet discussion as to whether the SDF could use satellite information, 
the Diet resolution was reinterpreted in the way in which general satellites and their 
information could be used by the SDF, with which the so-called spy satellites were 
launched in the form of information gathering satellites. Despite the absence of 
discussion in the Diet, it took three years to enact as law since 2005. This is because the 
LDP decided to submit the relevant bill in the form of legislation by House members. 
There were virtually no bureaucrats who could be solely responsible for drafting a law 
for space exploration, including military use (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2007c).  
 
The LDP first organised a committee—the Committee of National Space Strategy in 
2005—under the Koizumi administration, which subsequently turned into a special 
committee of space exploration. It took a year to draft a plan that was apparently 
opposed by the coalition partner, the Komeito, regarding the interpretation of ‘peaceful 
use for space’ in 2006. The Komeito requested the LDP to specify the definition of 
space use for military purposes more clearly and include the denial of possession of any 
military weaponry in space (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2007g). In the end, the Komeito’s view 
was included in the final draft to a degree in that the use of space is limited to the launch 
of satellites for military purposes (Cabinet Office, 2008c).  
 
It was mid-2007 when both parties agreed on the draft. Due to the upcoming general 
election in the summer of 2007, the bill was supposed to be submitted in the fall; this, 
however, faced a significant challenge because of the sudden resignation of Abe as 
prime minister and the resultant Cabinet shuffle. With the weakened LDP, the DPJ saw 
the sluggish process of the Basic Space Law as an opportunity to take the lead to 
become the ruling party. The DPJ itself pushed forward a more or less similar proposal 
of the law with one difference: a proposal to establish the Ministry of Space (Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 2007e). The involvement of the DPJ prolonged the process, but eventually, 
the three parties agreed on a draft the coalition initially put forward in 2008.  
 
Given the three parties had 440 seats out of 480 in the Lower House (296 for the LDP, 
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31 for the Komeito and 113 for the DPJ), the submitted bill was enacted smoothly as the 
Basic Space Law. In this case, again, the economic groups would receive a large benefit 
from the enactment of the Basic Space Law (M. Noda & Tanaka, 2009).  
 
First, the resolution of the ideal military satellite was far more precise than the generally 
used satellite, such as GPS, which suggests the defence industry took up the role of 
developing and selling, now that developing spy satellites was justified (Asahi Shimbun, 
2007u). Second, as such technology was held by the defence industry, launching and the 
relevant procedure of controlling spy satellites also was conducted by the defence 
industry. For example, the JAXA buys the ‘service’ of launching satellites provided by 
the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries; one launch appeared to cost 10 billion yen (M. Noda & 
Tanaka, 2009).  
 
The way in which such vested interests are represented can be seen by examining the 
necessity of enacting the Basic Space Law in light of BMD. BMD is an integrated 
system with the US, and satellite information can be obtained by the US now that the 
GSOMIA was enacted, allowing a smooth information sharing. The cost of purchasing 
domestically developed military satellites is more expensive than buying from the US 
(M. Noda & Tanaka, 2009). As repeatedly lobbied by Keidanren and the SJAC, their 
appeal was based on the idea of kokusanka, the protection and development of the 
indigenous production as well as catching up with the emerging global space 
exploration and markets. This infers that the Basic Space Law serves many economic 
groups supported by kokubō-zoku and the Cabinet.  
 
 Ban on arms export  
 
In the end, the LDP, together with the defence industry, failed to lift the ban on arms 
export between 2004 and 2009, in the period of concretising defensive realist-oriented 
grand strategy. This is despite the fact that the two large parties (the LDP and the DPJ) 
favoured BMD as an effective rationale and had strong support from the defence 
industry. It is one of the few remaining elements of the institutionalised form of 
anti-militarism. 
 
A reason for the abortive attempt is not only unstable domestic politics but also the way 
in which the risk-aversion stance of the Cabinet hinders from changing this 
long-standing institutionalised form of anti-militarism. With the gradually growing 
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public acceptance of the US-Japan alliance, the way in which the US is treated in the 
ban on arms export was exceptional. In 1976, the ban on the export of arms was revised 
in the form of the Cabinet decision under the Miki administration to restrict the export 
to all the countries, whilst in 1983 under the Nakasone administration, the technological 
transfer to the US became an exception (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2004c). There was still a 
large step between technological transfer and export of military equipment because the 
public perception seemed to dictate that the lift of the ban on arms export might have 
direct contributions to actual conflicts in a third country through the transfer of physical 
weapons (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2004d).  
 
The Cabinet therefore again pursued the partial ban on arms export with the US through 
the form of danwa (cabinet statement) at the end of 2004, which did not require a 
policy-making process. There was no institutional channel to override the decision by 
either the public or the opposition parties. In this case, the Cabinet made the most of the 
rationale for BMD as the only means to defend Japan, which sticks to the stance of and 
extremely defensive-oriented defence policy (Cabinet Office, 2004). Furthermore, the 
urgent need to prepare not to violate the ban on arms export made the Cabinet the safest 
option to pursue; otherwise, a planned deployment would not be feasible without the 
framework where US-Japan co-production and deployment were conducted. 
 
Even in the process of issuing the danwa, the coalition partner the Komeito played a 
role in restricting the LDP’s plan. The LDP’s Committee of Security Policy initially 
planned to pursue the complete ban on arms export, with the same view of the defence 
industry and Keidanren (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2004a). However, even the Cabinet 
hesitated to follow the LDP’s plan given the strong repercussions of Ishiba’s 
statement—the chief of the DA— that the ban on arms export should be revised. The 
Cabinet changed the draft in a way in which only the area of BMD with the US-joint 
production should be possible with additional strict regulation that allows export to 
other countries that are not termed as ‘terrorist nations’ (Asahi Shimbun, 2004o). After 
the intra-coalition negotiation, the Komeito’s view was reflected in the final draft: the 
arms export of co-produced BMD equipment to other countries by the US requires the 
‘prior approval of Japan’ and no other direct export to other countries by Japan as a 
general principle (Asahi Shimbun, 2004q). This led to the issuance of the danwa in 
2004.  
 
It is interesting to note there is another reason a form of danwa was chosen. It would be 
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possible, and probably further enhanced if the Cabinet decided to include the new ban 
on arms export in the NDPG, which is renewed every five years. Kyuma apparently 
came up with the idea of a danwa because the inclusion in the Guidelines fixes the 
renewed ban on the export of arms for the next five years so that an immediate lift on 
the ban would be more difficult (Asahi Shimbun, 2004b). This suggests the new ban is 
considered an ad hoc decision with future attempt to lift it further. The further attempt 
was seen subsequently, which, however, cannot necessarily be related to BMD as the 
Cabinet already used it to construct the acceptable logic.  
 
What changed is another exception of exporting military equipment—cruise ships —in 
the form of ODA to Indonesia (Asahi Shimbun, 2006d), in particular, Kyuma as the 
chief of the DA between 2006 and 2007, who actively advocated the need to further lift 
the ban on arms export on an economic interests basis. He argues that the repair of the 
US military equipment—besides BMD-related ones—in Japan is necessary, enlarging 
the areas of allowance on arms export to the US (Asahi Shimbun, 2006c). The LDP and 
the defence industry put forward the necessity of the lift to avoid being technologically 
left behind (Asahi Shimbun, 2009d).  
 
Nevertheless, these are not convincing enough to challenge the institutionalised form of 
anti-militarism. In the end, it seems that the ban on the export of arms goes beyond the 
need of the grand strategy of a defensive realist-oriented one.  
 
 Completion of deployment  
 
The initial deployment plan issued in 2004 through the mid-term defence plan states 
that by 2011, four Aegis destroyers with BMD system, 16 units with PAC-3 missiles and 
seven fixed position radars (FPS) would be deployed to function as Japan’s BMD 
system with US military integrated deployment (Defense Agency, 2004a, 2004b). Once 
the BMD was chosen to be introduced in 2004, there largely was autonomy in how to 
improve and deploy, as well as its speed of development as long as the budget allowed.  
 
One potential hindrance is the negotiation with the locals to deploy BMD-related 
military equipment. However, as the case of Aegis destroyers deployment in Niigata 
shows, there was not much opposition from the areas where Aegis destroyers are to be 
deployed (Asahi Shimbun, 2004a). Therefore, relatively smooth deployment was seen. 
The first PAC-3 was deployed in Saitama to protect Tokyo in 2006 (Asahi Shimbun, 
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2005l) followed by deployment in Kanagawa, Chiba and Ibaragi—all in the Kanto 
region. The deployment continues to cover each region.  
 
The deployment phase shows the struggle between ideal, early deployment and 
parochial interests. SM-3 missiles were co-developed, and the PAC-3 was to be 
domestically developed by the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Asahi Shimbun, 2003i). 
However, due to the urgent need to deploy BMD, the DA decided first to introduce them 
through foreign military sales (FMS) from the US-Japan already acquired Aegis 
destroyers, but these were not equipped with BMD system (i.e. system integration to 
transmit the information from radars and capabilities to launch SM-3 missiles). 
Therefore, these need repair and improvements. Due to the budget restriction—each 
repair might cost 27 billion yen—the plan was revised to develop one Aegis destroyer 
for each year since 2007 (Hughes, 2007). In the end, the plan was accelerated. By 2010, 
a year earlier than expected, four Aegis destroyers with BMD systems and PAC-3 
missiles were deployed accordingly with the integrated system for information 
gathering. In theory, by 2010, Japan completed the initial phase of deployment with 
legal rearrangement to be able to address ballistic missile attacks.  
 
 The reflection of the strategic environment and the intervening variables 
 
Since Japan decided to introduce BMD in 2004, the strategic environment surrounding 
Japan has arguably been more ‘restrictive’ because North Korea is a recognised threat. 
North Korea shows hostility to harm the US with intimidation through missile tests and 
launches after the US conducted joint military training (Asahi Shimbun, 2003c). In 
2004, it was already reported that North Korea had developed a submarine-launched 
ballistic missile (Asahi Shimbun, 2004l) ICBM (Asahi Shimbun, 2004k) that could 
reach Japan and the US. Although there is not an established way to measure imminence, 
North Korea threw away the diplomatic dialogue for negotiation in 2005 by announcing 
the indefinite postponement of participating in the six-party talks with official 
recognition of possessing nuclear weapons (Asahi Shimbun, 2005g) 
 
The strategic environment incentivised Japan to balance against North Korea as a 
threat—the means of which is constructed by the key strategic culture—with its US ally, 
partially constituting leaders’ image as one intervening variable. The US initially 
proposed an overarching missile defence system and requested Japan to join. Leaders of 
bureaucracies, such as the MOFA and the DA, were keen on pursuing BMD. Politically 
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elected leaders came to terms with the necessity of BMD that stems from the 
information asymmetry in terms of BMD (e.g. the information asymmetry between the 
prime minister, and kokubō-zoku as well as bureaucrats). This shared view on BMD as a 
valid strategic option is suitably reflected in the nascent transformation of domestic 
politics: the emerging political axis between the LDP and the DPJ, both of which favour 
of BMD with more than two-thirds of seats in the Diet (Asahi Shimbun, 2003e).  
 
Turning to the variable of state-society relations, for the sake of ‘extremely 
defence-oriented policy’, BMD was effectively supported by the public through the fear 
of North Korea ingrained in the fabric of society in the 2000s. This public acceptance 
through the absence of ‘social norm of anti-militarism’ gave the green light to the 
leaders to pursue BMD (Asahi Shimbun, 2005a). Moreover, the efforts made by the 
economic groups mostly paid off in the elimination of some of the long-standing 
institutional barriers, such as the space use and the exception of the ban of arms export. 
For economic actors, they pursued the way that reflected their interests. Therefore, 
BMD deployment often brought financial benefits, such as co-production and GSOMIA, 
which enables the defence industry to take on the role of repairing the US military 
equipment (Asahi Shimbun, 2006i). However, there is a dilemma between the 
protection of indigenous production capabilities and strategic needs. In the end, to 
promptly respond to the strategic environment, Japan first introduced the system from 
the US through FMS because it could take less time to deploy. Even though vested 
interests made a substantial contribution to the development of BMD, strategic needs 
overrode them for swift deployment.  
 
The institutionalised form of anti-militarism—domestic institutions as a key intervening 
variable—that has long played a role in delimiting Japan’s security capacity underwent 
a substantial change in the process of BMD development. Joint research and production, 
together with its export, were officially allowed for future sophistication and upgrade in 
the defence system in Japan. The newly enacted Basic Space Law allowed Japan to 
participate in the new dimension—space—in security policy (Hughes, 2013). These 
institutional changes show a sign of significant integration of the US-Japan military. 
The GSOMIA with the US enabled Japan to treat and fix the US military equipment in 
Japan whilst sharing classified information.  
 
In the end, the strategic environment’s influence was mitigated by intervening variables, 
the interaction of which led to the progressive grand strategic shift to a defensive 
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realist-oriented one. Only the examination of intervening variables allows us to reveal 
the nuanced view on Japan’s security policy development and the degree to which the 
so-called antimilitarism matters vis-à-vis policymakers and other relevant actors, as 
illustrated by the strategic environment.  
 
6.3 Continuity of Defensive Realist Grand Strategy of Ballistic Missile Defence 
Between 2009 and 2012  
 
With the aggravating strategic environment, the analysis of the period between 2009 and 
2012 theoretically would have seen a substantial improvement in BMD as the strategic 
environment became more restrictive. In actuality, there was a particularly stagnated 
process. One could go as far as to say that Japan in this period failed to respond to the 
strategic environment. North Korean missile and nuclear tests were aggravated, with 
missile and nuclear experiments in 2009 and further missile tests twice in 2012 
(Jungmin, 2013). Sino–Japanese relations arguably culminated in a severe diplomatic 
chasm through intensified territorial disputes, characterised by the boat collision 
incident with Japan’s detention of the Chinese skipper in 2010 and Japan’s purchase of 
the islands, the heart of the disputes (Howe & Campbell, 2013). Following the rise of 
China with its GDP surpassing that of Japan in 2012, China was recognised for the first 
time as a threat in the annual defence white paper.  
 
Examining domestic politics, a regime change took place through a landslide victory of 
308 seats, the largest number of seats with the largest voter turnout for one party in 
post-war politics. The DPJ proposed a rather radical view on the US-Japan alliance, 
distancing itself from the US to be an ‘equal’ partner (Lipscy & Scheiner, 2012). From 
realist perspectives, this suggests that, with less support from the US to cope with a 
newly recognised threat of China and the worsening threat of North Korea, Japan would 
need to drastically upgrade its defence strategy and revolutionise its security posture, 
which would have enormous impacts on BMD. Such an expectation was immediately 
evaporated within a year through the change in the prime minister and so was the 
subsequent Cabinet’s strategy. This chapter discusses that whilst the changing strategic 
environment resulted in some updates to the US alliance, the intervening variables 
played a crucial role in explaining the stagnated progress to hold the grand strategy 





 Shifting Domestic Institutions as a Policy-making Process  
 
The regime change instigated the alternation of the very core structure in terms of 
policy-making process: the power concentration of the Cabinet with the exclusion of 
bureaucrats as manifested in the DPJ’s slogan for ‘politician-led politics’. As promised 
in the manifesto of the DPJ, one of the significant changes that materialised under the 
newly established Hatoyama administration was the decision-making process. A ‘three 
political appointees’ conference was established to plan and co-ordinate policies, with 
the prime minister, the minister and deputy minister in charge of decision-making 
(Shinoda, 2013). The DPJ also ceased the administrative vice-ministerial meeting where 
prior policy co-ordination (nemawashi) took place. This was seen as a symbol of the 
bureaucracy’s supremacy within the government—virtually all administrative policy 
decisions needed the meeting’s approval before submission to the Cabinet under the 
LDP (Ito and Miyamoto, 2014). Furthermore, the ministers were in charge of 
nominating the vice-ministers to facilitate smooth co-operation, not as a representation 
of different factions (Nagatsuma, 2011). This reform was the long-advocated objective 
of the DPJ since its birth. Consequently, there was a strong uniformity in terms of this 
policy orientation, especially in the core executive members of the DPJ, such as Kan, 
Hatoyama, Ozawa and Sengoku (Abiru, 2011; Kan, 2009) 
 
This was followed by ‘Basic Policies’ as stated by Hatoyama (2009), which made a 
clear separation between politicians and bureaucrats in terms of their respective roles in 
policy-making. A document was issued by the Hatoyama Cabinet regulating the rights 
of bureaucrats, ranging from a virtual prohibition on bureaucrats holding press 
conferences to inter-ministerial communication without permission from superiors 
(Shimizu, 2011). This suggests there was virtually no direct influence of bureaucrats on 
policy-making or at least policy planning. Their task is like other countries’ bureaucrats, 
the execution and implementation of policy initiatives ordered by the Cabinet.  
 
To further enhance the centralisation of decision-making in the hands of the Cabinet, the 
Policy Affairs Research Council subcommittees were done away with, as initiated by 
Ichiro Ozawa. However, Hatoyama appears to have agreed with the plan despite strong 
opposition from Kan and some of the members (Yamaguchi & Nakakita, 2014). These 
subcommittees served as actual decision-making organs. Under the Hatoyama 
government, the requests and suggestions from the DPJ members would be delivered 
through political appointees to the minister. The Basic Policy materialised by Hatoyama 
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states that the decision of the government would be made by the Cabinet, not by the 
party (Machidori, 2015). This suggests a weakened power of kokubō-zoku as they can 
no longer have as much influence over policy-making as before. Moreover, a type of 
research council of national security, which was seen under the LDP with direct 
influence on policy orientation, no longer exists. As discussed in the theoretical 
framework, the examination of the policy-making structure as a part of domestic 
institutions reveals the leaders who are responsible for policy-making. In the case of the 
DPJ, the influence of bureaucrats—inter alia the MOFA and MOD—were largely 
diminished.  
 
Another important perspective in the variable of domestic institutions is the political 
situation in the period that is called a twisted Diet. Although the 2009 general election 
led to the DPJ holding the majority in both houses because it won the Upper House 
election in 2007, the loss of the Upper House election in 2010 resulted in a twisted Diet 
(Shinoda, 2012). The further problem is that, unlike the twisted Diet under the Fukuda 
administration in 2007, the coalition did not hold two-thirds of the Lower House. This 
created a situation where the superiority of the Lower House did not apply. Even if the 
submitted bill was rejected in the Upper House, it could be overridden in the Lower 
House by holding more than two-thirds of the seats.  
 
Within a year of the premiership of the DPJ, the DPJ faced one of the most severe 
challenges to pass the bill, the situation of which is dubbed cynically with kimerarenai 
seiji (‘partisan gridlock’) (Lipscy & Scheiner, 2012). As will be discussed in more detail 
later, the DPJ-led coalition could not materialise any of BMD-related bills and it could 
at most issue a Cabinet decision to slightly influence the restrictions on Japan’s security 
policy such as the ban on arms export, which does not require a policy-making process 
with the majority in the diet.  
 
 State-society Relations (Absence of Keidanren and Kokubō-zoku)  
 
Unlike the LDP-led Cabinet where kokubō-zoku has long bridged the channel between 
such economic groups as Keidanren, the defence industry and politicians and 
bureaucrats since WWII, the DPJ did not have connection and structure due to a lack of 
experience (Hiroshi, 2009; Howe & Campbell, 2013). The difficulty of establishing an 





The first is Cabinet-led politics where the co-ordination between bureaucrats and 
politician were completely disconnected. Therefore, the conventional quasi-iron 
triangle—bureaucrats, kokubō-zoku and the defence industry—became dysfunctional. 
Policy initiatives came from the coalition parties to the minister where the decision is 
handed down to the bureaucrats in a top-down manner (Yamaguchi & Nakakita, 2014). 
Although this arguably sounds like an ideal political organisational structure, in the case 
of Japan, the expertise of each policy area has long been largely held by bureaucrats. 
They have played a critical role in Japanese politics through the position of vice 
administrative minister, which was abolished under the DPJ (Shinoda, 2013).  
 
The popularity of this policy stance comes from the successive scandals by bureaucrats 
(Yamaguchi & Nakakita, 2014). In case of the MOD, under the LDP, there was the 
mishandling of US classified information and the accidental leak of the DA’s 
information, together with substantial corruption between the defence industry and the 
DA officials. The second, under the name of ‘the stop wasting taxpayers’ money’, the 
DPJ banned political donations from private firms and Keidanren, which it saw as a 
representation of vested interests; hence, it was a waste from the public perspective 
(DPJ, 2009). On the other hand, this is how the LDP established the channel with 
economic groups, and both have been considered to go hand-in-hand.  
 
Despite Keidanren’s attempt to organise several meetings with DPJ officials, they did 
not find a way to reconcile the differences in policy orientation (Asahi Shimbun, 2009h). 
The lack of connection is arguably most represented in the members of the prime 
minister advisory board without any member from Keidanren. Under the LDP, at least 
one member is chosen from Keidanren (Asahi Shimbun, 2010r). However, it does not 
mean that Keidanren gave up on the long-standing objective of lifting the ban on arms 
export. Keidanren again lobbied for policy change for the domestic industry; on this 
occasion, this was not the direct proposal to the ruling party but the statement to 
advocate (Asahi Shimbun, 2010f). 
 
 Budget reduction: Bureaucrats vs the Cabinet  
 
The MOD faced a severe challenge to further upgrade BMD due to the ever-more 
restrictive budget allocation despite the aggravating strategic environment. Based on the 
DPJ’s principle of cutting ‘waste of money’ for taxpayers’ money—known as 
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jigyoshiwake (‘budget screening’)—the defence budget was one of the main targets (A. 
Ito, 2009). This created a different structure from the one between bureaucrats and the 
LDP with close co-ordination. It has been the job of the Ministry of Finance to restrict 
and control the budget. However, now that the Cabinet became responsible for the task, 
there emerged a conflicting structure between the MOD and the Cabinet as well as the 
Ministry of Finance. The budget screening targets the host-nation support to the US 
bases in Japan, which plays a crucial role in maintaining the US-Japan security alliance. 
Kitazawa, the then minister of defence, who arguably has the closest view amongst the 
DPJ members, opposed it (Asahi Shimbun, 2009l). The budget had been decided 
through negotiations between the US and MOD and the budget screening suddenly 
weighed in the co-ordination in a rather arbitrary way. The demand from the MOD to 
increase the number of SDF members was rejected because the screening budget 
committee claimed the need for an increase was unclear (Asahi Shimbun, 2009g).  
 
This firmly entrenched stance of reduction took its toll on the defence budget. In 
particular, the defence budget saw a constant decline for seven consecutive years since 
2002 (Asahi Shimbun, 2010c). Even additional purchases of PAC-3, a critical part of the 
BMD system, were apparently questioned within the DPJ (Asahi Shimbun, 2010c). The 
conflicting relationship was intensified by the Cabinet’s attempt to dissolve the Airport 
Environment Improvement as a public welfare corporation and turn it into a foundation, 
which was the place for amakudari for the MOD officials (Asahi Shimbun, 2010p).  
 
One MOD official stated that the ministry fought the Cabinet to secure enough budget 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2010h). As the Cabinet created an intra-ministry contest to allocate an 
additional 1 trillion yen, the MOD attempted to secure the already-reduced budget of 
host-nation support from the allocation to make up for (Asahi Shimbun, 2010n). 
Kitazawa was arguably one exceptional figure who tried to connect the deep chasm 
between the Cabinet and the MOD; he showed clear dissatisfaction with the reduction 
of the defence budget (Asahi Shimbun, 2010b) and pushed for the idea of allocating the 
host nation support to the contest (Asahi Shimbun, 2010o). Furthermore, following the 
3.11 earthquake, the Cabinet offered a ‘Great East Japan Earthquake Recovery Special 
budget where the MOD managed to squeeze the budget to acquire military equipment 
that is compatible with disaster relief, such as C-2 military transport aircraft (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2012l). With these situations, the MOD could at most maintain the budget 
allocation to maintain the status quo. This suggests there is a severe difficulty pursuing 
substantial improvement in BMD, at least quantitatively.  
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 Domestic institutions: The ban on arms export  
 
One notable exception in terms of the change in the institutionalised form of 
anti-militarism in this period is the further lift of the ban on arms export where not only 
BMD could be potentially further developed but also the economic interests of the 
defence industry would receive benefits. Although no evidence suggests that Kitazawa 
has corrupted relations with the MOD or the defence industry, he played a crucial role in 
this institutional change. He was the first one in the Cabinet who referenced the need to 
review the current ban on the export of arms (Asahi Shimbun, 2010e), which was later 
denied by Hatoyama as a representative voice of the Cabinet with severe criticism from 
the SDP (Asahi Shimbun, 2010j). Since the SDP’s firm stance against it with its 
principles, no further actions occurred until it dissolved the coalition partnership.  
 
After the Hatomaya administration’s blunder to relocate the Futenma US military bases, 
the following Kan administration was urged to restructure the US security relationship, 
which facilitated the discussion of the ban on the export of arms as the US has long 
requested to loosen it. Kitazawa participated in the MOD-led ‘meeting to exchange 
views between the defence minister and the defence industry’ in 2010, where all the 
major defence-related economic groups participated, including Keidanren, the Japan 
Association of Defence Industry (JADI), SJAC and the Shipbuilders’ Association of 
Japan (SAJ) (Suzuki, 2010).  
 
Without the prime minister, Kitazawa organised a private meeting with Maehara 
(kokubō-zoku), Noda (conservative politician and later prime minister) and the chief 
Cabinet secretary and reached an agreement to revise the ban on arms export (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2010a). Furthermore, Kitazwa, due to the concerns of the lack of the prime 
minister’s involvement, added another secretary to the prime minister from the MOD to 
the existing six secretaries, ranging from Ministry of Finance to the MOFA. Until then, 
the official from the National Police Agency co-ordinated security (Asahi Shimbun, 
2010d). Kitazwa and Maehara—responsible for a 2+2 meeting with the US 
counterparts—engaged in the negotiation of the revised plan on the ban on the export of 
arms (Asahi Shimbun, 2010i).  
 
In the end, following Kan’s resignation after accusations that he mishandled the nuclear 
power plant meltdown by the 3.11 earthquake, the Cabinet under the Noda 
administration decided to revise the ban on arms export at the end of 2011. The revised 
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ban enabled Japan to export arms to countries than the US that had a security 
relationship with Japan. This move expanded not only BMD but also military 
equipment that could be used for peacekeeping. Moreover, joint research and production 
became possible with ‘allies’ (Cabinet Office, 2011). 
 
However, there was one critical drawback in BMD development because of the 
prolonged process of revising the ban on the export of arms, which took more than two 
years. This is the setback of the US-Japan joint development of BMD software, as the 
US decided to give up in the mid-2011 because Japan’s ban on arms export did not 
allow the US to export the system if it was fully developed (Asahi Shimbun, 2010g). 
The system, named the Ballistic Missile Defence Open Architecture Research 
(BMDOAR) programme, would not only enhance missile interception capability but 
also provide a back-up when the existing system fails to function (Tanida, 2011). 
Although this case itself does not present significant jeopardy in the US-Japan BMD, 
the implication cannot be ignored. The US and Japan have been engaged in joint R&D 
as well as production in SM-3 and PAC-3 missiles. If the hindrance of the ban on the 
export of arms had continued to discourage the US to work with Japan, then Japan 
would have been isolated in BMD research and production. However, the revised ban 
on the export of arms would prevent such a worst-case scenario in Japan’s BMD 
development. 
 
Immediately after the relaxation of the export ban, the United Kingdom (UK) and Japan 
issued an official statement to start the joint development of defence-related equipment. 
Although at this stage, the joint development does not extend to BMD, the relaxation 
makes it technically possible to develop it jointly. A MOD official revealed to the media 
there were numerous requests for joint development from countries such as Italy, France 
and Australia (Asahi Shimbun, 2012k). Japan finally opened its door to countries other 
than the US for the trade of military equipment. This institutional change is an 
accomplishment for the defence industry with its constant lobbying.  
 
 Ongoing Qualitative Improvement  
 
Political instability demonstrated that further institutional changes did not occur except 
for the export ban. One area that could see development is the qualitative improvement 
in BMD. As long as the budget allows, the MOD’s plan for qualitative development is 
still possible. In particular, the budget screening organised by the Cabinet members who 
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do not seem to have extensive knowledge of BMD did not—or perhaps were unable 
to—evaluate the necessity of BMD to reduce the defence budget. Therefore, the 
attention and order of the budget screening were rather vague, such as the reduction of 
‘host nation support’, which includes utility, welfare, labour and training relocation 
costs of the US military in Japan.  
 
In the end, the MOD at least succeeded in securing the budget for improving BMD. The 
first item is to deploy PAC-3 all over Japan, and not just the main regions (Kanto, Kinki, 
Toukai and Kyushu), as well as Hokkaido, Aomori and Okinawa. (94.3 billion yen) 
(MoD, 2011). There was an additional improvement on the current PAC-2 radars with 
an update on the operating system. This is together with the sacrifice of the MOD’s 
rejected demand to increase the number of SDF members. Although the Hatoyama 
administration took a stance to distance itself from the US, the joint research project for 
SM-3 missiles that are to be equipped with Aegis destroyers remained intact (MoD, 
2011). Furthermore, the MOD initiated new research on the BMD high power laser that 
could be used to address ballistic missiles.  
 
In the following year, the MOD successfully managed to secure a budget for equipping 
two existing Atago-class Aegis destroyers with BMD systems so that Japan would 
possess six Aegis destroyers. According to a military journalist, at least two of them 
need to be deployed to cover Japan against missile attacks (Ota, 2009). Although it 
takes years to make these BMD-equipped Aegis destroyers, the qualitative improvement 
should be significant. Each Aegis destroyer requires a six-month inspection every four 
years and an annual 1–2-month inspection. To be fully operational all the time, the 
existing four Aegis destroyers with BMD system are insufficient (Sankei News, 2015). 
Although not necessarily related to BMD, given the rise of China, the MOD decided to 
invest more in developing Type 03 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missiles to address 
cruise missiles potentially coming from China during this period.  
 
What is most interesting about the qualitative development of BMD is the clear 
indication of more integration with the US military and the implication of Japan’s future 
security posture. The planned two Aegis destroyers are to be equipped not only with a 
BMD system but also an updated BMD software (version 5.0) (Asahi Shimbun, 2010g). 
The new software has two key features. The first is ‘co-operative engagement 
capability’, which can share information spontaneously with other Aegis destroyers, 
such as the US ones. The existing version of the software is in general capable of 
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addressing missiles with its own radars. This technological development is predicated 
on the assumption that CSD would be allowed, making it possible for Japan to engage 
in BMD-related operations with the US (Kaneda, 2016).  
 
The second is that the software is compatible with SM-3 Block IIA missiles that Japan 
and the US have jointly developed. The missile could address ICBMs designed and 
predicated on the assumption that North Korean missiles will be directed towards the 
US (Panda, 2017). Therefore, Japan’s Aegis destroyers with this capability suggest it 
can address missiles in the boost phase, during which it is virtually impossible to predict 
where these go. Japan did not choose to adopt three phases of BMD system because 
addressing missiles in the boost phase with unknown targets violates CSD. Obviously, 
the MOD, according to the project plan on equipping Aegis destroyers with the 
upgraded BMD system, has not specified which version or even the name of the system 
(Defense Agency, 2004b). The MOD has been engaged in developing the BMD system 
despite political instability; it even went as far as to prepare for a further institutional 
shift, arguably the largest: CSD. Because the technical preparation of military 
equipment easily lasts for several years, the MOD went ahead in response to the 
aggravating strategic environment.  
 
 Reflection on the Strategic Environment and the Intervening Variables 
 
As the changing strategic environment has moved towards a more restrictive one, Japan, 
in the end, saw moderate development in terms of BMD during the period between 
2009 and 2012. The assumption that political instability is a key to explaining the 
slowed response was not necessarily true in comparison with the analysis of the 
previous period between 2006 and 2009 when three prime ministers served. The 
disconnect of bureaucrats and economic groups was mainly responsible in this period 
for failing to respond to the strategic environment. Although the ban on the export of 
arms was further relaxed, it was attributed to the role played by the defence minister 
who managed to deliver the interests in the Cabinet decision (Suzuki, 2010). This was at 
most what was possible to achieve with the pressure from the strategic environment, 
where BMD was decided to deploy in Europe as part of the NATO missile defence 
system.  
 
Therefore, in terms of the defensive realist-oriented grand strategy, political stability is 
not necessarily sufficient to explain the slowed response to the strategic environment. 
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Political stability seemed necessary when Japan attempted to shift its grand strategy, 
such as in 2004 to deploy and develop BMD. The momentum of the decision to deploy 
BMD obviated the need for political stability to address the legal arrangement in the 
period between 2004 and 2008 (Hughes, 2013). After the initial legal development 
phase was finished, political instability may have been the key to explaining why Japan 
did not proceed to CSD: the need for a sufficient number of seats in the Diet and the 
substantial BMD development, such as counter-strike capability.  
 
The reason for the lesser scale of strategic adjustment lies in the intervening variables. 
The regime change resulted in a policy-making shift—the domestic institutions—which 
by excluding bureaucrats narrowed the leaders (Hrebenar & Nakamura, 2015). Although 
the degree of influence of each leader might have increased at least in policy 
planning—in the case of Hatoyama for changing the direction of the US-Japan security 
relations—many leaders did not have a specific vision in security policy. This, in fact, 
helped to readjust and restore the previous security policy stance of the US ally within a 
year, along with the strategic environment, and partly explained the slowed response to 
the strategic environment. Nevertheless, the strategic culture that applies to leaders’ 
image was not relevant because the vision of the prime minister was so ambiguous.  
 
Another reason is the change in the domestic institution, resulting in the weakening 
bargaining power of bureaucrats and the economic groups—state-society relations 
(Shinoda, 2013). This weakening was due to the elimination of channels for lobbying 
and involvement in the policy-making process. Therefore, state-society relations have 
not played as crucial a role in recent years as they have done in pushing for the grand 
strategic shift up to 2009. 
 
In summary, the domestic institutions—policy-making process and institutionalised 
form of anti-militarism—again played a crucial role in explaining Japan’s BMD 
development in this period. The degree of influence of bureaucrats and the economic 
groups—state-society relations—substantially weakened due to the change in 
policy-making. In return, the variable of state-society relations was not as conspicuous 
as it had been previously. Instead, it seems that leaders’ image and their relative 
influence were accentuated. The absence of clarity of leaders’ image and policy plan did 
render such power meaningless.  
 
Overall, the institutionalised form of anti-militarism, such as Article 9 or the ban on 
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arms export, as well as 1% ceiling of defence budget continued to exert its influence by 
delimiting Japan’s security capacity. Ultimately, even though the strategic environment 
incentivised Japan to shift its grand strategy to an offensive realist one, the complex 
interplay of intervening variables mitigated its impact and resulted in the continued 
defensive realist-oriented grand strategy.  
 
6.4 Towards an Offensive-realist Oriented Grand Strategy Between 2012 and 2018 
  
The period between 2012 and 2018 saw outstanding political stability with the second 
inauguration of Abe. However, unlike his first premiership, his tactics with an emphasis 
on political stability to handle the dilemma between political legitimacy and strategic 
needs have thus far enabled him to maintain the premiership for more than five years. In 
comparison with the DPJ regime, the LDP—who closely co-ordinated with the 
MOD—facilitated the process of BMD development to be commensurate with the 
strategic environment that has had a crucial impact on Japan’s response, together with 
the continuous rise of China and North Korean increasing missile launches. 
 
The sign of a grand strategic shift seems to have occurred in 2015–2016, where further 
integration of the US military and the acquisition of counter-strike capability have been 
a real possibility. A consistent strong leaders’ image along with the centralisation of 
power through the establishment of the NSC has always pushed for more upgrade of 
BMD—be it qualitatively or change in domestic institutions—the view of which has 
echoed with that of the MOD (Hughes, 2013). Despite the weakening link between 
Kokubo-zoku and economic groups/bureaucrats due to the consequence of political 
scandals and bribery in the late 2000s, the political stability of the Cabinet with leaders’ 
image made their lobbying less important when it comes to BMD development. 
Although this shift is ongoing, it is likely that Japan will soon complete it, and an 
offensive realist prediction is most likely to apply to envision its future behaviour. 
 
 The Change in Domestic Institutions: Transition and Concentration of Power  
 
Arguably the establishment of the (NSC) has had the most significant implications on 
Japan’s subsequent security policy. Although the plan of establishing it was initiated by 
the first Abe administration and the DPJ, it did not materialise, partly due to political 
instability (Asahi Shimbun, 2006r). The NSC is responsible for constructing the main 
posture of security policy where the prime minister holds authority over 
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decision-making. The creation of the NSC largely changes the security policy-making 
process in comparison with past LDP administrations.  
 
First, the planning of NSPG, which were once submitted by the MOD and approved by 
the prime minister, is now planned and constructed by the NSC (Hughes, 2015). This 
suggests the transition of bottom-up policy-making to top-down. Every two weeks, the 
‘four-minister meeting’ is held with the prime minister, the chief Cabinet secretary and 
the ministers from both MOD and MOFA with smooth inter-ministerial co-ordination, 
suggesting the centralisation of power within the hands of the prime minister. Moreover, 
the prime minister has the authority to appoint the ‘special advisor to the Cabinet’ who 
may represent or share a close view of the prime minister (Cabinet Office, 2013). In 
addition, ‘experts’ are summoned when adviser meetings occur where retired SDF 
members, political scientists and the defence industry, such as the Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries, gather. In the case of issuing the National Defence Programme Outlines, a 
‘nine-ministerial meeting’ occurs for finalising the Outlines. Although the close 
examination comes later, the way in which the BMD is developed has, in part, become 
the other way around.  
 
It has been argued in the previous chapters that the economic groups and the then-DA 
were a prime factor pushing for BMD development (Noda & Tanaka, 2009). However, 
with the establishment of the NSC, it can be top-down order to facilitate development. 
This suggests, albeit depending on the leaders’ image that prime ministers such as Abe 
might give a substantial impetus to accelerate the BMD development. Furthermore, 
because changing some institutionalised form of anti-militarism, such as the CSD, is a 
policy-making process where the prime minister’s political resources with political 
stability is a key, the NSC would be able to radically restructure security policy by 
challenging them (Asahi Shimbun, 2006j).  
 
Further centralisation of the power of the Cabinet over bureaucrats is seen through the 
establishment of the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs (Kuramochi, 2015). 
Conventionally, the right of assigning such top positions amongst bureaucrats, such as a 
vice administrative minister, lies in the hands of each bureau. However, in holding the 
authority, the Cabinet could choose like-minded personnel or switch if the person was 
considered inappropriate in the role. This substantially increases the authority of the 
Cabinet. As discussed previously, the examination of domestic institutions for 
policy-making reveals ‘leaders’. In this period, the prime minister (as a central focus of 
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this chapter), the ministers of the MOFA and MOD, the chief Cabinet secretary and the 
advisers are defined as ‘leaders’.  
 
 Leaders’ image  
 
In addition to the above-identified leaders, in previous chapters, there has been the 
influence of kokubō-zoku, the MOD and the MOFA, which should be incorporated and 
examined in the variable of leaders’ image. First, the examination of domestic 
institutions for policy-making reveals that the prime minister’s centralisation of power 
indicates the increased relative weight of the prime minister’s image. In the period 
between 2012 and 2018, Abe’s premiership was unlike the previous periods where 
short-lived prime ministers seemed to render their views less important. Abe is often 
described as a neo-autonomist and revisionist, which arguably stems from his 
nationalistic slogan ‘ending the post-war regime’, which pays particular attention to the 
1946 constitution and its possible change to constitutionally recognising the SDF as the 
military (Samuels, 2007). He crucially emphasises the US-Japan security alliance on 
numerous occasions, most notably in the case of Trump’s victory in the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election (Sheila, 2017). From this, his image arguably leans more towards 
the US ally when it comes to strategic culture. 
 
We will now consider the ministers of the MOD and MOFA. Four members of the LDP 
served the respective positions. For the MOFA, Fumio Kishida (between 2012 and 
2017) and Taro Kono (from 2017 onwards) served as ministers. Although Kishida was 
known for his pacifist stance within the party, his outlook was closer to ‘US ally’, 
although his view on the constitution and upgrade on BMD was rather cautious and 
suggestive of a preference for the status quo (Sankei Shimbun, 2017d). He publicly 
stated there did not seem to be an immediate need to revise Article 9 in 2015 and 2018 
(Sankei Shimbun, 2017b). His firm stance on the non-nuclear principles and no 
possession of nuclear weapons was often seen in the media, with which he argued the 
importance of strengthening the US alliance (Hosokawa, 2017). The evidence suggests 
he was rather reluctant about the upgrade of BMD, such as counter-strike capability, but 
emphasised the importance of economic sanctions on North Korea (Hosokawa, 2017). 
Kono similarly emphasises the strengthening of economic sanctions on North Korea 





For the MOD, Onodera (2012–2016 and from 2017 onwards) and Inada (2016–2017) 
served in the position of defence minister. Onodera’s view is based on the US alliance; 
rather than presenting his own ideas, he attempts to represent the view of the MOD (the 
US ally). Based on one of his interviews and the Diet record, he often prefaces answers 
to the questions ‘with the information from the MOD’ (Sakasegawa, 2017). On the other 
hand, Inada arguably leaned towards a ‘normalist’ view despite a rather short period as 
defence minister. She, like other kokubō-zoku, advocated for the need to acquire nuclear 
weapons as part of the national security policy (Inada & Satou, 2011). During her term, 
she was keen on upgrading the BMD by considering acquiring Aegis Ashore or 
THAAD missiles.  
 
According to the NSC The number of special advisers to the prime ministers in the NSC 
is 13, seven of whom are academics. Their expertise is wide and ranges from Middle 
Eastern politics to the European Union and Latin American politics. Therefore, their 
view is rather unclear as to their individual strategic culture. On the other hand, three of 
them are retired SDF members—each from the Air, Ground and Marine SDF—although 
their current position is different. This suggests that given one of the main tasks of 
Marine and Air SDF is now BMD, which is highly integrated with the US military, 
these views are arguably close to the US ally. Perhaps, more importantly, Ryoichi Oriki, 
the former chief of staff (the highest-ranking officer), was a member of the special 
advisers’ group. He published a book in which he argues that, in the end, Japan should 
be ‘independent’ and rely less on the US, which suggests he is a mild normalist (Oriki, 
2015). With one member from the National Institute for Defence Studies, the remaining 
members come from the private sector.  
 
As discussed, the MOFA has the strategic culture of the US ally. Furthermore, the MOD 
has seemingly strengthened its view on the US ally too. This is because one of the 
MOD’s raison d'être is to keep the SDF and if possible, expand. Kokubō-zoku in the 
LDP has developed a firmly entrenched view of normalism with strong military 
capabilities. Ishiba began to put forward a stronger view on Japan’s security to revise 
the non-nuclear principles (Sakakibara, 2017). The committee of national defence in the 
LDP has always advocated acquiring counter-strike capabilities as well as a more 
radical upgrade of the BMD, even in the 2000s (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2004a), with which 
even some kokubō-zoku from the LDP went as far to say that Japan might need to 




 Following Abe’s image or materialisation/concretisation of his by others: Nascent   
 ideas of offensive realist strategy  
 
Although there is a level of difference in leaders’ view, which is often either more 
radical or milder than the Cabinet direction on security policy, no evidence suggests that 
the abovementioned leaders show an explicit opposition to the Cabinet decision and, 
more importantly, Abe. This is a stark difference compared with the DPJ where the 
ministers of the MOD and the MOFA and the prime minister had very different views, 
such as the US security alliance and the relocation of the Futenma US bases. Mikuriya 
(2015) put this little opposition down to ‘the atmosphere’ within the LDP. That is, now 
that regime change is not a far-fetched scenario given the DPJ’s landslide victory in the 
2009 election, most of the LDP members share the idea that internal divergence of 
opinion over policy issues cannot be afforded (Mikuriya, 2015).  
 
Several proposals are made by groups where Abe plays a central role in the 
decision-making process. With the absence of the opposition among leaders and the 
centralisation of the prime minister’s power, most of Abe’s propositions during his first 
premiership are again put forward. His private advisory board issued a proposal to allow 
CSD (Cabinet Office, 2008b) and the ban on the export of arms (Asahi Shimbun, 
2013d), which he advocated as prime minister in 2006. NSC was also his idea to 
strengthen the Cabinet’s power (Asahi Shimbun, 2006j), along with the idea of the State 
Secrecy Law. All of these suggestions for institutional change have significant 
implications on Japan’s BMD structure, although these are discussed in more detail 
later.  
 
The renewed NDPG in 2014 is also constructed by the NSC, which advocates the 
further strengthening of the US-Japan alliance with the upgrade of BMD. The previous 
NDPG in 2010 merely mentioned the ‘growing number of the so-called “gray-zone” 
disputes’, defined as ‘confrontations over territory, sovereignty and economic interests 
that are not to escalate into wars’ (Ministry of Defense, 2010, p. 3). On the other hand, 
the revised NDPG re-recognises the gray-zone in the way in which ‘gray-zone situations 
over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests tend to linger, raising 
concerns that they may develop into more serious situations’ (Ministry of Defense, 2013, 
p. 2). Despite the escalated interpretation of gray-zone, making it hard for Japan to 
respond, the NDPG states that the SDF ‘needs to respond to various situations, 
including “gray-zone” situations which require SDF commitment’, and it proposes a 
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way to respond to these situations under the newly established concept of a ‘Dynamic 
Joint Defense Force’ (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 7). It officially indicates that Japan 
steps up its role by ‘enhanc[ing] its deterrence and response capability’ (Ministry of 
Defense, 2013, p. 9). The previous NDPG explicitly states the importance and reliance 
of the indispensable deterrence provided by the US.  
 
Because the centralisation of the Cabinet power seemed to not only make a smooth 
co-ordination between bureaucrats and politicians (the Cabinet) easier but also enable 
the prime minister’s view to reflect on security policy-making, at the point of policy 
planning, the leaders’ image, in particular Abe’s vision, is more or less translated into 
the overarching security policy orientation. The security policy stance indicates the 
nascent sign of offensive realist strategy.  
 
 Domestic institutions  
 
The period between 2012 and 2018 arguably underwent the most substantial change in 
domestic institutions. There was not only an institutionalised form of anti-militarism but 
also new institutions and regulations to facilitate BMD development. This highly 
reflects on leaders’ image, and hence new security policy orientation suggested by his 
advisory groups and the NSC.  
 
 The State Secrecy Law 
 
The first is the State Secrecy Law. The official name is the Act on the Protection of 
Specially Designated Secrets, and it was enacted in 2013 soon after the NSC was 
established. The law covers information such as ‘operation of the SDF’, ‘signal or 
imagery information in relation to the defence’, and information of weapons including 
those at the R&D stage (Kaido & Shimizu, 2014). The punishment for violation of the 
law is imprisonment for a maximum of 10 years. This is much stricter than the 
GSOMIA signed by the US in 2006. The implication of the BMD system indicates that 
Japan could have strict rules on military information other than the US so that GSOMIA 
could be signed with other countries such as South Korea more easily.  
 
Further integration of the US is expected. In fact, within two years since the law was 
enacted, a renewed Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation to strengthen 
Bilateral Planning Mechanism and Alliance Coordination Mechanism through the 
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Security Consultative Committee and Bilateral Operations Coordination Centre. The 
law is similar to that of the US, and the NSC is also based on the US NSC with which 
both can co-ordinate. As Samuels (1994) argues, Japan has been known as ‘spy heaven’. 
It is a sign of Japan’s desire to share more information (Pollmann, 2015). The sharing of 
more qualified information regarding BMD would be expected.  
 
 The ban on the export of arms  
 
The next erosion of the institutionalised form of anti-militarism is seen through the 
replacement of the ban on arms export by the Three Principles on Transfer of Defence 
Equipment and Technology 2014, which later goes hand-in-hand with the newly 
established Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) under the MOD. In 
fact, the renewed three principles, in essence, do not differ so much from the relaxation 
on the ban on arms export, issued in 2011 under the Noda administration because the 
basic three principles are more or less the same (M. Morimoto, 2014). The implications 
of the new principles are symbolic and institutional practices to allow export. Whilst 
cases such as the US-Japan joint development of BMD-related equipment were 
considered ‘exceptions’, under the new principles these are legitimate exports (Mori, 
2014).  
 
With the new regulations, Japan can sweep up the international image of a ‘closed 
country’ in terms of defence technology and military equipment and promote its 
‘proactive contributions’ through the export and transfer of military equipment and 
technology (Mori, 2014). It also aims to eliminate the internal image of ‘a merchant of 
death’ (Shi no Shounin) through the ‘dual-use’ of technology, putting the technology of 
private sectors (spin-in) in military and vice versa (spin-off) (CISTEC, 2015). These 
institutional practices judging whether a particular military technology or equipment 
can be transferred are specified under the new regulations. In general, special 
committees of the MOFA, MOD and METI make a collective decision, and in a case 
that requires cautious decisions, the NSC is responsible for the decision-making (M. 
Morimoto, 2014). This suggests that Japan has an official channel with which other 
countries communicate and negotiate with the potential cases of transfer and export. 
Japan did not have any of these committees for foreign communication apart from the 
US.  
 
Along with the Cabinet’s intention to expand ‘military business overseas’, a new 
182 
 
institution, ATLA, was established in 2015. This institution aims to streamline the 
process of acquiring and developing military technology in a more unified way. The 
degree of government intention can be seen by the size of the institution where 1,800 
individuals work (ATLA, 2016). The predecessor, the Equipment Procurement and 
Construction Office, had only 600 employees. The aim of ATLA is to reduce inflated 
costs of development and manufacturing given Japan’s limited budget due to the 1% 
ceiling of GDP on defence expenditure. It also participates in international exhibitions 
of military technology across the globe to promote and engage in joint development 
aside from the US. Although indirect, the implications for BMD can be substantial in 
the long-term. Hitherto, ATLA has succeeded in reducing 1.8 trillion yen—one-third of 
the annual defence budget (Ministry of Defense, 2017a). To put it simply, the more costs 
saved, the more investment can be made on BMD.  
 
The future accumulative cost reduction through an effective procurement would help to 
allocate a larger budget on BMD because it is arguably the costliest in terms of the 
defence equipment in Japan. The expansion of joint collaboration and export of 
BMD-related equipment would not only facilitate the process of development but also 
reduce the manufacturing costs due to the expansion of the production base besides the 
domestic markets. In fact, almost immediately after the establishment of the ALTA, the 
parts of PAC-3 produced by the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries are exported to the US 
(Bee Yun, 2016). Furthermore, because NATO embarked on the BMD system in tandem 
with the US, Japan could play a more active role in expanding BMD-related export and 
joint development, which would not only allow further cost reduction but also take the 
lead in the technological development of BMD. The director of the ATLA stated that the 
aim to ‘secure technological superiority’ given China’s rise is suggestive of Japan’s 
readiness for an arms race (Kallender-Umezu, 2017).  
 
As of 2017, Japan signed an agreement concerning the transfer of defence equipment 
and technology with seven countries—Germany, Italy, the UK, France, the US, India 
and Australia—according to publically available information (ATLA, 2016). Due to the 
difficulty handling the classified information in BMD technology, Japan has not 
embarked on the joint research on BMD-related equipment with countries other than the 
US. Signing an agreement such as GSOMIA would enable them to collaborate, which 





 Collective Self-Defence  
 
The enactment of the legislation to allow the right of CSD is arguably the biggest 
change in the institutionalised form of anti-militarism; its impact on BMD structure is 
also substantial. The first implication of the CSD legislature on BMD is to protect the 
US Aegis destroyers in their operations or missions (Swaine et al, 2001). In times of 
attack on these destroyers, Japan could protect them with the use of force. On the one 
hand, given the higher number of US BMD-equipped Aegis destroyers deployed in 
Japan, protecting them would contribute to the maintenance of the BMD system, which 
would be prepared for an emergency at any time. On the other hand, this also means 
further integration, if not complete subsuming, into the US military, such as the US-led 
missions that would request Japan’s dispatch of the Aegis destroyers (Kaneda, 2016). 
Furthermore, it is important to note that CSD is not necessarily confined to the case of 
the US but also its close allies. This leaves room for further co-operation and 
co-ordination with other countries, such as South Korea, if the security ties are 
strengthened to the point where the Cabinet defines it as ‘Japan’s close ally’.  
 
The second is more in relation to an actual military operation in BMD to allow Japan to 
address missiles directed towards the US but not necessarily the US bases in Japan. First, 
the legislature once and for all resolved the discussion as to whether the joint 
deployment of BMD is a violation of individual self-defence (Hughes, 2007). In case a 
missile flies over Japan to Hawaii or Guam, sharing and transmitting information of the 
missile caught by Japan’s radar system with the US was considered a debatable action. 
Helping the US address the missiles coming towards US territory presumably had 
nothing to do with Japan’s defence. Nevertheless, the legislature allowed officially the 
sharing of information in the past. In this sense, the CSD serves as a legal adjustment to 
the current situation.  
 
Last, the legislature paved the way for Japan’s ability to develop BMD to address 
missiles in the boost phase (Hughes, 2017). In the past, the direction of the missiles in 
the boost phase was hard to detect; therefore, Japan could not address them due to the 
prohibition on CSD. Moreover, as discussed, Japan could address missiles flying over it 
towards Hawaii or Guam. The US-Japan can now develop a BMD system to address 
missiles in the three phases—boost, mid-air and terminal—depending on the speed of 




 State-society relations  
 
Although the NSC arguably has similar views on Keidanren and the defence 
industry—or the other way around—it does not mean these actors did not play an active 
role in BMD development. In this period, Keidanren not only continued its lobbying to 
the LDP but also resumed financial contributions to support the LDP, the degree to 
which simply cannot be ignored. Keidanren proposed an idea of the new regulation on 
arms export in a way that involved more private sectors in the pursuit of international 
joint research and production (Chosyu Shimbun, 2014). Through the allowance of 
international joint development or research on military equipment, Keidanren plays a 
role in channelling the domestic defence industry and its counterparts overseas. Even 
before the new principles of transfer and export of military equipment and technology 
were enacted, Keidanren dispatched its own research team to Italy and the UK to 
discuss potential business opportunities (Asahi Shimbun, 2013c).  
 
Keidanren went ahead of the LDP in considering practical measures to export military 
equipment. First, it was Keidanren that proposed the establishment of an institution 
responsible for mainstreaming arms export in a more systemic manner (Asahi Shimbun, 
2014b; Keidanren, 2013). This later materialised in the ALTA. Furthermore, given the 
LDP’s move to allow the right of CSD, Keidanren had already anticipated the would-be 
expanded role of the SDF that would go in tandem with the increased demand for 
military equipment. Therefore, together with the relaxation of the ban on the export of 
arms, Keidanren submitted a proposal to the Abe administration to make the promotion 
of arms export one of the national strategies (Keidanren, 2015). Although this proposal 
did not fully come to fruition, the LDP and the MOD tried to implement a policy to give 
the defence sector financial aid and allow a loan with special interest rates (Reuters, 
2014b). Keidanren actively promoted domestic collaboration on military research 
between the defence industry and universities. In so doing, the MOD announced direct 
financial support to military-related research. Although in 2016, when it was issued, the 
budget was 600 million yen, it showed a tremendous increase in 2017 at 11 billion yen 
(Asahi, 2016). In the end, the ban on arms export and subsequent activities further 
eroded one of the institutionalised forms of anti-militarism: the ban on military-related 
research.  
 
Although these Keidanren activities did not necessarily improve the BMD system 
immediately and directly, a level of consequence has been seen. As mentioned, the 
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export and international collaboration of the BMD equipment already began, for which 
the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries are responsible. In 
terms of research on the military, a highly developed radar system, which is one of the 
integral parts of the BMD system, is already underway in collaboration with universities 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2016b).  
 
Keidanren’s financial support of the LDP is also substantial in that it contributes to the 
maintenance of the LDP as a ruling party, which facilitates the implementation of the 
current progressive security policy. Keidanren re-initiated political donation in 2013, 
which had stopped during the DPJ regime. Keidanren asked the companies belonging to 
it for a political donation that accumulates approximately 2 billion yen each year and 
has continued to increase for the last five years (Mainichi Shimbun, 2017b). Amongst 
the political parties, the LDP is most financially advantageous with its 23 billion yen in 
comparison with the second-largest party that has a revenue of 10 billion yen. This 
means Keidanren contributes up to 10% of the LDP’s financing. The substantial 
financial advantage directly translates into election results. Keidanren indirectly 
contributes to the stability of the LDP—in particular, the Abe administration—which 
pursues progressive security policy through BMD (Asahi Shimbun, 2017e).  
 
 Komeito unable to be a veto player: A dysfunctional brake or mere pawn?  
 
Another key aspect of intervening variables—domestic institutions—is the existence 
and influence of the ‘veto player’. In this period, institutionally, the Komeito is a veto 
player who, according to Ripsman et al. (2016, p. 93), ‘would have a greater 
opportunity to shape, constrain, or defeat policies at odds with their preferences’. The 
principles of the Komeito, as discussed, significantly differ from those of the LDP. In all 
the elections taking place in the 2012–2018 period (Upper House elections in 2013 and 
2016; Lower House elections in 2012, 2014 and 2017), the LDP would not have been 
able to secure two-thirds of seats in the Diet without the Komeito as an effective 
coalition partner.  
 
Institutionally, the Komeito has two means to influence decision-making. The first is 
Cabinet decision, which requires a unanimous agreement of all Cabinet members, 
including the one from the Komeito. Rejecting the proposal for the Cabinet decision has 
a destabilising impact, which makes the Komeito a veto player (Sataka, 2016). The 
second is the enactment of laws or policy-making. In general, if the ruling party holds 
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more than half of the seats in both houses, it can institutionally railroad its policy 
initiatives. Therefore, as the LDP itself does not hold more than two-thirds of seats, the 
Komeito is institutionally capable of preventing the enactment of a policy plan.  
 
Nevertheless, what the Komeito did was at most to add a non-substantial reflection of 
its preferences on policy plans and slightly delay Japan’s response to the strategic 
environment in times of changing domestic institutions—an institutionalised form of 
anti-militarism. The planning of the State Secrecy Law that facilitated the process of 
day-to-day security policy-making between Japan and the US, leading to the close 
co-ordination of BMD systems (Kaido & Shimizu, 2014). The Komeito only succeeded 
in requiring the LDP to add sentences to protect ‘the right to know’ for both the public 
and the media so that the media is not the target of punishment under the law (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2013e). The Komeito also changed the plan on the new principles of the 
export of arms in the way in which the details of export should be made available to the 
public (Asahi Shimbun, 2014a). When it comes to CSD, the Komeito was capable of 
adding a clause of the conditions for the use of force. The coalition party negotiation 
took a couple of months to finalise; in a way, this delayed the response to the strategic 
environment, albeit slightly.  
 
There are many areas where the Komeito did not act as a veto player when it could have. 
For the first time, the NDPG advocated the need for Japan to ‘enhance its deterrence 
and response capability’ with the SDF’s commitment to the grey zone, clearly indicating 
the enhanced role of Japan in the international security (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 7). 
The Komeito approved without any opposition. The same goes for the renewed 
Guidelines for the US-Japan security alliance. Regarding the acquisition of 
controversial BMD equipment such as Aegis Ashore, the Komeito kept silent (Asahi 
Shimbun, 2017l). Even with the discussion of ideas of constitutional revision, the 
Komeito hedged its stance against the LDP to specify the role of the SDF in the revised 
constitution by stating ‘it is not that we do not understand the LDP’s plan, further 
discussion is necessary’ (AERA, 2017). In the end, although the Komeito could squeeze 
its ever-so-slight request out of the coalition negotiation, it worked as if it was one of 







Qualitative and quantitative improvement: A shifting of Japan’s defensive  
 realist grand strategy  
 
This period saw the strong emergence of progressive leaders’ view, in particular, Abe, 
echoing with that of MOD and the inactive coalition partner. This directly reflects on 
BMD qualitatively and quantitatively.  
 
First, Japan reversed the trend of decreasing its defence budget for the first time in 11 
years. As of 2017, it increased for five consecutive years. The evidence suggests Abe 
had a meeting with the officials from the Ministry of Finance and ordered it not to 
reduce the defence budget (Asahi Shimbun, 2013k). In the end, the defence budget 
increased by nearly half a trillion yen to 5.250 trillion yen, a degree of increase that goes 
beyond the 1% GDP ceiling. In 2017, Abe insisted that during the coming fiscal year of 
2018, the Cabinet should not be constrained by the 1% ceiling (Asahi Shimbun, 2017a).  
 
The likelihood to continue the trend of increasing the defence budget is arguably high. 
When including revolving payment, the defence expenditure already exceeds the 1% 
ceiling because expensive defence equipment often takes years to build or prepare, and 
accordingly, only the divided costs are considered part of the defence budget. Whilst 
Japan constantly used this payment method to leave the payment for the following year, 
the amount of this payment has increased substantially (Ministry of Defense, 2017). 
During the DPJ’s regime, the revolving payment remained around 3 trillion yen; 
however, it increased to 4 trillion yen by 2017 due to the increase in BMD-related costs, 
such as building the Aegis destroyers. As such, any remaining cost is fixed, and new 
projects or periodical costs of repair are constantly required by the MOD. More than 
80% of the defence budget comprises labour costs (Ministry of Defense, 2017b), and 
the defence budget will likely continue to increase.  
 
The MOD has acquired a level of autonomy for BMD improvement under the Abe 
administration, unlike the DPJ regime where the reduction of the defence budget was an 
urgent task. Nevertheless, the building of two additional Aegis destroyers with BMD 
capability is projected on the defence budget, which will expand Japan’s BMD system 
to eight BMD Aegis destroyers. Because at least two Aegis destroyers are required to 
cover Japan from missiles, eight Aegis destroyers make it possible to protect Japan 
throughout the year and are scheduled for completion by 2020 (Ministry of Defense, 
2017). Similarly, the number of SDF units equipped with PAC-3 will increase from 16 
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as of 2016 to 24 by 2020 (Mainichi Shimbun, 2017c). The joint research of SM-3 Block 
IIA paid off, and the budget in 2017 includes its acquisition that is partially produced in 
Japan (Ministry of Defense, 2016). The missile could address ICBMs predicated on the 
assumption that North Korean missiles will be directed towards the US (Panda, 2017).  
 
Japan, therefore, is finally ready to address missiles outside the country through the 
exercise of CSD. The quality of missiles is enhanced in other areas. The number of 
PAC-3 missiles not only increased but also the defence budget in 2017 intended to 
acquire PAC-3 MSE (missile segment enhancement). This missile, in comparison with 
the existing missiles, is capable of addressing missiles in twice as wide and high an area, 
which takes up more than half of BMD-related expenditure in 2017. A further 
improvement is underway regarding FES-7 Radar that is to be equipped with the 
capability to detect and chase BMD missiles (Ministry of Defense, 2017).  
 
Arguably, the biggest improvement in BMD is the Cabinet’s decision to acquire two 
Aegis Ashore systems, a land-based component to shoot down missiles. Although 
introducing THAAD was also an option, the Cabinet leaned towards Aegis Ashore 
partly due to its less expensive deployment costs (Japan Times, 2017b). According to 
MOD officials, the two Aegis Ashore units should be able to cover entire regions of 
Japan with the SM-3 Block IIA missiles. This is because the developed SM-3 IIA could 
reach the range of 2000km radios (Defense Industry Daily, 2017). This land-based 
BMD system is also compatible with the Aegis destroyers to be deployed by 2020. 
Aegis Ashore BMD system adds the existing two BMD capabilities (Aegis Destroyers 
and PAC-3) to another layer of missile defence. The further significance of this 
acquisition is an indication that BMD is in future used to counter-balance against China 
because it is equipped with SM-6 missiles to shoot down cruise missiles from China 
(Mainichi Shimbun, 2018b).  
 
Although the Cabinet constantly denied the intention to acquire counter-strike 
capabilities, the new research projects proposed by the MOD indicate such future 
development and application. First, counter-strike capabilities are based on a response 
to the initiation of attack towards Japan, whilst a pre-emptive strike is based on ‘first 
strike’ with the concerns of immediate attacks. Therefore, the past Cabinet 
interpretation allows for possessing ‘counter-strike capabilities’ because it falls under 
the right of individual self-defence (Mainichi Shimbun, 2017d). Nevertheless, the term 
‘counter-strike capability’ drew substantial public attention and opposition because it 
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was considered a violation of an ‘exclusively defence-oriented security policy’. Thus, 
the MOD is careful enough not to mention the word in its official documents. It starts 
with the research on supersonic glide bombs, which is primarily designed for island 
defence supposedly against China. However, as Honda (1998) argues, it can be easily 
used as a counter-strike against North Korea as part of ‘offensive’ element of BMD 
system. The significance can be seen through its degree of investment: 10 billion yen on 
‘research’ (kenkyu), although development (kaihatsu) could easily cost more than 10 
billion yen, such as ship-to-ship missiles (Ministry of Defense, 2016). The same goes 
for the new anti-ship missile (7.7. billion yen on its research). While both missiles are 
named ‘island defence’, Honda continues that technical application should make it 
possible for counter-strike capabilities.  
 
Furthermore, arguably the most sophisticated missiles with a wider range and 
high-speed capacity had been co-researched with the UK and have now moved into the 
‘development phase’. These are to be equipped with newly acquired 42 F-35 (Sankei 
Shimbun, 2017f). Whilst the government denies it, the Yomiuri Shimbun (2018) reports 
a plan to repair Izumo-class helicopter destroyers to be aeroplane carriers so that F-35 
could be flown from them to engage in combat. In any military confrontation, including 
North Korea, counter-strike attack requires aeroplanes to fly close to the military base of 
the enemy to attack. Thus, such missiles and aeroplanes are critical. In fact, South Korea 
and the US conducted a military drill with F-35 and aeroplane carriers allegedly in 
anticipation that both would be engaged in attacking North Korean military and control 
bases (Kimura, 2018). The above ongoing projects and acquisition is a sign of 




The strategic environment surrounding Japan has been aggravated, particularly for the 
last five years, which indicates a clear signal from the international system to incentivise 
Japan to act in a realist manner (Grønning, 2014; Hornung, 2014; Hughes, 2016; Lam, 
2017a). As NCR dictates, the strategic environment delineates options for Japan, and the 
more restrictive the strategic environment, the fewer options available to the state.  
 
Japan’s response to the strategic environment has come much closer to the one predicted 
by realists: counter-balancing against North Korea and China. In so doing, Japan has 
recalibrated its security posture not only militarily but also institutionally regarding 
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BMD, which was not seen in the previous period between 2009 and 2012 during the 
DPJ’s regime. First, like the period between 2004 and 2008 when legal rearrangement 
took place for BMD deployment, Japan underwent a substantial institutional change. 
The NSC was established to centralise authority in terms of security policy formation 
and highly reflected Abe’s vision, as demonstrated by its NDPG (Ministry of Defense, 
2013).  
 
Following the logic of Japan’s grand strategy of defensive realism, Japan attempted to 
strengthen the security ties with the US further by enacting the State Secrecy Law to 
mitigate US concerns about the leaking of classified information (Samuels, 1994). The 
ban on the export of arms was finally replaced by the export principles so that not only 
joint development and transfer with the US but also international co-development and 
production became possible. Although the 1% ceiling of the defence budget remains—it 
may not in future—the MOD and the Cabinet has made every effort to reduce the costs 
of defence through the promotion of international joint development and the 
establishment of the ALTA to maximize the enhancement of deterrence. This went in 
tandem with the increase in the defence budget for five consecutive years (Mnistry of 
Defense, 2017). Most importantly, Japan is now capable of exercising CSD so that it not 
only provides security with the US as a sign of more active participation in the 
international security but also can form mutual alliances in addition to the US.  
 
There is a sign of a grand strategic shift in this period towards an offensive realist-type 
strategy with the emergence of acquiring offensive capabilities. Although the term 
counter-strike capabilities were not mentioned, Japan embarked on research on 
supersonic glide bombs and new anti-ship missile together with almost completed 
Meteor missiles as a joint research project with the UK  (Mainichi Shimbun, 2017a). 
This can be equipped with the F-35 Japan intended to purchase. Japan’s alleged 
intention to improve Izumo-class destroyers to be aircraft carriers to accommodate F-35 
will ready Japan for actual combat and military confrontation with its ‘offensive 
capabilities’. Although the government’s stance did not imply immediate consideration 
of acquiring offensive capabilities ‘directly against’ North Korea, many suggested 
acquiring them, including the minister of the MOD, Onodera (Sankei Shimbun, 2017e). 
Recent evidence suggests Japan in the next year or so plans to purchase cruise missiles 
that have offensive capabilities (Mainichi Shimbun, 2017a). The Cabinet termed them 
as ‘stand-off missiles’ because they are for addressing invasion outside the range of an 




The case study demonstrated the importance of leaders’ image in this period in 
comparison with the previous one (between 2009 and 2012). Despite the constant 
efforts of the MOD, the MOFA and actors in the variable of state-society relations, such 
as Keidanren, to push for the more active militarisation of Japan, leaders did not choose 
to do so in the DPJ regime. The reason lies in their dilemma between political 
legitimacy and strategic needs delineated from their strategic cultural views. In the case 
of Abe, he did not hesitate to railroad his policy initiatives such as the NSC, the State 
Secrecy Law and CSD. Given that all the prime ministers except for Abe did not pursue 
CSD as a policy objective—though they talked about CSD as a potentially necessary 
agenda for Japan’s security policy—the importance of Abe is accentuated; hence, the 
leaders’ image.  
 
State-society relations arguably became less significant in comparison with the initial 
phase of BMD (the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s), when there was considerable 
information asymmetry between leaders and bureaucrats/actors in state-society relations. 
However, this is because the leaders’ image is similar to such actors in the variable so 
that it functions to give additional support to the leaders, contributing to political 
stability. All of their images are more or less explained by the strategic culture of the US 
ally and normalism. Therefore, given the absence of conflicts between the two strategic 
cultures, in terms of BMD, the strategic culture of US ally and normalism seemed to 
reach the same path Japan should pursue: upgrading the US security alliance to facilitate 
the militarisation of Japan.  
 
The variable of domestic institutions also played a reduced role due to the significant 
erosion by institutional changes, leaving fewer institutional barriers. What is left is 
arguably the constitution and a 1% defence budget ceiling, the latter of which is about to 
erode. One interesting observation is that over the course of the last two decades 
arguably another conceptual barrier emerges in tandem with changing Japan’s security 
role—that is, ‘exclusively defence-oriented security policy’. This has been effectively 
used as an excuse for Japan to take up its role and pursue BMD. As such, despite the 
constitutional interpretation allowing the possession of counter-strike capability, the 
controversy arose in the debate of acquiring offensive capabilities. Therefore, the legacy 
of defensive realism in the 2000s has haunted Japan’s progressive attempt to further a 




Such domestic institutions are arguably backed by the public to some extent, which is 
why Japan did not upgrade its security policy as much as it could as a sign of the 
dilemma between strategic needs and political legitimacy. Although the past five years 
saw a substantial degree of an upgrade, political stability has always been the central 
concern of Abe’s Cabinet. Described by Hughes (2017) as ‘bait-and-switch’ election 
strategy, the Cabinet carefully avoided any militarisation policy during the run-up to the 
elections, which is demonstrated by the other case study of constitutional revision.  
 
In conclusion, mainly due to the strong view of the leaders, echoing those of the actors 
in state-society relations, Japan significantly weakened the power of institutionalised 
form of anti-militarism in this period, the degree of which paved the way for not only 
further improvement of BMD but also for maturity of defensive realist grand strategy to 
shift offensive realist one. Although the grand strategic shift has not completed, Japan 




7 Conclusion  
 
The final chapter starts with the summary of the thesis followed by the contributions to 
the literature. While discussing the value of NCR as an effective theoretical framework, 
it aims to provide a specific answer to the three research purposes (1) determining under 
what conditions Japan accelerates/decelerates its balancing behaviour, (2) investigating 
the causal mechanisms of the key factors, and (3) identifying the relative weight of each 
factor. The conclusion also puts forward a new interpretation of Japan’s grand strategic 
shift with further research scope and future implications on where Japan is headed.  
   
Summary of the thesis  
 
The thesis largely confirms the validity of NCR as an effective theoretical framework to 
analyse Japan because it provides a clear link between structure and policy outcome 
through the intervening variables. It observes the causal mechanisms of each 
intervening variable to mediate the impact of the structure. This does not mean the 
structure is largely diminished; the more aggravating the strategic environment, the 
greater its influence. In response, leaders prioritise strategic needs while they maintain a 
level of public support. The level of public opposition waned where domestic 
institutions’ hitherto role of constitutional guardian was downplayed by leaders. 
Ultimately, Japan, which only began the broad discussion of constitutional revision in 
2004 and issued the Cabinet decision to deploy BMD, has seen substantial development 
in both cases. The balancing behaviour of Japan moved towards defensive realist 
strategy by 2009, and since 2012, it again shifted towards offensive realist strategy.  
 
On the one hand, CSD was allowed in 2015 when leaders were comparatively more 
passionate about their strategic visions. By 2017, initial agreement on the constitutional 
revision of Article 9 was reached within the ruling party (Asahi Shimbun, 2018f). On 
the other hand, the degree of BMD capability was substantially upgraded qualitatively 
and quantitatively, and Japan has begun considering the acquisition of offensive 
capabilities such as aircraft carriers and ‘counter-strike capability’ (cruise missiles) 
(Mainichi Shimbun, 2018a). Thus, the thesis explains Japan’s responsiveness to the 
structure in a more nuanced way with the intervening variables. In other words, the 
acute strategic environment creates a favourable situation where leaders would find it 
easy to pursue their strategic visions. Such a contextualization on how Japan behaves 
provides a better explanation in comparison to a constructivist account which is based 
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on norms and domestic institutions. Nonetheless, there is also the stage (2009–2012) 
when leaders, in spite of their awareness of the strategic needs, could not materialise 
sufficient resources to realise their will. Accordingly, the influence of domestic 
institutions goes beyond leaders. In this stage, domestic institutions, along with the 
distance between leaders and state-society relations, accounts for the deceleration of 
Japan’s balancing behaviour despite the more aggravating strategic environment. Thus, 
the thesis provides a more nuanced account for Japan’s behaviour than those put 
forward by both realist and constructivist scholars in that the thesis confirms when and 
how each variable of realism and constructivism come into play.  
 
Amongst the intervening variables, leaders’ image is the most important variable in the 
NCR model in the case of Japan. Contrary to the suggestions in some literature, the 
so-called anti-militarism was not as substantial as claimed. While the state-society 
relation plays a crucial role, its influence declined as the strategic environment became 
aggravated. Thus, the thesis confirms the importance of leaders in Japan—particularly 
the degree of their enthusiasm to respond to the environment, even though it might put 
them in a position to lose public support.  
 
In summary, Japan started to shift its security policy in 2012 from an increase in 
defensive capabilities, which is more or less in line with Japan’s stance of exclusively 
defensive-oriented defence, to a nascent revisionist stance with the offensive 
capabilities to balance against China and North Korea. Given the ongoing aggravation 
of the strategic environment, NCR predicts that Japan will increase its military budget 
to develop further its offensive capabilities, which ultimately destabilises the region to a 
substantial degree as offensive realism predicts as a new, yet nuanced view on Japan’s 
behaviour. In this sense, NCR, rather than simply dichotomised between defensive 
realism and offensive realism, utilises the intervening variables to capture Japan’s 
security policy development, its shift to an offensive realist state, and how, why and 
when it occurred.  
 
Contributions to the literature  
 
Through NCR testing, the thesis first and foremost confirms that NCR adds sufficient 
explanatory power and effectiveness of incorporation of domestic politics in the form of 
intervening variables. The thesis advocates that the prime reason for the acceleration 
and deceleration of Japan’s behaviour, despite the strong signals from the structure, lies 
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in the struggle between leaders’ dilemma and domestic institutions as an internal barrier. 
 
 It not only highlights the usefulness of NCR to help strengthen the theorisation of a 
state’s behaviour within NCR but also indicates that NCR is a contextually informed 
theory, serving as a guide for policymakers (Kitchen, 2010). Second, the significance of 
NCR effectiveness is further confirmed through the case studies to investigate how a 
major power reacts to a rising power (i.e. China), providing a theoretically rigorous case 
to help theorise regional power transition and its dynamics (Paul, 2016; Williams, 
Lobell & Jesse, 2012). Lastly, by deductively incorporating domestic-level variables, 
the thesis provides an analysis to add the ‘political’ in the field of IR, particularly 
departing from structural realism. This overcomes the well-known criticism of NCR as 
an ad hoc application with the same basis of selection of evidence.  
 
Empirically, the thesis fills the gap in the literature that contributes to Japan’s change in 
velocity of balancing. Given the structure continuously incentivising Japan to be 
engaged in balancing, it is crucial for leaders to take action by effectively maintaining 
political stability, which is largely responsible for initiating and accelerating balancing 
behaviour. Whilst domestic institutions, including the constitution, are responsible 
generally for the slowed progress of balancing behaviour, they are not as influential as 
expected by constructivists. More importantly, these domestic barriers have mattered 
less as the strategic environment grew more restrictive, which shows a substantial 
finding in the literature of Japan’s security policy as the constitution and the publicly 
prevailed anti-militarism are often considered a key to constrain Japan’s balancing 
behaviour. Unlike constructivism, the thesis contends that objective impacts of the 
structure cannot be neglected, it constantly gives signals to Japan to behave in certain 
ways. 
 
Second, the analysis adds a key interpretation of Japan’s security policy development to 
the existing literature, rather than simply characterising it as ‘incremental’ or 
‘progressive’. Japan seems to have shifted its grand strategy from the one based on 
defensive realism to the one informed by offensive realism. Furthermore, it gives a 
more nuanced view of Japan’s balancing behaviour, which is not only incremental but 
also non-linear, by investigating under what conditions each intervening variable comes 
into play to accelerate/decelerate its balancing behaviour. This finding is new to the 
existing literature in that the NCR analysis explains the unpredictable elements. 
Furthermore, the thesis provides a theoretical prediction which seems to suggest a 
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radical departure from the past path of Japan as well as the existing literature with its 
nascent offensive realist grand strategy. Such a prediction is well-supported by the 
rigorous application of NCR.  
 
Unlike constructivists literature, such as Berger (1996) and Katzenstein (1996), the 
thesis does not consider the socially accepted and institutionally embedded 
anti-militarism factor constraining Japan’s balancing behaviour as much as them. In 
comparison with relational constructivists such as Hagstrom and Gustafsson (2015), 
who argue that ‘emotion’ and ‘relational identity’ of Japan vis-à-vis China triggers 
Japan to develop its security policy, the thesis contends that while the structure is crucial, 
depending on leaders and political stability, Japan can stagnate its policy development, 
nowhere near a linear, stable development. As discussed, whilst the thesis is partially in 
line with realist literature on Japan in terms of its incremental development of security 
policy, it contextualises how, when and why unit-level variables come into play besides 
the structure through the application of NCR.  
 
Third, looking at the two cases—military strategy through BMD and the 
institutional/legal capacity of security policy—highlights two types of 
quasi-independent security policy-making with different speeds and processes of 
balancing. On the one hand, from the perspective of military strategy, Japan always 
made every effort to maximise balancing power generally within the institutional and 
legal limits, such as the constitution, thereby being comparatively independent of the 
policy-making process and the public. On the other hand, the speed of the change in 
institutional/legal capacity to balance was rather temperamental and hugely dependent 
on domestic politics. Thus, the thesis helps reconcile realist vs constructivist debate as it 
delineates respective function and a more nuanced view on Japan’s security policy 
(realist-oriented military development and constructivist-inspired static nature of the 
constitution) through the two case studies.  
 
Last, the thesis also provides a comprehensive map on many allegedly important 
domestic factors by addressing how, when and why each matters. There is a link 
amongst the intervening variables that helps us to understand the complexity of 
domestic-level factors, each of which is often focused on by the existing literature. 
Furthermore, the thesis connects these domestic-level variables with the structural-level 
variable by highlighting each role and function of the intervening variable as a 
transmission belt between structure and foreign policy outcome. From the following 
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section, each contribution shall be discussed in more depth.  
 
Under what conditions Japan balances  
 
Throughout the two cases, the thesis addresses the three main research puzzles. First, it 
examines under what conditions Japan strengthens/weakens its incremental security 
policy development (i.e. balancing behaviour). It examines how it is possible to 
compare the relative weight of contentious domestic factors within a single theoretical 
framework without neglecting the importance of structure. In short, the thesis confirms 
the fundamental NCR premise that whilst structure incentivises a state to act in certain 
ways, the ultimate outcome depends on domestic factors regarding how a state chooses 
the options. The degree of the limitedness of the options depends on the extent to which 
the strategic environment is restrictive/permissive. Since the starting period of each case 
study in 2004, the strategic environment surrounding Japan (i.e. North Korea and 
China) has become increasingly restrictive and has led Japan to engage in balancing 
more actively. In this sense, the thesis confirms the significance of structure, which 
imposes more limited choices on Japan. the more restrictive the strategic environment 
gets, the more likely Japan is to balance against, the degree on which depends largely on 
leaders’ image and partially on domestic institutions.  
 
However, confirmation of the structure itself does not answer the question of under 
what conditions Japan strengths/weakens its balancing behaviour. This insufficiency of 
structure per se as an absolute explanatory variable goes to the second purpose of the 
application of NCR: to find ‘causal mechanisms’ regarding the intervening variables 
(leaders’ image, domestic institutions and state-society relations) by addressing the 
second research question of how it is possible to compare the relative weight of each 
intervening variable. 
 
Each intervening variable plays a different role in the two cases, explaining the 
relatively quick response to the structure through BMD with the slowed progress of 
constitutional revision that prevented Japan from engaging itself in balancing behaviour 
as quickly as it should in theory. This is in fact counter-intuitive because the acquisition 
and development of military equipment generally take many years—possibly a 
decade—whilst constitutional revision is policy-making/law-making that institutionally 




In realist studies, as argued, Japan’s grand strategy has already departed from the 
existing literature such as mercantile realism (Heginbotham & Samuels, 1998) and 
reluctant realism (Michael J. Green, 2001). This is because given the public seemingly 
disinterest in security policy development, along with enthusiastic leaders and 
bureaucrats, Japan has increasingly focused on security, suggestive of no longer 
‘reluctant’ nor ‘mercantile’. The thesis is more in line with ‘resentful realism’ (Hughes, 
2016) and ‘new realism’ (Auslin, 2017). However, the thesis provides a more clarified 
conceptualisation on when to further balance and when not to in a rigorous theoretical 
manner with predictive values. Furthermore, the thesis helps settle debates on various 
factors, shaping Japan’s behaviour by testing when and how each variable plays a role.  
 
Regarding the means to balance against, while the means is determined by the prime 
minister in terms of overarching approach and bureaucrats in terms of specific ways to 
balance, Japan’s balancing strategy is not necessarily based on strengthening the US 
alliance. Although it is true that Japan has been strengthening the US alliance, Japan, at 
the same time has allocated a tremendous resource on internal balancing through the 
rearrangement of legal constraints and military capability. One can say that the 
requirement of the US alliance has levelled up (Berger, 2004; Dian, 2014; Michael J. 
Green & Cooper, 2014; Osius, 2002; Penn, 2014; Rozman, 2015; Wirth, 2015). 
However, it is also true that Japan’s independent military capability and legal security 
capacity have substantially increased over the last 15 years. Japan now can technically 
form a quasi-alliance with a third country besides the US, and with the acquisition of 
counter-strike capability, Japan can theoretically be engaged in conflict unilaterally for 
the sake of ‘individual self-defence’. Thus, the thesis considers that Japan and the US 
both are actively engaged in balancing together, the former of which already shifted its 
stance from hedging to active balancing.   
 
Relative Weight of Intervening Variables and Their Causal Mechanism 
 
While the relative weight of each intervening variable has already been examined, the 
more detailed conditions under which each intervening variable comes into play should 
be outlined. 
 
Leaders’ image  
 
As discussed, leaders’ image has the most substantial explanatory power amongst the 
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other intervening variables. As Table 7.1 shows, the two types of leader play a different 
role in the two cases. In short, elected politicians have a causal relationship between 
outcome and role regarding the case of the constitution, where no role seems played by 
non-elected leaders, whilst non-elected leaders exert substantial influence over the case 
of BMD. This is particularly because unless elected leaders take on the agenda of 
constitutional reinterpretation or revision, the discussion did not even start. Non-elected 
leaders might have lobbied to push the agenda during the period between 2004 and 
2018; there is no evidence to show how they might have influenced elected leaders.  
 
However, in the case of constitutional revision and reinterpretation to allow CSD, the 
evidence shows that the negotiation and finalisation of the plan to allow CSD was held 
within the ruling coalition, thereby confirming the absent role of non-elected leaders. In 
the period between 2004 and 2012, elected leaders were almost always caught up by the 
leaders’ dilemma, which prevented them from initiating the discussion to proceed to 
constitutional revision despite most leaders agreeing on the idea of the revision and 
CSD. On the other hand, since 2012 onwards, elected leaders became more active in 
pursuing the constitutional revision and CSD, the latter of which was enacted into law 
in 2016. Thus, elected leaders are responsible for both delayed and accelerated 
balancing. 
  
Table 7.1 The Presence/Absence of Leaders’ Image  
Leaders’ image Article 9    BMD   
 2004–09 2009–12 2012–18 2004–09 2009–12 2012–18 
Politicians  





× × × 
〇 〇 〇 
〇 Confirmation of the causal mechanism of the variable  
× Confirmation of no causal mechanism of the variable  
*△ means both partial absence and presence are found without a definite causal 
mechanism 
 
In the case of BMD, non-elected leaders have substantial influence even with the 
attempt to surpass the constitutional limits. Whilst the Cabinet decision was required to 
make a decision to deploy BMD in 2004, in this sense elected leaders matter to some 
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extent. Preparation for BMD introduction and the way in which they took the lead were 
such that elected leaders did not get involved in the decision-making process as much. 
Non-elected leaders have a relative authority over what to choose and how to strengthen 
the military capability in case of BMD.  
 
In the period from 2009 to 2012, non-elected leaders went ahead of the CSD debate and 
already considered the instant data link system that was to be introduced to Aegis 
destroyers, allowing close co-operation with the US based on CSD. Elected leaders 
came into play since 2012 when they began advocating more active engagement in 
international security with the change in the decision-making process through the 
establishment of the NSC. This not only echoed non-elected leaders’ strategic visions 
but also gave them lee-way to strengthen military capability in an attempt to introduce 
offensive weapons. Thus, although without strong commitments from elected leaders, 
non-elected leaders have always striven to strengthen Japan’s military capability. 
However, with elected leaders on the same page, they can exert a significant influence 
with more visible material change. Therefore, whilst non-elected leaders play a more 
important role in BMD, overall, elected politicians’ key role in both cases is the most 
substantial variable.  
 
Domestic institutions (I): Policy-making framework  
 
Domestic institutions are crucial in explaining Japan’s slowed or delayed process of 
security policy development as an institutional barrier. First, the policy-making 
framework helps to highlight FPEs (i.e. elected and non-elected leaders) and specify 
their role in the policy-making process between 2004 and 2018. The policy-making 
framework enables us to accommodate changes in the policy-making process, such as 
the establishment of the NSC. With the upgrade of the then-DA to ministerial status, the 
MOD officials are given more power to orchestrate military build-up since 2007, whilst 
the NSC enabled elected leaders to more closely co-ordinate with non-elected leaders 
from 2012 onwards. This explains a notable influence of non-elected leaders in the 
period of 2009 and 2012 over BMD and the combined strength of both elected and 
non-elected leaders over BMD since 2012. However, such a change in security 
policy-making framework did not apply to the case of the constitution simply because 
there was no change in the process of the revision.  
 
Table 7.2 The Presence/Absence of Domestic Institutions  
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Domestic institutions  Article9   BMD   
 2004–09 2009–12 2012–18 2004-–09 2009-–12 2012-18 
Policy-making 
framework   





△ △ △  △ 
  
Elections  △ × 
〇 
× × × 
〇 Confirmation of the causal mechanism of the variable  
× Confirmation of no causal mechanism of the variable  
*△ means both partial absence and presence are found without a definite causal 
mechanism  
 
Domestic institutions (II): Institutionally embedded anti-militarism  
 
As is often claimed important by constructivists, institutionally embedded 
anti-militarism has an explanatory value to account for the delayed process of security 
policy-making. This includes constitutionally binding restrictions such as the ban on 
arms export, CSD the use of space and the institutionalised bureau of the CLB to keep 
the constitutionality. Nonetheless, the thesis finds that the significance of the 
institutional anti-militarism was not as much as it is claimed to be for several reasons. 
The analysis intends to measure to what extent it functions as a barrier to block any 
initiatives to challenge them by leaders. Because these are the institutional barriers, once 
these are changed—in the case of constitutional reinterpretation, the new interpretation 
overrides the existing one—they no longer hold any institutional significance. 
Throughout the period, these are eliminated one by one: the military’s use of space in 
2007, the elimination of the ban on arms export and the allowance of limited CSD. 
What remains is the full degree of CSD, the 1% GDP ceiling on the annual defence 
budget and the constitutional revision that potentially eliminates all hitherto 
constitutional barriers.  
 
Nonetheless, there is still room for the institutional anti-militarism to weigh in on 
security policy development. However, arguably the last stand is the constitutional 
revision, the probability of which became more likely in 2018. If it happens, this would 
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probably mean that the institutional anti-militarism would not necessarily be considered 
in influencing Japan’s security, at least much less than now.  
 
Domestic institutions (III): Elections 
 
Elections as part of the domestic institution—much related to the general public—are 
also crucial in explaining the delayed response to the structure as the ruling coalition 
constantly requires a majority to enact laws to reinterpret or revise the constitution. 
Most notably, it explains the Cabinet taking almost four years to allow CSD in the 
period between 2012 and 2018. The general election was held twice between 2013 and 
2014, during which the discussion of CSD was blocked as leaders prioritised political 
stability in the name of the leaders’ dilemma. The same goes for constitutional revision, 
which demands more votes than enacting a law: two-thirds in both houses for the 
revision, whilst two-thirds of seats in the Lower House should institutionally suffice. In 
particular, the variable can be a crucial causal mechanism connecting foreign policy and 
domestic politics in Japan.  
 
State-society relations (I): The public  
 
Whilst predicated on the assumption that the variable of state-society relations would 
not hold a decisive explanatory power, state-society relations often appeared absent or 
lacked a causal mechanism to influence security policy-making. As anticipated by the 
policy-making framework as part of domestic institutions, it is largely left out of the 
process. The thesis thus intends to examine to what extent the ‘indirect impact’ of it 
could be seen.  
 
The public, defined as ‘socially accepted anti-militarism’, directly responds to particular 
security policy initiatives and to whether the public aversion to ‘militarisation’ would be 
capable of blocking security policy initiatives. The entire period did not observe any 
mobilisation of the public that was strong enough to change the policy initiatives. Of 
course, it does not mean the public does not matter at all. The causal mechanism 
examined by the thesis is that, for instance, initiatives of a security policy by the 
Cabinet caused a substantial drop in the Cabinet’s support rate, ultimately leading to the 
shuffle of the government with the abortive attempt. This was not found in the period. 
The general public itself caused political instability, most notably between 2006 and 
2012. Six prime ministers and two regime changes caused a significant delay in the 
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policy-making process and hence balancing behaviour.  
 
However, the way in which the public matters is ‘indirect’ in the sense that the Cabinet’s 
failures in other policy areas or scandals resulted in a sharp drop in its support rate. This 
was indirectly taken into consideration in the variable of leaders’ image and elections in 
the variable of domestic institutions. Furthermore, the public seems more concerned 
about seiken-unyou nouryoku (‘administrative capability’) rather than security policy as 
one policy area. As discussed later, the administrative capability and its appeal to the 
public in regards to Japan’s security policy is another scope of research and weakness of 
the thesis.  
 
Nonetheless, the public in the sense of anti-militarism did not appear as anticipated. A 
valid causal mechanism of this variable potentially exists, which cannot be confirmed in 
this thesis. That is, if the national referendum will occur, whether or not the revision 
occurs is entirely left in the hands of the public. However, until such time, the publicly 
shared anti-militarism does not hold any direct explanatory power for Japan’s security 
policy development. Arguably the reason for the absence of the public defined in the 
thesis lies in the fact that those who show a strong aversion to security policy change 
are not a majority anymore. Half of the public does not oppose revision. 
 
Table 7.3 The Presence/Absence of State-society Relations 
State-society 
relations  
Article9   BMD   
 2004–09 2009–12 2012–18 2004–09 2009–12 2012–18 
The public  × × × × × × 
Economic/societal 
groups  
△ △ × 
〇 
△ × 
Opposition parties  × × △ × × × 
〇 Confirmation of the causal mechanism of the variable  
× Confirmation of no causal mechanism of the variable  
△ There is not a definitive causal mechanism although partial presence is evident  
 
State-society relations (II): economic/societal groups  
 
Economic groups, whilst largely absent in the case of the constitution, show a level of 
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influence over both the initial deployment phase of BMD (between 2004 and 2009) and 
partially in the following period (2009–2012). Although economic groups such as 
Keidanren could have a causal mechanism as it officially provides a substantial amount 
of donation to the ruling party (the LDP) with lobbying, the elected leaders did not 
accommodate in times of political instability in the case of the constitution. More 
importantly, the main way of dealing with lobbying is adjustment in the way that 
Keidanren wants regarding economic policy. Furthermore, the interests of Keidanren 
regarding the constitution often match those of elected leaders. Thus, it is unclear 
whether the existence of Keidanren and its lobbying is directly responsible for security 
policy change as a causal mechanism.  
 
In the case of BMD, where Keidanren’s economic interests are more outstanding, it 
gears up the level of lobbying. It issued and submitted a policy proposal to the Cabinet 
to enact a law allowing for the use of space for defensive purposes, which in turn 
enables the domestic defence industry to gain profits. Without the defence industry’s 
enthusiasm, particularly demonstrated by the MHI, the early deployment of BMD by 
2010 would be impossible with decades-long efforts of the MHI. This shows a causal 
mechanism between the defence industry and the outcome of BMD in the period 
between 2004 and 2009.   
 
Furthermore, Keidanren lobbied for the relaxation of the ban on arms export for decades. 
Despite the DPJ rising to power as the ruling party, which does not show any sign of 
changing the law, the first relaxation of the ban on arms export was enacted in 2011. 
Although this does not confirm a definite causal mechanism, the level of influence 
seems too large to ignore. In the following period of 2012–2018, mainly due to the 
ruling party’s interests and attempts to accommodate the need of Keidanren, there does 
not seem to be any evidence that Keidanren actively lobbied.  
 
Turning to the societal groups, there is no linkage in the outcome of the case of BMD, 
arguably because there are no societal groups directly against BMD. For the 
constitutional revision, as discussed, the potential impact of societal groups is offset by 
two completely opposite groups: 9jou wo mamoru kai (the organisation to protect 
Article 9) and Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference). Similar to the variable of the public, 
the outcome of the national referendum—should it take place—might give us an avenue 




The last variable is opposition parties, which are absent as a causal mechanism for most 
of the periods. The opposition parties had an indirect impact on security policy-making 
by getting votes and rising towards a would-be ruling party in 2009 and 2012. However, 
due to the fragmentation of opposition parties themselves—the constant split and 
emergence of new parties—they could not exert institutional influence to block the 
ruling party’s initiative. Such inability is most notably shown in the case of CSD and the 
discussion of constitutional revision in between 2012 and 2018. All they could do is 
criticise the attempts to revise and reinterpret the constitution and the Cabinet itself in 
the hopes of appealing the general public—which was in vain. 
 
Moreover, the aim of such open criticism often has little to do with Japan’s security 
policy or remilitarisation, partly because the once biggest opposition party, the DPJ, was 
also inclined to revise the constitution. Further, large opposition parties such as the DPJ 
did not oppose BMD: only tiny, pacifist parties such as the SDP and the Communist 
Party strongly opposed, despite the lack of institutional strengths. Arguably, in case of 
future referendums, they could have a chance to appeal to the public to render the 
referendum unfavourable, the outcome of which, however, is only observable when it 
happens.  
 
In sum, as Table 7.4 shows, leaders’ image is the most important variable in explaining 
changing velocity of Japan’s policy development. While elected politicians are largely 
present in the case of the constitutional revision, non-elected leaders played a crucial 
role in BMD in all the periods. Although policy-making framework, part of domestic 
institutions is present in all the periods in both cases, this serves as a preliminary 
examination for which actors are identified. Therefore, it does not necessarily have 
explanatory power. As discussed, the public is the least important variable which is not 
influential nor present in each case, although for the case of the constitutional revision, 











Table 7.4 the Summary of Each Intervening Variable  
    Article 9      BMD     
 
  2004–09 2009–12 2012–18 2004–09 2009–12 2012–18 
Leaders’ 
image 
Politicians  〇 〇 〇 △ × 〇 
Non-elected 
leaders  
× × × 〇 〇 〇 




framework   




〇 〇 △ △ △  △ 
  
Elections  △ × 〇 × × × 
    
State-society 
relations  
The public  × × × × × × 
Economic/soci
etal groups  
△ △ × 〇 △ × 
Opposition 
parties  
× × △ × × × 
 
The thesis adds more values to the various key factors in terms of how these play a role 
in shaping Japanese policy. As touched upon in the literature review chapter, growing 
attention to the prime minister (Hughes, 2015a; Shinoda, 2011; Uchiyama, 2013) is a 
key to examining Japan’s security policy. The thesis indeed confirms the prime minister 
is one of the most important factors, while the thesis similarly confirms the importance 
of bureaucrats particularly in terms of BMD. This is not in line with the above literature 
as these often argue that relative decline in the influence of bureaucrats. The prime 
minister matters when it comes to a drastic shift in security policy, which, however, 
does not necessarily matter in terms of ‘how’ to balance through BMD. As BMD is a 
critical factor for the MOD in securing budget and enlarging the SDF role, however the 
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prime minister constructs overarching approach to Japan’s security, the means of which 
is likely to be determined by bureaucrats. Nonetheless, the prime minister is crucial 
when it comes to policy-making process in terms of the constitutional revision and 
reinterpretation.  
 
Furthermore, the thesis disagrees with the influence of the public (Midford, 2006). As 
delineated by the variable of domestic institutions, the public often lacks any effective 
means to influence policy-making process in both constitutional reinterpretation and 
BMD development as the majority of the public does not seem to vote based on their 
preference on security policy. Rather, the public any potential concern is well-calculated 
by leaders in the way in which their interests are most effectively realised without much 
public opposition.  
 
Shifting Japan’s grand strategy  
 
Besides the relative weight of unit-level factors, another finding is a nuanced and 
accurate interpretation of Japan’s security policy development. Overall, Japan’s 
temperamental yet incremental security policy development is examined in the name of 
grand strategy. As defined, grand strategy refers to the combination of the diplomatic, 
military (including tactical aspects for war) and economic factors to meet long term, 
larger ends that many often call ‘national interests’. The grand strategic adjustment as a 
dependent variable in this thesis means a change/shift in not only the ‘ends’ but also the 
‘means’.  
 
Accordingly, the two means and ends are conceptualised and likened by offensive and 
defensive realism. Whilst the former sees a heavy focus on defensive measures as a 
means to meet the ends to maximise security, the latter intends to maximise military 
power with so-called power projection capabilities as a means to meet the ultimate ends 
of achieving a regional hegemony that serves to maximise security. At the initial period 
of each case study, Japan began strengthening its strategy based on defensive 
realism—internal balancing through BMD deployment and external balancing with the 
nascent attempt to allow CSD. This stems from the relatively aggravating strategic 
environment with the rise of China, which at the time had not yet taken over Japan’s 
economy and the emergence of North Korea without so much imminence to attack. 
Although the level of restrictiveness was not sufficient to allow Japan to have CSD in 




Another sea change in the strategic environment adds extra restrictiveness, which 
eventually served as a critical juncture where Japan began its shift of grand strategy for 
more of an offensive realist state. The period saw high tension with China that finally 
overtook Japan’s economy, and China’s defence budget is more than twice as much as 
that of Japan. Similarly, from this period, North Korea began threatening the use of 
force not only against the US but also against Japan, with an exceptional sense of 
imminence, together with its intention and capability to inflict harm to Japan. Japan not 
only finally allowed CSD but also proceeded with the constitutional revision to 
eliminate the past shackles on its capacity. Similarly, BMD saw a different type of 
development towards the incorporation of offensive capabilities as part of the BMD 
system in Japan. Although it is not a complete shift, Japan surely set in motion a more 
aggressive balancing through means inspired by offensive realism.  
 
As discussed, one of the domestic conditions for Japan to respond to the strategic 
environment in the way that realists predict is leaders’ image with effective maintenance 
of their political legitimacy, particularly for elected leaders. The period from 2012 saw 
greater political stability in comparison with the previous period (2004–2012) or even 
potentially the most stable in the post-WWII period given the renewed and anticipated 
premiership of the current prime minister until 2021. The analysis of the two cases 
shows that opposition parties, the public and other economic actors did not display 
much influence to slow the progress of Japan towards a would-be offensive realist state. 
It is likely to continue this trajectory with a direct confrontation between the 
constitution as a barrier (domestic institutions) and leaders (leaders’ image) within a 
broad parameter of the structure.  
 
Therefore, Japan adjusted its grand strategy from a defensive realist-inspired one to an 
offensive realist-informed one since 2012 in answer to the question of when Japan 
would shift its strategy. The finding largely confirms the hypotheses outlined at the 
beginning of the chapter: the increasingly restrictive environment contributes to the shift 
from defensive realist behaviour to offensive realist behaviour. In this sense, the 
projected trajectory largely departs from the existing literature, most of which puts 
forward a more moderate interpretation of Japan’s security policy development. This 
leads to the thesis prediction that Japan is on the path of an offensive realist state by 
enhancing both internal and external military capabilities, which now includes 
quasi-offensive capabilities not necessarily constrained by the constitution.  
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Further Research Scope  
 
Several areas serve as a future research agenda based on the findings of the thesis. 
Theoretically, Japan can provide more case studies to test the logical consistency of 
NCR. First, there could be a similar research study on Japan’s security policy 
development during the period before and after the Cold War (i.e. the period between 
the mid-1980s and the 1990s) during which Japan experienced a structural change in the 
balance of power with a purported departure from the post-WWII period. With 
consideration of domestic-level factors, research into how Japan developed with a new 
grand strategy, or the lack thereof, in response to the structure is fruitful. It can 
potentially capture the nascent grand strategic adjustment from almost complete absence 
in the balance of power to hedging. Examining how domestic factors come into play not 
only provides us with another clue to understanding Japan’s enigmatic behaviour but 
also gives us an avenue to test NCR.  
 
Turning to more empirically specific scopes, due to the limit of the research time frame, 
the thesis cannot provide a full picture of the constitutional revision because it has yet to 
take place. It thus cannot yet verify a causal mechanism of the state-society relations (i.e. 
the public and societal groups). Continued research, therefore, is meaningful for full 
verification of the intervening variables. In the alternative, statistical analysis could be 
useful in visualising the impact of the public on security policy outcome, which to the 
best of the author’s knowledge is yet to be conducted.  
 
Second, although the thesis aims to capture Japan’s shift in grand strategy through the 
two case studies, the scope can be widened with more reference to China. In other 
words, examining balancing behaviour requires not only BMD but also other areas, 
specifically balancing against China through means such as offshore defence 
capabilities and Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capacity. This would examine the 
extent to which Japan’s newly developed/acquired military capabilities can 
counter-balance against China.  
 
Third, the analysis shows somewhat unexpectedly the potential intervening variables 
that are not incorporated. Seiken-unyou nouryoku (‘the administration capacity of the 
government’) somehow separates the public from the controversial security policy 
legislatures. Related to political stability, there is a growing tendency of the public to 
cherish the administration capacity as a voting preference despite the Cabinet’s attempts 
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to enact the publicly disliked security legislations, which requires a more thorough 
examination.  
 
Last, it is also interesting to provide an account as to why and how some of the 
institutionally embedded antimilitarism remained, and others did not. For instance, it is 
still unknown why the 1% GDP annual defence budget limit was not eliminated through 
the shift of grand strategy, as it is more costly than maintaining the status quo military 
capability.  
 
Future Implications of Japan’s Security Policy  
 
The thesis lastly attempts to propose a future implication of Japan’s security policy 
based on the NCR analysis. As NCR shares realism’s fundamental principle that the 
structure is the most influential determinant, Japan will be likely to complete its shift to 
the offensive realist inspired grand strategy through acquiring more offensive, power 
projection capabilities to balance vis-à-vis China and North Korea. This is particularly 
true with regard to China because it is extremely likely that China will continue to rise 
with more aggressive behaviour, at least in the foreseeable future. Given the weakened 
institutional barriers in Japan, it seems that not much will prevent Japan from becoming 
more engaged in counter-balancing. 
 
Turning to North Korea, the tension as of today seems relaxed after the US–Pyongyang 
meeting in June, at least to the public eye. However, given the extreme ambiguity of the 
agreement and its unknown implications on the denuclearisation of the Korean 
Peninsula, the deployment of nuclear weapons on the Peninsula by North Korea and the 
US will not be promising (Personal Communication, 2018). This is all the more 
uncertain given that the content of the US agreement with North Korea in the 1990s is 
substantially similar. The situation could create a huge gap between leaders and the 
public in terms of the perception of threat, the latter of which is significantly reduced by 
the reduction of North Korean missile tests from 16 in 2017 to none in 2018. Japan may 
face difficulty in mobilising political resources to counter-balance against North Korea 
that conveniently serves as an effective mechanism to counter-balance against China at 
the same time through BMD. The absence of North Korea as a public appeal will 
probably force Japan to make a choice: openly counter-balance against China or return 
to the slow ambiguous counter-balancing behaviour (although NCR strongly supports 




This is related to the future of BMD and the US-Japan alliance. The nature of BMD is to 
address ICBM regardless of geographical proximity. Japan has already allowed the 
partial exercise of CSD to protect the US by addressing a ballistic missile launched 
towards the US. Given the unprecedented level of integration of the two militaries over 
BMD, the alliance will increasingly strengthen. This is unless both felt that BMD is 
unnecessary, which is unlikely to happen given the costs they hitherto spent and the role 
it played to strengthen the alliance. It is already hard to differentiate the US and 
Japanese Aegis destroyers in times of actual operations as both share information 
instantly, are obligated to protect each other, and have a joint task force and command 
that constructs a strategy on a daily basis. With the initial fear of disturbance of the 
alliance gone in the two years since the inauguration of Trump as US president, it is 
almost unthinkable that the alliance will disintegrate.  
 
The future of constitutional revision is probably the most uncertain area, partly because 
Japan never revised the constitution nor held a referendum since WWII. However, 
whilst the probability is unknown, the likelihood has been greater than ever given the 
progress Japan made thus far. It formally established the procedure of the constitutional 
revision in 2007, proposed a quasi-agreement of the contents of the revision as the 
ruling party and has had the supermajority to pass the revision to proceed to a national 
referendum—the degree of maturity never seen before. Furthermore, the most 
pro-constitutional revision leader, Abe, was re-elected as president of the LDP and 
prime minister until 2021. If the national referendum was not in favour of the revision 
in a couple of years’ time, Japan might miss the most favourable moment to revise. If it 
does, Japan will need, at least, a number of years—possibly a decade even—which will 
be a huge setback for implementing an offensive realist grand strategy. If that happens, 
Japan may readjust its strategy in accordance with domestic politics at the time.  
 
There are several implications if the revision occurs. The revision itself has a symbolic 
significance for anti-militarism, which will be largely diminished and unable to play as 
much a role of a guardian to prevent Japan from counter-balancing as before. In fact, 
there are still a large number of proponents who believe the SDF is ‘unconstitutional’. 
Given the current idea of the revision, which includes the stipulation of the SDF as 
constitutional, this radical view to always oppose any initiatives of SDF activities will 
be gone. Third, the current plan is to allow the possession of a minimally armed 
organisation required for self-defence, whilst the remaining clause prohibits the 
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possession of ‘war potential’, which is rather inconsistent given the interpretation that 
the armed organisation itself is arguably war potential. This suggests that a new series of 
interpretations of the newly revised constitution will emerge, rendering past 
interpretations ineffective. Thus, even with the current plan of revision, which seems 
moderate to most of the public, there is a likelihood that Japan further accelerates its 
balancing behaviour at the point at which the constitution is revised.  
 
It is beyond the scope of the thesis to predict how likely it is that Japan will see a direct 
confrontation with China in the future. In fact, Japan has experienced an aggravating 
strategic environment with the rise of China, together with more aggressive behaviours 
in the region. So far Japan does not show any sign of confronting China and will be 
likely to continue this stance in the foreseeable future. However, with the very-tightened 
up structure of the US-Japan alliance, which sees China as a common threat with the 
potential to be a hegemon, a confrontation or even war seems inevitable—and the 
likelihood might increase with constitutional revision. Whether or not Japan can avoid 
the Thucydides Trap will seemingly depend on future leaders and will provide a future 





The List of Interviews  
# Date Name Position 
1 14/07/2018 Takashi Genda The Former ASDF member (Major General) 
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Director) 
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11 02/08/2018 Toshiaki Miura Asahi Shimbun Journalist 
12 02/08/2018 Anonymous Asahi Shimbun Journalist  
13 04/08/2018 Dr Masahiro Kohara Professor at the University of Tokyo 
(previously working for the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs)  
14 04/08/2018 Anonymous  Professor at the Housei University  
15 06/08/2018 Anonymous  The former executive at the Mitsubishi 
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16 07/08/2018 Anonymous  GR Japan (political consultancy company)  
17 07/08/2018 Anonymous  GR Japan (political consultancy company) 
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22 19/08/2018 Anonymous  Working for the Ministry of Finance  
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Boueichou no Gaisan Yosan [According to the Budget Request from the Defense Agency, 
140billion Yen will be spent to deploy BMD by 2006]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2003g, December 19 2003). Misairu Bouei Dounyu Kettei Seihu Kitachousen 
wo Nentou ni Bei Shisutem Kounyu [the Government decided to introduce BMD by 
purchasing the US system with the response to North Korea]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2003h, May 24 2003). Misairu Bouei Giron Kasoku he Houteki Seiri nado 
Kadai Shushou Bei to no Kyoryoku Goui [the Prime Minister agreed to cooperate with 
the US, facilitating the discussion of BMD, with the hurdles such as Legal 
Arrangements]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2003i, 3 April 2003). Misairu Bouei Minshu ni Sekkyoku ron Koizumi Shushou 
Yotou heno Taikousaku [the DPJ keen on BMD as a Countermeasure against Koizumi 
and the Ruling Party]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2003j, June 5 2003). Misairu Bouei, 2dankai Geigeki wo Kentou, Boueichou, 
Gaisan Youkyuu he [Two-Layers Missile Defense System in Consideration, the Defense 
Agency Intends to Request Budget for it]. Asahi Shimbun  
Asahi Shimbun. (2003k, April 3 2003). Seihu Misairu Bouei wo Kentou Patorioto PAC3 
Rainendo Dounyuni Muke [the Government Considers BMD and Introduces PAC3 for 
the Next Year Deployment ]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2003l, April 14 2003). Teki Kichi Kougeki Nouryoku Ron no Shini Kasoku suru 
Neo Kokubouzoku Kitachousen Tai Kitachousen [the Truth of Counter Strike 
Capabilities, Acceleration of Neo-Kokubozoku Discussion against North Korea]. Asahi 
Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004a, October 11 2004). Bei Iijisukan Niigatani Jimoto ha Teikoukan Kyou 
nimo MD Haibi no Ikkan [the US Aegis Destroyer will arrive in Niigata today as part of 
deployment Plan of MD with some resistance from the public ]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004b, November 30 2004). Buki Yushutsu Sangensoku no Hyoumei Kanbou 
Choukan Danwa de Shin Bouei Taikou ni Meiki Senu Houshin [The revision of the 
Three Principles of Arms Export should be issued by the Danwa of the Cabinet Chief 
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Secretary not in the New National Defense Program Guidelines.] Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004c, January 17 2004). Gekirei Hantai Jieitai Iraku Hohei de Kouen Shukai  
[Encouragement and Opposition Regarding the Dispatch of the SDF to Iraq - meetings 
and speeches]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004d, May 1 2004). Kaiken Giron Tou wo Koe Kenpou Asahi Shimbun Yoron 
Chousa Kara [the Discussion of the Constitutional Revision goes beyond parties, 
according to the Asahi Shimbun Survey of the Public Poll on the Constitution]. Asahi 
Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004e, June 17 2004). Kaiken Ronten Seiri Tousoumu ni Houkoku Jimintou 
Kenpou Chousa Kai [the LDP committee of the Consitution issued the main points of 
the Revision to the Chair Person of the General Council in the LDP]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004f, May 1 2004). Kaiken Sansei 5wari Kosu 9jou kaisei 60% Hantai Asahi 
Shimbunsha Yoron Chousa [50% support the Constitutional Revision while 60% is 
opposed against the Revision of Article 9]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004g, January 15 2004). Kaikin Meguri Zure Senmei Ishiba Choukan Buki 
Yushutsu Sangensoku Minaoshi Hatsugen [Discrepancy is obvious in terms of 
reinterpretation of the Ban on Arms Export as Ishiba Director General of the DA states]. 
Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004h, July 16 2004). Keidanren Kaiken wo Giron 9Jou Shouten Toshiake 
Teigen Kentoui ga Hatsu Kaigou [the Keidanren intends to propose the Constitutional 
Revision Plan with the focus on Article 9, A Research Committee meeting]. Asahi 
Shimbun.  
Asahi Shimbun. (2004i, June 23 2004). Kenpou Kaisei An no Chukan Houkoku Minshu ga Seisiki 
ni Happyou [the DPJ officially Announced the interim report on the Consitutional 
Revision ]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004j, December 18 2004). Kenpou Kaisei Jieitai Senryoku Meiki wo Chihou 
Bunken Unagasu Nisshou Ikensho An [The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Revealed its Plan of the Official Statement that  the SDF should be Stipulated in the 
Consitution,, together with the promotion of Decentralization]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004k, July 8 2004). Kitachousen Shin Misairu Haibi  Knkokushi Houdou 
[North Korea deploys new missile according to South Korean Report]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004l, May 5 2004). Kitachousen Shin Misairu Kichi Nikasyo de Kensetsu 
Susumu Knkokushi Houdou [North Korea Began building new missile facilities in two 
places according to South Korean Report]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004m, August 24 2004). Koizumi Shushou Jouninri Mezasu Hyoumei he 
Kokuren Soukai Gen Kenpou no Mama [Koizumi stated at the UN General Assembly 
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that Japan will aim to be a Perment Member with the Consitution, remaining 
unchanged]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004n, January 15 2004). Koizumi Shushou Kaiken Minshu to Kyouryoku mo 
Kyougi Jitsugen ni Kitai Shimesu [Prime Minister Koizumi Expects that the LDP should 
Cooperate with the DPJ over the issue of the Constitutional Revision]. Asahi Shimbun.  
Asahi Shimbun. (2004o, January 14 2004). Koizumi Shushou Minaoshi MD ni Gentei Buki 
Yushutsu Sangensoku [[Prime Minister Koizumi  stated that the revision of the Three 
Principles of Arms Export should be limited to BMD]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004p, October 3 2004). Koumei Kenpou 9Jou mo Kaken Taishou Undou 
Houshin Toutaikai ni Teian he [Komeitou intends to Propose at the Party's Congress 
that Article 9 is also considered as 'adding' to the Consitituion]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004q, October 6 2004). Koumei Reigai Mitomeru Bei ni Gijutsu Iten MD 
Gentei Buki Yushutsu 3gensoku [Komeito Accepts the Technological Transfer to the US 
as an Exception with a condition that it is limited to MD - the Ban on Arms Export]. 
Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004r, June 25 2004). Sanin Kouhosya Seiji Shisei no Chigai Senmei Asahi 
Toudai Kyoudou Chousa Kara [Stark Discrepancy in Political Stance amongst the 
Candidates for the Upper House Election according to the Joint Survey by the University 
of Tokyo and Asahi]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004s, January 8 2004). Shinnenkai de Jougai Zetsusen Shushou Renritsu de 
Kaiken wo Kan shi Jibun de An Dasu [A Quarrel at the New Year's Party: the Prime 
Minister insists Cooperation with the DPJ to put forward the Revision while Kan claims 
the DPJ will issue the Plan on its own]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2004t, November 15 2004). Ugokidasu Misaairu Bouei - Gunji Henkaku no 
Nami Jieitai 50nwn [the Begining of BMD: Military Reform and 50 years of the SDF]. 
Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2005a, February 22 2005). Asahi Shinbunsha Yoron Chousa Sitsumon to Kaitou 
[Questions and Answers of the Asahi Shimbun Survey of the Public Poll]. Asahi 
Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2005b, January 21 2005). Bunmin Tousei Kakuho Mezasu Misairu Geigeki 
Syushou ga Jijen Shounin [Aim for securing Civilian Control, Prior Approval of the 
Prime Minister is Necessary for addressing Missiles]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2005c, May 3 2005). Jieitai Kitei wo 7wari 9jou Hantai 51% [70% for the 
Stipulation of the SDF while 51% is opposed against the revision of Article 9, According 
to the Asahi Survey]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2005d, October 29 2005). Jimintou Shin Kenpou Souan (Zenbun) [the LDP's 
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Plan of the Constitutional Revision (the Whole Sentences)]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2005e, October 4 2005). Kaiken Tejun Kyokusetsu no Kan Yoyatou tomo 
Chouseinan Kokumin Touhyou Hou 6nichi ni Tokubetsui Sutaato [the Bill for the 
National Referendum will be discussed at the Special Committee: Difficuly reamains as 
to the Reaching An Agreement both in Ruling and Opposition Parties]. Asahi Shimbun.  
Asahi Shimbun. (2005f, August 26 2005). Kenryku no Bousou wo Tomero, Kokumin Shintou no 
Kouyaku 2005 Sousenkyo [Stop the Abuse of the Right!, the Manifesto of the PNP, the 
2005 General Election]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2005g, February 11 2005). Kitachousen Senmei Odoshi wo Yamete Sekini ni 
Tsuke  [North Korean Statement, Stop threatening and Begin Negotiation]. Asahi 
Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2005h, August 18 2005). Kokumin Shintou Hataage Shu San 5nin Sanka 
Daihyou ni Watanukishi 2005 Sousenkyo [The begining of the PNP 5 participants from 
both Upper and Lower House, Mr Watanuki is the President of the Party, the 2005 
General Election]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2005i, December 24 2005). MD Kyoudou Kaihatsu ni Chakushu Rainendo 
Kaijou Haibigatade Kakugi Kettei [Japan started a joint-research on MD next year as the 
Cabinet Decision - sea-based deployment of BMD]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2005j, July 16 2005). Misairu Bouei PAC3 Kokunai Seisan Mitsubishi Jukou 
Nendonei ni Keiyaku Kostodaka no Kanousei [Mitsubishi Heavy Industry will Sign the 
Contract to Produce PAC3 for BMD with a possibility of more expensive projects]. 
Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2005k, February 4 2005). Misairu Geigeki Kokai Houkoku Gimuzukezu Jieitai 
Hou Kaiseian Kakugi Kettei he [The Cabinet Decision to revise the SDF Law without an 
Obligation to report to the Diet regarding addressing Missiles]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2005l, July 21 2005). PAC3, Dai4 Koushagun ni Haibi 08nendo Ikou Boueichou 
Houshin Gihu Shirayama nado Kouho [PAC3 will be deployed in the Fourth Air Defense 
Missile Group from 2008 onwards as part of the DA's plan and Gihu and Hausan will be 
other candidates]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2005m, January 19 2005). Rongi Seikai to Hochou Bouei Sangyou wo Atooshi 
Keidanren [Keidanren Supports the Cabinet to Advance the Domestic Defense Industry]. 
Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2005n, January 13 2005). Shudanteki Jieiken Koushi no Kitei, Keidanren ga 
Meikaku ka Teigen he Kaiken An Gaiyou [Keidanren Publishes the plan of the Revision 




Asahi Shimbun. (2005o, August 20 2005). Sousenkyo Shouri demo Rainen 9gatsu Taijin Koizumi 
Shushou ga Hyoumei [Koizumi States that even though he wins the General Election, he 
will Resign by the Next September]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2005p, September 13 2005). Tou no Sonbou Tousyu Shidai Asahi Toudai 
Kyoudou Kenkyu [The Lifeline of the Party depends on  its President according to the 
joint-research by the University of Tokyo and Asahi]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2006a, November 11 2006). Abe Shushou Ninki Chu ni Kaiken 9Jou Hukume 
Iyoku Bei Ei Media ni [Prime Minister Abe is Keen on Revising the Consitution, 
including Article 9 to British and American Media]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2006b, September 30 2006). Abe Shushou no Moto ni Kenkyu han Setti 
Shudanteki Jieiken [A research team is established under Abe regarding h Right of 
Collective Self-Defense]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2006c, May 6 2006). Buki Yushutsu Sangensoku Kyuma shi Kanwa wo Zainichi 
Beigun no Kokunai Seibi Nentou  [Mr Kyuma advocates The revision of the Three 
Principles of Arms Export given the Domestic adjustment of the US military Bases in 
Japan]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2006d, June 13 2006). Junshisen no ODA Kyouyo wo Kakugi Kettei Abe 
Kanbou Choukan Buki Yushutsu Sangensoku no Reigai  [the Cabinet Decision to allow 
the Supply of ODA to Patrol Boats, According to the Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe, it is 
an Exception in terms of The revision of the Three Principles of Arms Export]. Asahi 
Shimbun.  
Asahi Shimbun. (2006e, December 7 2006). Kokumin Touhyou Houan Kokkaku Katamaru 
Seiritsu made nao Haadoru yotou 18sai Touhyou nado Ryousyou [the Basic Plan of the 
National Referendum Law seems Fixed despite the Existing Hurdles for the Enactment- 
the Ruling Coalition agreed to allow those who are over 18 to vote]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2006f, May 11 2006). Kon Kokkai Teistsu Konnan Ni Yotou Minshu Norazu 
Shinchou Kokumin Touhyuo Houan [It is unlikely that the Bill for the National 
Referendum will be Submitted, the Ruling Coalition will not Rely on the DPJ]. Asahi 
Shimbun.  
Asahi Shimbun. (2006g, February 12 2006). Kuni No Shinro Dokohni Kenkoku Kinenbi no hi 
Kyouto Shi nadode Shukai Houshukuha Koushitu Tenban Kaku [Those who are for and 
against the Revision both took place meetings Respectively on the National Foundation 
Day for Discussing the Celebration and the Imperial House Law]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2006h, July 11 2004). Misairu Bouei Kasokuron Maedaoshi hou Yosan ni Kabe 
Kitachousen Hasshano Hamon [the Impact of North Korean Missile Launch on the 
discussion of Missile Defense with the hurdles of Legal Arrangement and Budget]. Asahi 
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Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2006i, December 29 2006). Nichibei Gunji Kimitsu Hozen wo Kyouka Kyoutei 
Teiketsu he Bassoku Tekiyou mo Kakuadi [the US and Japan will strengthen the 
protection of information by signing an agreement with the expansion of punishment]. 
Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2006j, November 6 2006). Nihon Ban NSC Kaato Kyanberu Maiku Guriin 
[Japanese NSC, Cart Cambel Mike Green]. Asahi Shimbun Retrieved September 10, 
2018 from https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASKCQ6T4RKCQULFA028.html  
Asahi Shimbun. (2006k, September 23 2006). Shudanteki Jieiken Abeshi no Shin Kaishaku ha 
Nichibei Doumei Kyouka Nerai [Abe puts forwards a new Interpretation to allow the 
Right of Collective Self-Defense to Strengthen the US-Japan Security Alliance]. Asahi 
Shimbun.  
Asahi Shimbun. (2006l, September 12 2006). Shudanteki Jieiken Koushi ha Kaiken Hitsuyou 
Mitarai Keidanren Kaichou ga Kenkai [Mitarai, the President of the Keidanren puts 
forward his view that the Allowance of the Right of Collective Self-Defense should be 
done through the Constitutional Revision]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2006m, May 2 2006). Shudanteki Jieiken Koushi Kenpou ni Meikiwo Kansi 
Keizai Douyuukai ga Meigen [the Allowance of the Right of Collective Self-Defense 
should be Stipulated in the Consitution, proposed by the KANSAI Association of 
Corporate Executives]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2006n, August 2 2006). Tanigaki shi Shudan Jieiken no Koushi wo Senmei ni 
"Kaiken Zentei" Jimintou Shousai Shen [the LDP Presidential Election, Tanigaki Made 
it Clear that the Right of Collective Sef-Defense is to be Allowed with the premise of the 
Constitutional Revision]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2006o, March 16 2006). Uinii ni Seihu Oteage Tsuzuku Kimitsu Jouhou 
Ryusyutsu Saidai no Taisaku ga Shiyou Jishuku [the Goverment at the mercy of Winny 
with a series of leaks of classified Information, the Measure is to 'refrain from using']. 
Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2007a, March 8 2007). Abe Shusou Kaishaku Henkou Unagasu Shudanteki 
Jieiken Koushi Younin he Houseikyoku Kensei  [Abe Promotes the Interpretation to 
allow the Right of Collective Self-Defense and Put a first Strike Against the Cabinet 
Legislative Bureau]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2007b, June 29 2007). Beikoku muke Dandou Misairu Abe Shushou ga Geigeki 
Hitsuyousei Kyouchou Yushikishakon [the Prime Minister Abe emphasizes the need for 
strike capabilities for Ballistic Missiles towards the US at the Private Advisory Board]. 
Asahi Shimbun   
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Asahi Shimbun. (2007c, October 22 2007). Daijin Touben Mae ni Tsutaezu Boueishounai ni 
Kentoukai Kaiji Kyuuyu Ayamari [the Misrecord of the amount of Oil Supply by the 
MSDF was not reported before the Ministerial Speech at the Diet - A Team will be 
organised]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2007d, May 4 2009). Gaikokujin Shimedasu Koyou Kokusai Kouken Dekinu 
Kenpou Goken Kaiken ha Shukai [the Consitution - pushing away Foreign Workers and 
unable to contribute internationally - meetings of the Groups for the Constitutional 
Revision and against it]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2007e, March 28 2007). Hantai Minshu Yurui Kokumin Touhyou Houan 
Kessokuryoku Dou Iji Ozawashi Sanpi Kakae Shounenba  [the DPJ is Opposed against 
the National Referendum Law, a weak political Platform over it, Ozawa is at the Critical 
Juncture with both supports and oppositions for the Law]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2007f, April 21 2007). Himitsu Hogo Hou Kentou he Kaigi Kimitsu Rouei ni 
Genbatsu Jimin ga Raigetsu Secchi [the LDP will hold a meeting team for the Secrecy 
Law to strengthen the punishment on the leak of classified information]. Asahi Shimbun. 
Asahi Shimbun. (2007g, October 23 2007). Ishiba Boueisou Yobi Fukufa Shushou ga Genju 
Chuii Hushouzi meguru Mondai de [the Prime Minister Fukuda Calls for Ishiba and 
Severally Warns him over the issues of scandals]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2007h, August 1 2007). Kaiji Iijisu kan Beiga Buhin Kyoukyu Ichiji Teishi 
Sngetsu Nihon ni Jouhou Hozen Motome [the US temporarily suspended the supply of 
the Parts to the MSDF due to the request to Japan to protect classified information]. 
Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2007i, January 18 2007). Kaiken Koso Abe Shushou Kowadaka Sidouryoku 
Enshutsu ni Yakki Koumei Shoutenka ha Jiki Shousou [Abe Loudly Insists the 
Constitutional Revision with the attempt to highlight his Leadership while Komeito 
maintains that it is too early to make it a Focal Point]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2007j, March 13 2007). Kokumin Touhyou Houan Dousuru Abe Shushou 
Kenpou Kinenbi Seiritsu ni Kodawarazu [What to do with the National Referendum Law, 
Abe does not mind the Enactment on the Constitutional Memorial Day]. Asahi 
Shimbun.  
Asahi Shimbun. (2007k, January 20 2007). Kokumin Touhyou Houan ha Seijihandan Hitsuyou 
Minshu Hatoyama Kanjichou [the DPJ, Hatoyama States that Political Decision is 
necessary for the National Referendum Law]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2007l, March 21 2007). Kokumin Touhyou Houan Jiminnai ni Iron Tousyo no 
Yoyatou An de [the National Referendum Law The Divergence of Opinion within the 
LDP with a preference on the Original Plan by the Ruling Coalition]. Asahi Shimbun.   
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Asahi Shimbun. (2007m, January 25 2007). Kokumin Touhyou Houan Minshu Sanpi Sakiokuri 
Saninsen no Shoutenka Ozasa Shi Kamawanu [The DPJ Decided not to Put Forward the 
National Referendum Law, making it A Focal Point in the General Election, Ozawa does 
not Mind]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2007n, May 11 2007). Koumei Koushi Younin wo Kensei Shudanteki Jieiken 
Kenkyu [Komeito Warns the initiative for the Research on the Right of Collective 
Self-Defense]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2007o, June 22 2007). Koushi Younin Jigoku he no Michi Tsujimoto Kiyomi 
SHamintou Seishin Kaichou Dairi [the Allowance of the Right of Collective Self-Defense 
is a road to hell Says Kiyomi Tsujimoto, the Deputy Chief of the Research Council of the 
SDP]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2007p, December 13 2007). Kyouiku You Kopii Kakusan Zusan Kanri ni Mesu 
Kaijou Jieitai Iijisu Kan Jouhou Rouoei [the Classified Information of Aegis Destroyers of 
the MSDF is leaked, the Revalation that Copies of information for 'educational purposes' 
are spreat]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2007q, June 6 2007). Kyoukouteki Shudan Kanarazu Shipai Ishiba Shigeru  
jimintou Kenpou Shin Jimu Kyokuchou [A way to Railroad will Always Fail, Says Shigeru 
Ishiba, the Executive Director of the Committee of the Consitution]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2007r, September 24 2007). Osozaki Chouseigata Kuroko Yaku de Toukaku 
Fukuda Shin Sousai Jinbutsu Kenkyu [the Research on Fukuda as the New President of 
the LDP - late commer, the role of adjustment and working behind the scene]. Asahi 
Shimbun.  
Asahi Shimbun. (2007s, March 8 2007). Shudan Jieiken no Kenkyu Abe Shushou ga Keturon 
Isogu Kangae [Abe wants to see the Conclusion of the research about the Right of 
Collective Self-Defense]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2007t, July 20 2007). Shudanteki Jieiken Younin Hurenu Abe Shushou Koumei 
Shinchou Shisei Kuzusazu Saninsen [Towards the General Election, while Abe did not 
Touch the Allowance of the Right of Collective Self-Defense, Koumei did not Change its 
Cautious Stance]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2007u, March 11 2007). Uchuu Kihon Hou Nekki to Keikai Bouei Riyou Kaikin 
he Seitei no Ugoki [the Basic Space Law with Enthusiasm and Caution, a movement 
towards the Relaxation of the Use for Defensive Purposes]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2008, May 3 2008). 9Jou Kaenai Yoron Modoru Kaeru 23% Kaenai 66% [Back 
to the Past, the Poll Suggests that 23% for the Revisin of Article 9  while 66% is 




Asahi Shimbun. (2009a, May 4 2009). 9Jou mamori Heiwa HAsshin Kenpou 60nen Kaiken 
Goken Uttae Atsuku [the Protection of Article 9 as the Constitutional Role to Promopte 
Peace, those who promote the revision and the protection Passionately Debated]. Asahi 
Shimbun.  
Asahi Shimbun. (2009b, August 5 2009). Anpo Giron Nerau Jimin Shudanteki Jieiken 
Minaoshiwo Houkokusho Minshu nerinaoshihe [the LDP with the aime to revise 
security Policy with the report to advocate the Right of Collective Self-Defense while the 
DPJ will re-plan ]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2009c, September 1 2009). Asahi Toudai Kyoudou Chousa Minshu Sorowanu 
Shisen Singhiin Tounai mo Sya, Kuni tomo Sousenkyo [Different aims amongst the new 
Politicians in the DPJ, the same Goes for the SDP and the PNP according to the 
joint-research by the University of Tokyo and Asahi]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2009d, May 30 2009). Buki Yushutsu Sangensoku Tsuyomaru Kanwa no Koe 
Jimin Gyoukai Gijtsutu Okureru Koumei Nashi Kuzushi Keikai   [A growing voice for 
The revision of the Three Principles of Arms Export. While the LDP and the Defense 
Industry are concerned for going behind technologically, Komeitou is concerned for the 
limit of the revision]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2009e, December 27 2009). Hatoyama Shushou Kenpou ni Genkyu Kuni 
Chihou Kankei Mazu Tou de [Prime Minister Hatoyama mentioned the Consitution, 
Things in relation to Local and National Politics should be decided by the Party at first]. 
Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2009f, November 3 2009). Hirano Kanbou Choukan no Hatsugen ni Hamon 
Houseikyoku no Kaishaku Kenpou no Toutatsuten Minaoshi Warukunai [A Controversy 
around the Statement of Hirano, the Chief Cabinet Secretary "Reaching the limit of 
Discussion with the CLB's past interpretations and not bad to revise"]. Asahi Shimbun.  
Asahi Shimbun. (2009g, November 25 2009). Jieikan Zouin Miokuri Beikichi Shakuchi Ryou 
Youkyu Doori Jigyou Shiwake Kyou  [the Postponement of the Increase in the SDF 
Members while the Request for Expenditures for the US Bases was Approved Budget 
Screening Starts Today]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2009h, June 2 2009). Keidanren VS Minshutou Saguriai Ryou Toppu 3nenburi 
Kyougi [Keidanren VS Minshutou the top of the both Seeks for Cooperation, a meeting 
for the first time for the last three years]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2009i, May 2 2009). Kenpou Iji Nejuyoi Koe Kenpou Kaisei de [the Strong 
Opposition against the Constitutional Revision of Article 9, According to the Asahi 
Survey]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2009j, November 3 2009). Shinseiken Kenpou Dokoe Minshu Ozawashi Hou 
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no Bannin Huuji [A new Cabinet, where the Issue of the Consitution is? the DPJ, Ozawa 
Did not Act on the Gurdian of the Law]. Asahi Shimbun.   
Asahi Shimbun. (2009k, April 10 2009). Tai Kitachousen Ayaui Kyoukou Ron Jimin Nai Dokuji 
no Kougekiryoku Giron Sengo no Giron Naozari [The Danger of Hawkish Debates in 
response to North Korea, the LDP 'Own Strike Capabilities should be Discussed' with 
the negligence of the post-war discussion]. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2009l, November 11 2009). Teikou Daijin Haya Zokuzoku Jigyou Shiwake Kyou 
Chakushu [A number of Opposing Ministers, Budget Screening Starts Today]. Asahi 
Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2009m, June12 2009). Teki Kichi Kougeki Nouryoku Hoyuu ha Kiken na 
Hiasobi Kitachousen Nion Zendo ga Houhuku Kennai  [Counter Strike Capabilities is 
'Playing with Fire' , North Korea warns that the entire Japan will be in a scope of 
retaliation. Asahi Shimbun   
Asahi Shimbun. (2010a, December 4 2010). Bei Igai tono Buki Kyoudou Kaihatsu Kaikin ni 
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